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This dissertation is the first historically balanced and comparative study on 
civilian and enlisted Filipinos in the U.S. Navy (USN), and in other branches of the U.S. 
military. Filipino civilians were native-born Philippine locals recruited by U.S. military 
officials to work under indefinite civilian contract within U.S. military bases in the 
Philippines, Okinawa, Guam, and elsewhere in Asia and the Pacific. These civilians often 
worked in positions of manual and technical labor within these bases. In turn, Filipino 
enlistees were native-born locals in the Philippine archipelago who U.S. military officials 
recruited in its enlisted force. The terms of their enlistment normally lasted between four 
to six years, with probable chances for re-enlistment.  
Drawing upon the oral historical records of such Filipino American historians as 
Fred Cordova and Riz Oades, I examine how the experiences of Filipinos shaped—and 
were facilitated by—the United States Navy since the end of the nineteenth century. In 
addition, I build on their works methodologically by investigating more than 1,500 pages 
of written correspondences, letters, and memorandums within—and between—U.S. and 
Philippine military officials, political officials, military personnel, and civilian citizens 
regarding Filipino enlistment policies. Historiographically, this dissertation departs from 
the previous work of a plethora of scholars—including Yen Le Espiritu, Paul A. Kramer, 
and Gary Gerstle—by assessing and theorizing the conflations of race, gender, and 





of U.S.-Philippine relations. I coin this bi-national condition as the ―U.S.-Philippine 
nation.‖ 
Nevertheless, while previous scholars have assumed a linear imperial history of 
U.S. empire in the Philippines from formal (1898-1945) to informal (1946-present), I 
make an underlying argument that the U.S. Empire behaved formally in certain ways, and 
informally in other contexts that were contingent upon the degrees of U.S. officials‘ 
anxiety and immediacy in securing their imperial project within the same region and time 
period: including and beyond the colonial Philippines. Subsequently, the simultaneous 
formal—and informal—practices of the U.S.-Philippine nation state further shaped the 
restrictive politics of Filipino enlistment, including the recruitment and marginalization 
of Filipino enlistees and civilians in the U.S. forces. Although Filipino enlistees were 
more geographically and upwardly mobile than their civilian counterparts within the 
global U.S. nation-state, their initial assignments in menial forms of labor (as cooks or 
stewards) often made the conditions of their enlistment parallel to the Filipino civilian 
workers. 
By closely investigating the unique historical distinctions and comparisons 
between enlisted and civilian Filipinos within (and beyond) the U.S. Navy, I explore the 
following questions within the contexts of empire, militarism, and bi-national 
recognition. When and why did U.S. military officials enlist Filipinos in the first place? 
Second, what political implications did Filipino recruitment serve in expanding U.S. 
practices of war, occupation, and colonial governance in the Philippines—and elsewhere 
in Asia and the Trans-Pacific? And third, to what extent did these recruited Filipinos 





parametrical restrictions by the U.S. military and the nation-state? Based from these 
underlying questions and frameworks within this dissertation, I argue that the inclusive 
and restrictive politics of Filipino enlistment, coupled with the intricate bi-nationalities of 
U.S.-Philippine relations vitally contributed to the Cold War imperial politics and 
multiethnic alliances within the U.S. Empire nation-state. These seemingly contradictory 
politics of enlisting Filipinos played a key role in shaping militarized formations of the 
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The words above were spoken by a retired U.S. Navy enlistee as he was reflecting 
in hindsight on his thirty-year service in the U.S. Navy (1945 to 1975). This enlistee of 
Philippine descent was a civilian worker in one of the military bases in the Philippines 
during the Japanese occupation in World War II. After the U.S. atomic bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki that promptly led to the end of the Second World War, this 
Filipino civilian worker decided to apply for the U.S. Navy at Sangley Point in Cavite 
City, Philippines. By September 22, 1945, this Filipino civilian worker became an 
enlistee as he was one of the very few ‗good men‘ who were accepted in to the U.S. Navy 
during that time. U.S. Navy officials‘ acceptance of this enlistee marked the beginning of 
a thirty-year tenure that included promotion to chief petty officer in 1959, access to 
citizenship and the benefits of the G.I. Bill, and geographic mobility and settlement in the 
following military stations of enlistment: San Diego and Lemoore, California; Pusan, 
Korea; Newport, Rhode Island; Groton, Connecticut; Seattle, Washington; and Naples, 
Italy. 
The name of this Filipino enlistee is my grandfather, or lolo: Bonifacio Luna. Mr. 
Luna was one of the 22,000+ Filipinos who joined the U.S. Navy between 1944 and 
1973. As an appointed enlistee throughout his naval career, Mr. Luna received access to 
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U.S. citizenship and veterans‘ benefits which was part and parcel of the U.S.‘s politics of 
Filipino inclusion in its nation-state. The U.S.‘s politics of enlistment, for Navy Filipinos, 
entailed empowering degrees of upward mobility within the ranks and files of the U.S. 
military in particular, and the U.S. nation-state in general. For U.S. officials, the politics 
of Filipino enlistment meant the continuing ideological facilitations and practical 
manifestations of the U.S.-Philippine nation-state in a time of postwar economic 
rehabilitation, strategic hegemony as a leader of the ‗free world‘ against the ideological 
perils of communism, and the continuum of the colonial relationship between the U.S. 
and the Philippines. These politics of enlistment were exercised and enforced as much by 
the upward mobility and inclusion of Filipinos in the nation-state as the restricted and 
exclusive positioning of Filipino enlistees as stewards in the U.S. Navy and other 
branches of the military. Such restrictive and exclusive positions of enlistment also 
applied to Mr. Luna. Though promoted as chief petty officer during the middle and latter 
half of his naval career, U.S. naval officials often designated him strictly to duties of 
stewardship throughout most of his naval career. 
But what about some of the other 22,000 Filipino enlistees, along with the dozens 
of thousands of Filipino civilians, who worked in the U.S. Navy and other branches of the 
military?  To what extent were they included and positioned by U.S. military officials in 
the U.S. nation-state in the same way that Mr. Luna was during his naval tenure? How 
did Filipinos respond to the politics of their civilian and enlisted work in the U.S. 
military? And last but not least, in what ways did the continuities and changes in the 
politics of Filipino enlistment facilitate U.S. global (and domestic) militarisms during the 




This dissertation examines the trans-local sites of Filipino enlistment, experience, 
and subjectivity in the United States Navy and other branches of the military within the 
broader global context of the U.S. Empire and Cold War politics. I argue that these trans-
local experiences and histories must be examined in relation to what I call the Cold War‘s 
―politics of recognition‖, which I explain further in this chapter. In particular, this project 
delineates the comparative histories of two types of Filipino workers within and beyond 
the U.S. Navy: civilians and enlistees. Filipino civilian workers were native-born 
Philippine locals recruited by U.S. military officials to work under indefinite civilian 
contract on U.S. military bases in the Philippines, Okinawa, Guam, and elsewhere in Asia 
and the Pacific. These civilians often worked in positions of manual and technical labor 
within these bases. In turn, Filipino enlistees were native-born locals in the Philippine 
archipelago who U.S. military officials recruited into its enlisted force. The terms of their 
enlistment normally lasted between four to six years, with the possibility of re-enlistment. 
On the one hand, these enlistees‘ physical inclusion and upward mobility within the U.S. 
nation-state, and its imperial bases across the globe, differentiated their conditions of 
enlistment from that of their civilian counterparts. On the other hand, their initial 
assignments in menial forms of labor (as stewards) often made their experiences parallel 
to Filipino civilian workers. In other words, the divergent experiences between enlisted 
and civilian Filipino laborers actually resulted in their convergence. 
By investigating the historical similarities and distinctions between Filipino 
civilian and enlisted workers in U.S. forces, this dissertation addresses the following 
questions. When and why did U.S. military officials enlist Filipinos in the first place? 




shaping of U.S. practices of colonial governance, war, and militarism in the Philippines 
and elsewhere in Asia and the Trans-Pacific? And third, to what extent were these 
recruited Filipinos able to forge and negotiate their own terms of enlistment, upward 
mobility and subjectivity within—and despite—the restrictive politics of their inclusion 
within the U.S. military and its nation-state? 
Over the course of this dissertation, I make three overarching arguments. One, the 
origins of United States Navy (USN) Filipino enlistment lay in the immediate aftermath 
of the Spanish-American War of 1898. Within this context, U.S. officials enlisted as 
many as 500 Filipinos in the U.S. naval force. These Navy Filipinos, in turn, aided the 
U.S. against Philippine nationals in the Philippine-American War (1899-1913).  This 
politics of enlistment endured unevenly throughout the twentieth century, and 
geographically across global bases of the U.S. military, over the course of its exponential 
escalations (including World War I and especially World War II). Two, during and after 
the Second World War, the continuation of policies that enlisted Filipinos played a vital 
role in creating a powerful bi-national feeling of partnership between United States and 
Philippine officials and personnel. The formation of this ―imagined community,‖ as 
Benedict Anderson might put it, was underwritten by the formalization of official policies 
and treaties, and I call this phenomenon the emergence of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation.‖ 
And third, coupled with the bi-national emergence of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖, the 
overlapping and competing politics of enlistment contributed to the Cold War imperial 
politics and the rising dominance of the U.S. Empire nation-state. On the one hand, the 
competing politics of Filipino enlistment existed in vertical and horizontal modes within 




and exclusion of Filipinos within these bases foreground affiliations among Filipino 
enlistees with United States imperial politics in the early Cold War period.
2
 
The remaining sections in this introductory chapter trace the underlying 
conceptual frameworks, research methodology, historiographical interventions, and 
structural outline shaping the overarching arguments and scope of this dissertation. 
 
The Politics of Enlistment 
 
I coined the phrase ―politics of enlistment‖ in order to capture the multiple 
meanings and repercussions of U.S. officials‘ enlistment of foreign nationals and racial 
minorities, specifically Filipino laborers. What did the enlistment of foreign nationals and 
racial minorities mean to U.S. diplomatic, political, and military officials who anxiously 
sought to sustain, enforce, and popularize their ideologies of democracy, capitalism, and 
strategic military presence on a global scale? For Filipinos, particularly the civilian 
workers and enlisted personnel at the heart of this study, what did enlistment mean to 
them in their struggles for survival, basic sustenance, and upward mobility, especially in 
relation to middle-class standards in the United States during the early Cold War period? 
And for other racial and ethnic minorities, including African Americans, Arab/Arab 
Americans, Asian Americans, Latina/o Americans, Native Americans, and Pacific 
                                                 
2
 It was primarily among the intergenerational civilian descendants of these militarized workers where 
Filipino Americanist visions of what Sarita See would coin as ―the decolonized eye‖ became most evident, 
promising, and worthy of infinite dialectical revision. I recall the term ―Filipino Americanist‖ as a 
descriptive and adjective form of what Dylan Rodríguez articulates as ―Filipino Americanism.‖ According 
to Rodríguez, Filipino Americanism, ―as a discursive communal possibility and instigation of identity is 
unthink(ably) absent [in] its sturdy allegiance to the American civil society form, and as such must 
articulate through a generalized (if only sometimes ‗critical‘) allegiance to the political integrity and 
essentialized moral legitimacy of the United States of America in its localized institutionalizations… and as 
a putative ‗national‘ hegemony writ global‖ (Rodríguez 2010, 26-27). See Dylan Rodríguez, Suspended 
Apocalypse: White Supremacy, Genocide, and the Filipino Condition (Minneapolis: University of 





Islanders, what did enlistment mean to them in historical and political comparison with 
Filipino Americans? This dissertation, in varying degrees, addresses these contingently 
comparative historical paradigms within the scope and methods shaping the overarching 
arguments. 
Historiographically, the politics of enlistment derives and departs from a similar 
conceptual term associated with liberal multiculturalism: the politics of recognition. 
According to historian Paul A. Kramer, the politics of recognition are the parametrical 
meanings of U.S. racial inclusion in civil society and discourse.
 3
 So when it comes to the 
study of enlistees versus civilians, a theoretical framework that emphasizes a politics of 
recognition would conflate minority enlistees with civilians and include them in the same 
political category of scholarly analysis. Important distinctions between the two groups 
would not be acknowledged. In contrast, my conceptualization of the ―politics of 
enlistment‖ makes and assumes clear-cut distinction between the political recognition of 




“The U.S.-Philippine Nation”: A Wartime and Postwar Ideological Partnership 
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 Paul A. Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines (Chapel 
Hill: North Carolina Press, 2006), 18-19..  
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 On the one hand, I recognize and honor the necessity of politically conflating agents of civilian and 
military society in order to avoid commonsensical trappings of neo-liberal simplicities. For example, Keith 
Camacho and Setsu Shigematsu argue that neo-liberal frameworks emphasize the distinction between civil 
and military society while overlooking the common politics of knowledge production overlapping them. 
Or, for a more necessarily elaborative explanation, please see Keith Camacho and Setsu Shigematsu eds., 
Militarized Currents: toward a Decolonized Future in Asia and the Pacific (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2010), xxvi-xxvii. On the other hand, I believe it is also important not to overlook the 
disparate conditions of inclusion and exclusion that shape the politics of enlistment. The conditions of 
enlistment, as will be further elaborated and articulated in this dissertation, also defined and facilitated the 






The phenomenon of Filipino enlistment is connected to the emergence and imperial 
hegemony of what I call the ―U.S.-Philippine nation.‖ Instead of treating the relationship 
between the United States and the Philippines as one that evolves bilaterally between two 
separate or distinct entities, I propose the concept of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ because 
it more accurately describes the development of an ideological and bi-national 
partnership between the U.S. and the Philippines, particularly amongst politicians, 
diplomats, scholars, military officials, and military personnel. In other words, I am 
distinguishing the ―bi-national‖ from the ―bilateral‖ by emphasizing the unilateral nature 
of this bi-national relationship between the United States and the Philippines. Earliest 
discursive and political manifestations of this bi-national entity can be traced back to the 
Spanish-American War of 1898, the official end of the Philippine-American War in 1902, 
and during the First World War from 1917 to 1918. As the forthcoming chapters of this 
dissertation illustrate, the peak of this ideological and bi-national alliance emerged in the 
trans-pacific theatre of World War II from 1944 to 1945 and during the early stages of 
Cold War politics, militarisms, and orientalisms
5
 in the late 1940s, 1950s, and early 
1960s. Also, in varying degrees, the celebratory imaginary of bi-national alliance 
informed and shaped U.S. and Philippine officials‘ dominant interpretations of the ―U.S.-
Philippine nation.‖ Nevertheless, U.S. officials, in particular, interpreted this alliance 
with relevant levels of anxiety towards, and surveillance of, Filipino nationals—
particularly Filipino nationals enlisted by U.S. officials themselves. By studying the 
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 This dissertation also follows and builds on the lineage of works that have centered on the Cold War 
politics of knowledge production in post-World War II U.S. history, including Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War 
Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2000); Christina 
Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2003); and Penny von Eschen, Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the 




everyday and institutional encounters between Filipino laborers and their U.S. military 
officials in this dissertation, I assess how the complexities and contradictions of 
celebratory alliance structured and potentially destabilized the ideological foundations 
and hegemonic practices of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation.‖ 
My historical and conceptual account of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ stems from 
previous studies of U.S.-Philippine history, knowledge politics
6
, and the political 
contradictions shaping the celebratory discourse of this bi-national alliance. The 1947 
Military Bases Agreement, which I will further explain later in this dissertation, clearly 
contravenes the presumption of the sovereign status of these two nations. In reality, this 
agreement only confirmed the neo-colonial status of the Philippines in relation to the 
United States.
7
 While scholars from all political, disciplinary, and interdisciplinary 
spectrums agree that there is direct contradiction between the sovereign and neo-colonial 
status of the Philippines, there are fissures and divergences when it comes to the political 
meanings and logics of this contradiction. Conservative and moderate military historians 
have justified this contradiction by emphasizing the ―necessity‖ of strategically enforcing 
U.S. imperial and ideological dominance against actual and potential global threats of 
communist, or anti-colonial, dominance. Meanwhile, liberal and radically leftist scholars 
have largely critiqued, if not collectively protested, this basic contradiction often by 
calling our attention to the gendered and nationalist grounds of social justice, equality, 
and opportunity. In this dissertation, I address the history and transpirations of this 
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 Comparative literary critic Neferti Tadiar, for example, articulates the notion of U.S.-Philippine bi-
national alliance and friendship as a ―fantasy production‖ within lens of gender, sexuality, and nationalism. 
See Neferti Tadiar, Fantasy Production: Sexual Economies and other Philippine Consequences for the New 
World Order (Hong Kong: Hong Kong UP, 2004).  
 
7
 Specific sections of this treaty enforcing U.S. jurisdiction over the Philippines and other acts confirming 
the Philippines‘ neo-colonial status include: the restoration of the Joint United States Military Advisory 




contradiction by assessing the emergent, competing and dominant ideological formations 
of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation,‖ along with its imperial implications across lines of 
gender, race, nationalism, and citizenship. 
My coinage of this term derives and differentiates from previous historical actors‘ 
definitions of and challenges toward this bi-national concept during the early-mid Cold 
War period, as well as from previous definitions and delineations of particular variations 
of this term by recent scholars in Filipino studies. Claro Recto and Lorenzo Tanada, for 
instance, were historical actors who both assessed and critiqued the ideological 
foundation of U.S.-Philippine bi-national relations. In turn, Recto and Tanada were in 
strong support of an actual Philippine independence that stood apart from United States 
neo-colonial rule. Claro Recto, as a Philippine Senator, led the nationalist movement in 
the Philippines during the time of his political tenure in the 1950s. Subsequently, his 
views on Philippine-U.S. relations were immensely influential on official and grassroots 
activists for many years to come.  
Specifically, Recto was one of the most notable Philippine officials to openly 
criticize the militaristic foundations and dehumanizing implications of the U.S.-
Philippine bi-national ―friendship.‖ In his public speeches, Recto frequently critiqued the 
presence of U.S. bases in the Philippines on the grounds that the militaristic conditions of 
extraterritoriality, as applicable to U.S. bases, contradicted (and hence violated) the terms 
of Philippine sovereignty. In addition, Recto was not afraid to express his fear that the 
continual U.S. base presence in the Philippines would invite open attack by foreigners, 
even to the point of nuclear warfare.
8
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 Daniel B. Schirmer and Stephen Rosskamm Shalom, eds. The Philippines Reader: a History of 




 Lorenzo Tanada was another Philippine senator who critiqued the neo-colonial 
politics of U.S.-Philippine relations on an official level. In particular, Senator Tanada 
often spoke about the ―myths‖ that the Philippines has lived by as a developing nation, 
particularly in relation to the United States and other foreign powers. These ―myths‖ that 
Tanada alluded to included the following: first, that the Philippines needed to depend on 
U.S. and/or other foreign powers in order to sustain itself economically, politically, and 
diplomatically; second, that the Philippines needed to rely on western models predicated 
by the U.S. and other western foreign powers in order to achieve similar results as a 
newly sovereign nation; and third, that the nature of the U.S.-Philippine relationship lay 
in American ―benevolence‖ and its ―special relations‖ with the Philippines, rather than 
the actual and conditioned Philippine neo-colonial mentality and its erased public 
memory of the immensely violent Philippine-American War since the American colonial 
period. Hence, in order for the Philippines to elevate itself as a developing nation, it must 
first admit its ―real‖ status as such, and then take appropriate measures—as a truly 
sovereign nation—in order to advance and empower itself politically and economically 
apart from the westernized and capitalist standards of the U.S. and other foreign powers.
9
 
In the historiographical sense, this concept of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ derives 
from recent scholars‘ analyses of the bi-national imaginaries and neo-colonial realities 
shaping U.S.-Philippine relations. In particular, it stems partly from Neferti Tadiar‘s 
notion of bi-national U.S.-Philippine relations as a ―fantasy production‖ that has served 
U.S. interests, instead of bilateral interests or Philippine sovereignty. Consequently, to 
Tadiar, the Philippines have carried the burden of the discursive erasure of the 
                                                 
9
 Lorenzo Tanada, ―The Folklore of Colonialism,‖  in The Philippines Reader: a History of Colonialism, 
Neocolonialism, Dictatorship, and Resistance, ed. Daniel B. Schirmer and Stephen Rosskamm Shalom 




contradiction between the bi-national and mutual friendship of U.S.-Philippine relations 
on the one hand, and the contingent status of the Philippines as subservient to U.S. 
interests on the other. In addition, this concept of the U.S.-Philippine nation derives from 
Dylan Rodríguez‘s notion of ―Filipino Americanism.‖ Rodríguez defines Filipino 
Americanism as the everyday civil and cultural allegiances, particularly among Filipino 
Americans, to the U.S. nation-state.
10
 While my definition of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ 
takes cue from both of these scholars, what distinguishes my conceptualization of this bi-
national imaginary from these previous delineations is twofold (especially in the 
methodological sense). First, I utilize specific case studies of Filipino laborers in the U.S. 
military to illustrate how this bi-national entity was exercised and challenged on the 
ground. Second, I complement these case studies with military correspondences that 
revealed the ways in which the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ was enforced, particularly on the 
official level. 
 
The United States Empire as a Formal and Informal Operation of Global 
Governance 
 
By underscoring the discursive formation and the imperial manifestation and 
enforcement of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖, I argue that the United States, in matters 
relating specifically to the Philippines, behaved as both a formal and informal empire 
since the official inception of this diplomatic relationship in 1898. Previously, scholars of 
United States and Philippine history have delineated the history of U.S. Empire in linear 
or binary terms. Historians who have narrated a linear history of U.S. Empire emphasized 
that the U.S. transitioned from a formal empire in the Philippines, from 1898 to 1946, to 
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 Dylan Rodríguez, Suspended Apocalypse: White Supremacy, Genocide, and the Filipino Condition 




an informal one from 1947 to the present.
11
 Scholars who have theorized the history of 
U.S. Empire in binary terms often noted that the U.S. was either formally implemented in 
certain regions (like Puerto Rico) or informally in others (including the Philippines).
12
 
While these scholars should be acknowledged for groundbreaking work that furthered 
social and cultural studies on U.S. Empire, I emphasize a more complex and multilayered 
historical analysis that deconstructs the teleological and binaristic framework shaping 
previous works on empire, particularly in a region as complex as the Philippine 
archipelago. I show that the United States Empire behaved formally in certain ways and 
informally in others, depending upon the degree of necessity and secrecy in securing its 
imperial project—within the same particular region and time period.  
I define formal and informal U.S. Empire as divergent and convergent 
characteristics of imperial hegemony. By ―formal‖ empire, I mean the actual and 
carefully planned implementation of policies enforcing U.S. hegemony toward a specific 
territory—or group of territories. In turn, I use the phrase ―informal‖ empire to describe 
the sudden, spontaneous, and hidden acts of building and reinforcing American 
hegemony in subjugated territories around the globe. Throughout United States history, 
the lines between formal and informal U.S. Empire have blurred to the point where they 
have become almost indistinguishable and unrecognizable. Some formal policies of U.S. 
Empire have been planned and executed with the most informal and spontaneous 
methods (e.g., the Military Bases Agreement and its shifting policies of enlistment), and 
with some of the most informal and covert acts of imperial domination that have been 
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committed through formal and pre-meditated methods—e.g., U.S. officials‘ use of now-
banned waterboard torture to squelch guerilla resistance in the Philippine-American War, 
the CIA‘s suppression of the Huk Rebellion in the early Cold War Period, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency‘s similar implementation of covert operations to overthrow socialist 
governments in Guatemala (1950s) and Chile (1970s).
13
 In this dissertation, I argue that 
the lines between formal and informal U.S. Empire were not only blurred, but were 
mutually constitutive of each other. In other words, I define formal and informal U.S. 
Empire in mutually and inclusively constitutive ways.  
 
Methodological, Historiographical, and Temporal Contributions of this Dissertation 
Study 
 
This dissertation project draws upon both written and oral historical records to 
shape its explicit and implicit historical arguments. By written historical records, I mean 
correspondences, letters, and memorandums composed by U.S. and Philippine military 
officials, political officials, military personnel, and civilian citizens. In turn, interviews of 
mostly Filipino naval enlistees, from various published oral history collections and 
manuscripts, comprise the oral historical records cited in this dissertation. While the 
written historical files largely informed my findings regarding enlisted stewards during 
World War II and civilian workers during the early Cold War period, the oral histories 
primarily guided and shaped my historical analysis of Filipino enlistees following the 
Second World War. My extensive, balanced, and methodical use of written records and 
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oral histories is what distinguishes this dissertation project from the work of previous 
scholars on this subject, particularly within Philippine/Filipino American history, Asian 
American studies, and American military history. 
Since the interdisciplinary and groundbreaking merging of these scholarships (and 
activisms) in the massively influential 1976 anthology Counterpoint, there has been a 
plethora of published works that have documented the oral histories of enlisted Filipino 
stewards, primarily in the U.S. Navy.
 14
 Examples of such community- and academic- 
oriented works include Dorothy and Fred Cordova‘s Filipinos: Forgotten Asian 
Americans (1983), Yen Le Espiritu‘s Filipino American Lives (1995) and Homebound 
(2003), Riz Oades‘s Beyond the Mask: Untold Stories of Navy Filipinos (2004), Filipino 
American National Historical Society‘s In Our Uncles‟ Words: „We Fought for Freedom‟ 
(2006), Ray L. Burdeos‘s Filipinos in the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard during the Vietnam 
War (2008), and Teresa Cenidoza Suarez‘s article ―Militarized Filipino Masculinity and 
the Language of Citizenship in San Diego‖ from the published anthology Militarized 
Currents (2010). With the exception of Dr. Suarez‘s astute study which emphasizes a 
feminist cultural studies and critical race studies lens, these works largely are more 
interested in recovering histories of Navy Filipinos as part of nationally discursive and 
community building projects that seek to move such histories from the margins to the 
center of American history. While these veteran recovery projects are, to a large degree, 
necessary for increasing social awareness about ethnic diversity in American culture, they 
are in large part either celebrated or briefly assessed in various national conferences and 
class curricula. In other words, the primary oral histories contained in these previous 
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works have been under-utilized or ignored. This dissertation addresses this 
methodological and historiographical gap by assembling this rich but scattered archive of 
Navy Filipino testimonials published over the past forty years and by treating and 
studying them with the sustained historical and theoretical attention that they deserve. 
In addition, this dissertation calls attention to the politics of knowledge production 
about minority enlistees. The scholarship to date by American military and public 
historians tends to draw upon the records regarding minority enlistees in the National 
Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Record No. 24 in the NARA file archive 
is an example of what Asian American and American Studies scholar Jodi Kim calls 
―regulatory knowledge production.‖
15
 Arguably the most widely researched archive 
concerning minority enlistees, this record group includes a well-organized collection of 
files that the NARA archivists promote for public and scholarly viewing. One the one 
hand, this particular collection of files provides a plentitude of illuminating and useful 
correspondences between mostly U.S. military and political officials regarding minority 
enlistment. On the other hand, the content and form of this collection largely imply a 
teleological narrative of minority advancement within the narrowed periodization of U.S. 
involvement in the Second World War (e.g., 1941-1945). Moreover, military historians 
who have referenced this record group have done so briefly as evidentiary historical 
backdrops for the larger centerpieces shaping their particular studies: e.g., naval oral 
histories of minority enlistees and ensigned officers. This dissertation addresses this 
methodological and historiographical gap in American military scholarship by providing 
a fuller account of these written record files concerning minority enlistment and by 
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complementing the NARA files with an analysis of USN Filipino testimonials, which are 
absent from these official military records.  
Although this project takes the late nineteenth and entire twentieth centuries into 
account, it focuses on World War II and the early Cold War period up to 1965. The 
reasons for this are twofold. First, the overwhelming majority of researched written and 
oral historical records focus on this particular time period. Second, this project 
complements the majority of previous works in Asian American historical scholarship 
that focus on the post-1965 period of Asian migration and settlement in the United States. 
While many works rightly recognize the quantitative importance of the 1965 Immigration 
Act as a port of entry for hundreds of thousands of Asian professionals and families to the 
U.S., there were also critical masses of Asian immigrants, including Filipinos, who came 
to the U.S. well before 1965.
16
 In conversation with the historians Mae Ngai (2003) and 
Dorothy Fujita-Rony (2003), this dissertation decenters our temporal understanding of 
Asian immigration as a post-1965 phenomenon, and re-centers on a significant segment 
of Third Wave Filipino migration to the U.S. and elsewhere in the transpacific: enlisted 
civilians and stewards in the U.S. military (1945-1965).
17
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 The ―Third Wave‖ of Filipino immigration to the U.S., according to Fred Cordova, was Filipinos who 
came to the U.S. between 1945 and 1965. This wave primarily consisted of navy men, women nurses, 
professionals, business technicians, and engineers. (Cordova 1983, 20) The Second Wave of Filipino 
immigrants came during the U.S. colonial period between 1906 and 1934. This wave first comprised of 
―pensionados‖, who were students subsidized by the Philippine colonial government. Those who came later 
in this second wave were single male laborers who worked in the farms and canneries—primarily in the 
American West, Midwest, and the East Coast. (Cordova 1983, 14-19) The very first wave of Filipino 
immigration came between 1763 and 1906. This wave included more sporadic patterns of migration among 
seafarers, laborers, domestic workers, and ―stowaways‖ escaping Spanish colonial captivity in the 
Philippine archipelago and the galleon trade ships. On these galleon ships in particular, many of them were 
stationed as crew members and slave laborers.  While most of them migrated to Alaska and Hawai‘i, a few 
of them landed in Acapulco, Baja California, Peru, Guam, and New Orleans, among other places in the 




Like the early Cold War period, the overwhelming impact of global circumstances 
and catastrophes in World War II cannot be overestimated or over-studied—especially 
the politics of minority enlistment, inclusion, and experience in the U.S. Navy and other 
branches of the U.S. military. My prioritization of World War II, therefore, seeks to 
redress previous works by scholars of this period who have not yet addressed the most 
crucial events in world history—and all of its related and regional historical scholarships. 
My emphasis on the Second World War fills this under-theorized area of historical 
scholarship in Asian American studies. 
Furthermore, the comparative historical lens on civilian and enlisted Filipino 
workers in the U.S. military utilizes a trans-local, transpacific, and transnational 
approach. This approach has grown exponentially in numerous fields of study especially 
in Southeast Asian Studies, a field that has remained an area-studies program over the 
past forty years. However, this dissertation hopes to exert productive pressure on the field 
of Southeast Asian Studies in order to prioritize Philippine/Filipino American studies and 
to decenter the overall area studies approach that has established and enforced Southeast 
Asian Studies as a globally dominant and state-funded field of scholarship since its 
inception as a surveillance-oriented political project for U.S. Cold War officials in the 
1960s. Its disciplinary area-studies approach remains, to this day, a direct and 
problematic obstacle to its enriching intellectual dialogues with Asian/Pacific Islander 
American Studies, American Studies, Globalization Studies, and Empire Studies. 
Nevertheless, Southeast Asian Studies has since become much more mindful of its own 
political history, and has showcased well-intended efforts to transform and align itself 
                                                                                                                                                 






with other related scholarly fields.
18
 With the method and scope of this dissertation, 
therefore, I strive to catalyze a new scholarly movement and trajectory in Southeast Asian 
Studies toward a more transpacific and transnational approach that would expose and 
advance its interconnection with research subjects and scholars related to 




The main chapters are divided into two parts. Part I, ―The Origins of Filipino 
Enlistment and the Making of a ‗U.S.-Philippine nation‘‖, delineates the converging, 
diverging, and synergistic trajectories of the U.S.-Philippine relationship within the 
context of Filipino enlistment in the U.S. Navy and other branches of the military from 
1898 to 1945. This historical overview and analysis, based largely on secondary and 
primary sources, sets the stage for Part II of this dissertation, ―The Politics of Filipino 
Enlistment and the Enforcement of the ‗U.S.-Philippine Nation.‘‖ Grounded in primary 
sources both written and oral historical, Part II assesses the converging and diverging 
politics of integrating Filipino civilians and enlisted stewards within the U.S.‘s armed 
forces and militarized spaces around the globe during the early and mid Cold War period.  
Largely drawing upon the secondary works of established and groundbreaking 
scholars in U.S. history, empire studies, and Philippine/Filipino American studies, 
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chapter one traces the connections between U.S. officials‘ policies of Filipino enlistment, 
the emergence of the U.S. as a global empire, and the making of the ―U.S.-Philippine 
nation‖: from the Philippine-American War in 1899 to the Philippine Liberation 
Campaign in 1945, and during the early Cold War Period. This chapter then examines 
case studies of Filipino civilian workers and enlistees who were recruited by U.S. 
military officials during this period. By synthesizing these specific case studies with the 
shifting and uneven grounds of U.S.-Philippine relations during this time period, I argue 
that the celebratory, contradictory, and reconciliatory foundations of the ―U.S.-Philippine 
nation‖ were forged through early recruitments— and restrictions—of Filipinos in the 
U.S. military during the Philippine-American War, the implementation (and evacuation) 
of the American colonial state in the Philippines, and the two World Wars. It was not 
until World War II when the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ arrived at its peak, and proved 
strategically and ideologically vital to the global emergence of the U.S. as an empire state 
by the end of the Philippine Liberation Campaign in 1945 and throughout the early Cold 
War period. 
Chapter two is a historical analysis of Filipino and other minoritized enlisted 
stewards of the U.S. Navy during the wartime period. Drawing upon written 
correspondence between U.S. military officials and civilian citizens, this chapter 
discusses the politics of U.S. naval officials‘ enlistment of Filipinos primarily as 
stewards, messmen, and cooks. It is true that the U.S. Navy stopped the recruitment of 
Filipinos during much of the Philippine Commonwealth period in the late 1930s and 
early 1940s. However, as the Second World War dragged on and the United States 




officially reversed its policy and began enlisting more Filipinos into the armed force by 
1943. While many Filipinos embraced this opportunity to enlist in the U.S. Navy during 
this period, their limited inclusion in manual work positions placed them alongside other 
racial, ethnic, and foreign minorities hired for similar lines of work. Despite written 
efforts by concerned civilians to enhance their upward mobility within the naval ranks, 
the anxious responses and methods among U.S. officials proved not only similar to these 
officials‘ handling of civilian personnel matters in the Philippines, but they also 
illustrated the extremely limited sense of political mobility amongst Filipino and other 
minority enlistees within (and beyond) the U.S. militarized space especially during the 
Second World War. 
Chapter three details the contingent and intimate connections between the 
enrollment of Filipino civilians and enlistees in the U.S. military; and, the enforcements, 
anxious continuities, and destabilizations of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ following the 
Second World War. As the bi-national alliance of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ peaked by 
the end of World War II, anxieties among U.S. officials regarding the destabilization of 
this bi-national entity—or even worse to some, its decolonization—escalated when 
Philippine Independence was officially enacted vis-à-vis plenary power in 1946. Drawing 
upon secondary and primary research, this chapter gives an overview of how the 
continual recruitment and experience of civilian and enlisted Filipino laborers both 
enforced and unsettled American militarist presence in the Philippines, elsewhere in the 
transpacific, and around the globe. 
Chapter four assesses case studies about Filipino civilian workers in the U.S Navy 




on the Bartolome Roldan case. Roldan was a former civilian worker on Clark Air Force 
Base who organized a labor union inside the base in order to agitate for overtime pay, 
actions that prompted his termination by U.S. Air Force authorities. His immediate 
termination led to increased horizontal mobilization amongst his fellow co-workers on-
base, vertical-based alliances with Philippine local and national politicians, and national 
press coverage regarding his case. This case proved politically influential at the national 
and international levels, as evidenced by simultaneous mobilizations among Filipino 
civilian laborers around the transpacific, as well as the subsequent persistence by 
Philippine labor officials to establish a U.S.-Philippine labor committee to investigate 
U.S. officials‘ treatment of Filipino laborers on its bases in the Philippines. While this 
and other related cases illustrated the great political maneuverability of Filipino civilian 
workers on U.S. bases in the transpacific, they also illuminated the anxieties of U.S. 
officials and the methods that these officials had at their disposal to declare and enforce 
unilateral practices shaping the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ during the early postwar period. 
Chapters five and six focus our attention toward Filipino enlistees during the 
early-mid Cold War period. While my earlier chapters rely upon the analysis of written 
records to articulate and assess the historical politics of Filipino enlistment, this chapter 
draws largely from available oral historical records to provide an in-depth analysis of the 
―upward mobility‖ of Filipino enlistees and their varying degrees of inclusion within the 
U.S. nation-state. These varying degrees of inclusion, as determined by U.S. officials, 
also facilitated the politics of Filipino enlistment. Unlike their civilian counterparts, 
Filipino enlistees in the U.S. Navy and in other branches of the U.S. military were offered 




their families within U.S. militarized spaces all over the globe. It is true that their 
increased inclusion in the U.S. nation-state facilitated celebratory terms and conditions of 
their enlistment, and I address these terms of inclusion in chapter five. However, their 
limited mobility within the navy rank and file, coupled with their restricted political 
mobilization within these militarized spaces (in the collective sense), illuminated and 
reinforced the uneven, contradictory, and reconciliatory conditions shaping the ―U.S.-
Philippine nation‖ in particular, and the U.S. as a global empire state in general. In 
chapter six, I delineate and deconstruct these politics of postwar enlistment and restricted 
inclusion affecting Filipinos in the U.S. Navy and other branches of the military. 
This dissertation contains topical, temporal, and methodological ―blind spots‖ that 
I will correct in future revisions and distributions. One blind spot is the comparative 
empire studies analysis of Filipino enlistment in transpacific U.S. bases to those stationed 
in bases of the Trans-Atlantic. Another is a more central gendered analysis of Filipino 
enlistment, which is more emergent in the fifth chapter than in the rest of the dissertation. 
My primary reason for these ―blind spots‖ is this: there was not enough evidence in the 
recovered written historical records to extrapolate gender-centered or further comparative 
regional analysis of this subject of empire and postcolonial history.  
Additionally, as a side note one cannot underestimate the relationship between my 
own personal and local history, as a ―Navy brat‖, and the politics of enlistment shaping 
Filipino recruitment and experience in and beyond the U.S. Navy: particularly, as the son 
of a Navy Filipino seaman, the nephew of a Navy Filipino midshipman, and the grandson 
of a Navy Filipino steward. Having been born and raised in the Cavite Province, my 




Also, having been born in Cavite City and growing up all over the world as a ―Navy 
brat‖, my uncle became a U.S. naval officer via the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) in 
Annapolis, Maryland in 1979: the same year that I was born. Moreover, as the daughter 
of a Navy Filipino steward, my mother joined the U.S. Navy in 1978 vis-à-vis Lemoore 
Naval Air Station in Lemoore, California, USA. Indeed, my personal and familial 
relationship with Navy Filipinos can certainly be further emphasized and studied in 
relation to my archival findings, especially as they pertain to the local histories of these 
aforementioned places of Cavite, Olongapo, Annapolis, and Lemoore respectively. 
However, I have not yet had the chance explore my personal connections with the politics 
of Filipino enlistment as thoroughly in this dissertation, especially given the disciplinary 
method and scope of the written historical archive. Nevertheless, my historical 
theorizations of these archival case studies have undoubtedly—if not implicitly—been 
significantly shaped by my own personal and local histories as a ―Navy brat.‖ It is in the 
manuscript version of this dissertation that I look forward to explicitly emphasizing and 
evaluating my own personal historical relationship with the politics of enlistment and 
empire in shaping the bi-national formations of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ on the one 
hand, and the ―tense and tender ties‖
19
 of U.S. Empire on the other. These connections 
between the personal, local, and historical need not only be explored within the history 
discipline
20
, but even beyond its confines in the creative and interdisciplinary outlets of 
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poetry, art, and spoken word. While I promise to correct these shortcomings by 
conducting more oral histories of wartime enlistees and postwar civilian workers in the 
manuscript stage of this project, I realize that the process of revision is, as poet 
Emmanuel Lacaba would note, like peeling a billion layers of coconut husks.
21
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The Origins of Filipino Enlistment and the Making of a “U.S.-Philippine Nation”:  
A Historical Overview of Filipino Civilian and Enlisted Workers in the U.S. Military 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
Historicizing the Politics of Filipino Enlistment: Philippine-American War to the 




On January 31, 1946, a Subic Bay U.S. Navy commandant corresponded with 
Charles J. Bodnar, a U.S. Naval Reserve commander. This letter confirmed the 
establishment of a board of review consisting of three high-ranked naval officers. 
According to this Commandant, the board of review of U.S.N. officers aimed ―to screen 
active, reserve, and retired naval personnel suspected of alleged collaboration with the 
enemy.‖ After the selection and screening of suspected naval personnel, the board of 
review met to determine the fate of those suspects: whether or not to bring them to trial 
for further investigation. The board then gave their final recommendations to the 
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The name of this U.S. Navy commandant was Mark L. Hersey, Jr.; and the 
targeted USN suspects described in Hersey‘s letter were Filipinos who directly—or 
indirectly—collaborated with the Japanese military during World War II. Hersey‘s letter, 
which confirmed the creation of this board of review, revealed two oft-concealed 
historical developments in U.S.-Philippine relations following the Second World War. 
First, it highlighted the anxieties of U.S. military officials about the possible prevalence 
of Filipinos whom they considered ―subversive.‖ In this early postwar period of the allied 
―U.S.-Philippine nation‖, U.S. officials defined Filipino ―subversives‖ as those who 
directly—or indirectly—cooperated with the Japanese military during World War II. U.S. 
and Philippine allied forces demarcated these subversives as the ―enemy‖ not only in 
wartime, but also in this early postwar period. 
Secondly, in this early postwar context, Commandant Hersey‘s letter paved the 
way for a broader historical definition of who U.S. officials considered ―subversive‖ in 
the Philippines. In other words, former collaborationists with the Japanese imperial 
military were not only considered as subversives by the U.S. government, but also worthy 
of close scrutiny by U.S. officials. Wartime collaborators with the U.S. government, the 
Hukbalahaps (e.g. the Huks), shifted their political allegiances from agents of the 
wartime ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ to anti-colonial nationalists who sought Philippine 
sovereignty, autonomous of U.S. influence, during the early postwar period. Like the 
wartime collaborationists of the Japanese government, the postwar Huks were seen as 
―subversives‖ in the eyes of U.S. government officials. The continuing presence of the 
collaborationists, coupled with the shifting politics of the Hukbalahaps, shaped U.S. 




Philippine formal independence approached on July 4, 1946. Postwar public celebrations 
of alliance and friendship between the U.S. and the Philippines often concealed U.S. 
officials‘ private suspicions about Filipino political ―subversives.‖ During the early 
postwar period, their usual Filipino suspects consisted primarily of two categories: one, 
the postwar Huks; and two, wartime collaborators with the Japanese government. 
Why did U.S. officials see the threat that these groups posed as great enough to 
merit the creation of a board of review and the invention of other methods to locate, 
investigate, and classify these Filipinos as ―subversive‖? To what extent did these 
investigative practices disturb but also reinforce the politics of enlisting Filipinos into the 
U.S. naval force? And third, what political and historical implications did Filipino 
enlistment have for the informing and shaping of U.S. colonial practices of war, 
militarism and governance in the Philippines, which dated from the late nineteenth 
century? 
By addressing these questions of Filipino political enlistment, I make the 
following arguments in this chapter. First, U.S. national conceptualizations and practices 
of race, nationhood, and citizenship informed U.S. involvement in, and evacuation from, 
the Philippines—from the Philippine-American War (1899-1913); to the 
institutionalizations of the American colonial state (1901-1934); and through the 
commonwealth period in the Philippines (1934-1946). During and following the Second 
World War, the U.S. reemerged as an occupying force in the Philippines, and U.S. 
notions of race, nation, and citizenship collapsed, in a bi-national context, to the point 
that by the early Cold War period the presence of the U.S. colonial state in the 




benevolence and bi-national friendship with the Philippines—among U.S. and Philippine 
officials—further shaped the unrecognizable presence of the U.S. as an empire, and 
reinforced the realities and continuums of colonial governance, political compliance, and 
economic inequality that shaped the foundations of U.S.-Philippine relations. And thirdly, 
I argue that these promises and realities of U.S.-Philippine relations foreground a bi-
national formation that I call the ―U.S.-Philippine nation.‖ These promises and realities of 
the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ facilitated not only the emergence and repression of anti-
colonial nationalists but also the policies of Filipino enlistment and the politics of 
Filipino marginalization in the U.S. militarized space. I foreground and broadly assess 
these policies and politics of Filipino enlistment through my case study of former U.S.N. 
civilian and enlisted laborer Jesus Bautista. 
 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE COLONIAL U.S.-PHILIPPINE 
RELATIONSHIP 
 
Throughout the Philippine-American War and the U.S. colonial period in the 
Philippines (1899-1934), U.S. officials justified their imperial ambitions by articulating 
racially subjugating conceptualizations of Filipinos. These conceptualizations echoed 
invidious and concurring rationalizations of Indian removal, occupation of Mexico, and 
enslavement of Blacks. Concurrent pro-imperialist discourse represented Filipino citizens 
as ―children‖ and ―savages‖ in need of Christianity, education and overall ―uplift‖ within 
the American national standard.
23
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These images circulated through newspaper publications, congressional hearings, 
and especially exhibitions at worlds‘ fairs. Anti-imperialist groups such as the Trade 
Union delegate voiced their protests against the U.S. occupation of the Philippines under 
the rubrics of racial paternalism and xenophobia. For instance, some anti-imperialists 
claimed that Filipinos needed to be ―saved‖ from the savagery and atrocity of U.S. 
imperialism and militarism. Others, like Senator William Jennings Bryan, claimed 
Filipinos were the ―savages.‖ These ―savages,‖ therefore, were not deserving of 
incorporation into the U.S. nation and citizenry. In addition, to Bryan and other anti-
imperialists, the integration of Filipinos into U.S. society would only enhance and 
complicate the U.S. domestic race issue.
24
 Meanwhile, anti-imperialist artists like George 
Ade and Mark Twain satirized the Christian-based ideologies that justified U.S. conquest 
of the Philippines.
25
 On one hand, these public figures highlighted their anti-imperial 
politics by critiquing the ways in which lust and greed shaped the real motives of U.S. 
imperialism in the Philippines and elsewhere. On the other hand, their politics of 
recognition simultaneously subscribed to racialist conceptions that assumed Filipinos 
were unfit for self-government. 
Meanwhile, the U.S.‘s policies and justifications of imperial occupation directly 
contradicted with elite Philippine nationalist claims to sovereignty during the Spanish-
American War. Philippine military leader Emilio Aguinaldo, for instance, pleaded to U.S. 
naval commodore Dewey to grant the Philippines independence during their alliance 
                                                 
24
 See, for instance, Enrique de la Cruz et al., The Forbidden Book (San Francisco: T‘Boli, 2004); and 
Benito Vergara, Displaying Filipinos: Photography and Colonialism in Early 20
th
 Century Philippines 
(University of Philippines Press: Quezon City, 1995). 
 
25
 Please see Mark Twain, ―Darkness that Enters the Home,‖ in Luis Francia and Angel Velasco Shaw, 
Vestiges of War: the Aftermath of an Imperial Dream (New York: NYU Press, 2002); and Victor Román 




against Spanish forces. When Dewey and U.S. officials refused to acknowledge 
Philippine independence, Aguinaldo defiantly declared himself president of the 
Philippine republic on July 2, 1898. Nonetheless, critical masses of Philippine nationalist 
forces, led by Aguinaldo, grew prominence while Commodore Dewey kept his men 
stationed in Cavite and enhanced preparations for battle against the Philippines.
26
 Alas, 
with the opposing agendas of the U.S. and the Philippines coming to a head, the first 
shots were fired between U.S. and Philippine forces on February 4, 1899 in Manila. Thus 
the Philippine-American War had begun, with the occupation, colonization, and informal 
emergence of the American colonial state in the Philippines happening simultaneously. 
During the Philippine-American War, U.S. army field commanders openly 
recruited local Philippine scouts. Previously having served Philippine nationalists, these 
members of the Philippine scouts switched allegiances to the U.S. field commanders. 
These field commanders assigned the Philippine Scouts to duties similar to those 
assigned to Indian scouts during the early-mid nineteenth century in the following ways. 
First, these Philippine Scouts were designated navigators who would serve as guides 
through the terrain and tropics of the Philippine archipelago. Second, they served as 
interpreters to help commanders communicate, negotiate with, and pacify local Philippine 
natives. Moreover, President William McKinley passed an executive order to recruit 500 
Filipinos into the naval insular force on April 1, 1901 to assist the U.S. war, annexation, 
and colonization of the Philippines. Also, U.S. navy officials hired the first Filipinos in 
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the regular naval force as cooks, who later would be known as mess attendants.
27
 While 
naval officials assigned these Filipinos to menial positions and hence consigned them to 
the margins of the navy, the purpose of Filipino naval enlistment remained the same as 
that of recruiting Philippine scouts: the implementation and enforcement of the American 
colonial state in the Philippines. 
As the emergence and enforcement of the U.S. colonial state in the Philippines 
became imminent, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt declared the formal end of the 
Philippine-American War on July 4, 1902. The formal end of the war, in turn, meant the 
return of the majority of American troops to the United States. Four months later, the 
U.S. Philippine Commission passed the Brigandage Act, which declared that future 
armed subversion to foreign U.S. rule would be considered ―banditry.‖ These two formal 
announcements served three functions that further shaped the informal implementations 
of the U.S. Empire and the ―U.S.-Philippine nation.‖ First, they allowed subsequent and 
scattered sites of the imperial war to be downplayed, forgotten, and unknown within 
American political discourse. Second, they shifted public attention toward the 
multifaceted colonial project and building of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation.‖ And third, 
these acts added another political dimension to the U.S. racial classification of Filipinos: 
those who continued to resist U.S. foreign rule would be vilified and deemed 
inassimilable to the American colonial state project. These announcements, in turn, set 
the historical—and historiographical—tone for the almost complete denial of the U.S. 
Empire in the Philippines. Concurrently and subsequently, the racial distinctions between 
the ―good‖—e.g. ―assimilable‖—and ―bad‖—e.g. ―inassimilable‖ Filipinos further 
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shaped the fantasy productions of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ and actual continuities of 
war shaping the informal U.S. Empire in the Philippines. 
According to historian Reynaldo Ileto, the informal continuation of war between 
the U.S. and the Philippines became known as ―amigo warfare.‖
28
 Under amigo warfare, 
armed Philippine nationalists relied on guerilla forces and tactics to overthrow the U.S. 
occupation within different local regions and provinces throughout the archipelago, 
including Ilocos, Samar, and Mindinao. In the northern region, the last standoffs between 
U.S. and Philippine forces took place in 1907 before the establishment of the Philippine 
Assembly later that year. In the southern island of Mindinao, U.S. forces initiated a 
second front of war despite the negotiation and execution of the Bates Agreement which 
promised Muslim Filipinos peace and autonomy in this area of the archipelago. During 
these informal stages of the war, at least 4,000 U.S. troops and one million Filipino 
citizens died.
29
 After one last massacre within this southern province in 1913, the U.S. 
military government in Mindinao formally declared the area as ―pacified.‖ By this formal 
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declaration of pacification, the military government lifted its rule on the entire province. 
This 1913 massacre and pacification marked the end of the Philippine-American War.
30
 
Additionally, U.S. military forces informally pacified the Philippine insurgents in 
the southern province through methods of torture, including the practice of what had 
become known as the ―water cure.‖ This form of torture, alongside others acknowledged 
by previous scholars, would later be duplicated and modified in subsequent U.S. military 
actions: the declared Korean and Vietnam Wars during the early Cold War; the covert 
Latin American Wars during the 1980s; and the imprisonment of political detainees in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in the twenty-first century. Nonetheless, during the Philippine-
American War of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, U.S. military officials 
like Colonel Frederick Funston initially utilized this and other methods of torture to 
pacify and subjugate those they viewed as ―illiterate, savage people‖ who subverted 
―Anglo-Saxon order and decency.‖
31
 
With the formal and informal stages of the Philippine-American War ending in 
1913, U.S. officials implemented at least three technologies of colonial governance. First, 
U.S. officials constructed military base installations that included Sangley Point in Cavite 
City, Subic Bay in Olongapo City, and Clark Air Force Base in the Pampanga Province.
32
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 Sangley Point was immediately occupied by U.S. forces following the Battle of Manila Bay in May 




Second, they organized the infrastructural institutionalization of American colonial 
schools within intimate proximities toward these bases. And third, they implemented 
American political governance in the Philippines by former University of Michigan 
faculty Dean Worcester, future Detroit Mayor, Michigan Governor, and U.S. Supreme 
Court Judge Frank Murphy, and future U.S. President William Howard Taft. In turn, 
these three formal—and informal—technologies of colonial governance required the 
enlistment of Filipinos within the U.S. military for reinforcement and imperial expansion 
across the Pacific and Latin America during these first two decades of the twentieth 
century. 
Nevertheless, while these first two decades oversaw the formations of the 
American colonial state in the Philippine archipelago, Philippine subjects continually 
contested U.S. hegemony in varying degrees. Whether in the form of armed guerilla 
resistance in the 1910s, or in the form of politically seditious writings like that of Isabelo 
de los Reyes in the 1920s, anti-colonial Philippine resistance persisted despite the 
implementation of the American colonial state and its politics of Filipino enlistment. By 
1930, the Sakdalistas had emerged as a collective organization of Philippine resistance. 
Founded by former Senate Clerk Benigno Ramos in 1930, the Sakdalistas 
consisted primarily of poor and working-class laborers and peasants who consistently 
spoke out against the establishment, the American colonial educational system, colonial 
governance, and militarism in the Philippines. They argued that mass poverty in the 
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region resulted less from the global impact of the Great Depression and more from the 
―American stranglehold‖ on the Philippine economy. Hence, the Sakdalistas urged 
complete sovereignty for the Philippines, autonomous from the institutional and cultural 
hegemony of the United States. By the end of 1935, the Sakdalistas had demanded the 
following conditions for Philippine independence: tax abolishment; state control of 




The massive circulation of the Sakdalistas‘ newsletter Sakdal spurred the 
emergence and increased the influence of the communal-based organization. 
Accompanied by its masthead ―Independent with no master but the people,‖ the Sakdal 
newsletter included and politicized phrases that shaped the Sakdalistas‘ politics of 
recognition against the U.S. colonial state. Eventually, other radical groups such as the 
Tangulan would subscribe to similar views and practices that were also highlighted in the 
Sakdal newsletter. The common ground for these radical organizations stemmed from 
their oppositional relationship to the U.S. and Philippine ruling elite during that time. 
According to the historian Renato Constantino: 
The tabloid [newsletter] accused both Quezon and Osmena of being servants of 
the Americans and charged independence missioners with insincerity. It adopted 
the position that independence is not given but must be taken through the united 
action of the people. The paper ranged itself against the political and economic 
oligarchy and proved with statistics the widening gap between the rich and poor. 
It soon became immensely popular with all sectors that disapproved of or had 
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In reaction to the growing influence of the Sakdalistas on the peasantry and working 
class, the U.S.-Philippine colonial government made sincere efforts to squash the Sakdal 
movement. The colonial government harassed the Sakdalistas during their regular 
meetings. Also, in order to prevent the Sakdalistas from holding rallies in public spaces, 
the government refused permits to Sakdals who wished to protest publicly.
35
 
Nevertheless, the peasantry continued to attend, support, and shape the meetings 
organized by the Sakdalistas. These meetings were often held in private houses, stores 
(tiendas), barbershops, and even on water while pretending to be fishermen. In addition, 
the Sakdalistas became involved in electoral politics. In 1934, the first year of the 
Philippines as a Commonwealth, the Sakdalistas elected a plethora of candidates as 
representatives in local elections during that year. Subsequently, all three of their 
candidates were elected: two from the Laguna Province, one from Tayabas. Another 
Sakdal Party candidate was elected governor in Mardinduque, and others eventually won 
municipal posts in Laguna, Bulucan, Ecija, Rizal, and Cavite.
36
 
In response to the electoral success of the Sakdalistas‘ efforts, founder and leader 
Benigno Ramos gradually shifted the Sakdalistas‘ politics from grassroots independence 
to reformist collaboration with the Japanese imperial government. Evidence of this 
ideological shift included the following: one, Ramos‘s downplaying of the ―Anti-
Americanism‖ expressed by his followers; two, prioritizing his political party‘s agenda 
towards national ownership of the military, resource control, and corruption prevention; 










and three, the renaming and reconfiguring of their organization so as to form the Ganap 
Party, which took a pro-Japanese collaborationist political stance.
37
 
The shifting politics of the Sakdalistas led to the alienation of local peasantries by 
1935. Eventually, these local peasantries reclaimed and retained themselves as 
communal-based agents against the American colonial state and its local elites. The 
Sakdal leadership‘s alienation from the peasantry transpired in a massive protest by the 
peasantry on May 2 of that year. Held at midnight, this protest ultimately became an 
uprising, and it is interpreted by historian Renato Constantino as a politically conscious 
act against the U.S.-Philippine colonial relationship. The political lineage of such acts 
rooted in the formal and guerilla stages of the Philippine-American War, as emphasized 
earlier in this chapter. 
Consequently, the Sakdal leadership‘s departure from the peasantry demonstrated 
how fearful and cautious their organization was of the reactionary forms of terror 
displayed and perpetuated by militarized agents of the Philippine-American colonial state 
and commonwealth. Given Ramos‘s previous political affiliations as a senate clerk, it was 
likely that Ramos was more fearful and respectful of the U.S.-Philippine colonial state 
than the peasantry. While Ramos‘s middle-class background shaped his collaborationist 
politics with the elite, the peasantry‘s full knowledge of the U.S.-Philippine colonial state 
was rooted in the hardships they faced on a daily and nightly basis: lack of work, lack of 
land, lack of agricultural resources. 
These class-based divergences between the Sakdalista leadership and peasantry 
ultimately led to the political fissures within the party overall. The leadership, as 
represented by Benigno Ramos, collaborated with the Japanese imperial government to 






form the pre-war Ganap Party. Over time, the local peasantries, over time, collectively 
organized in different reconfigurations like the Hukbalahaps (Huks), Partido ng 
Komunista (PKP), and the Communist Party of the Philippines/National People‘s Army 
(CPP/NPA) during the post-World War II period. These trans-local countryside peasants, 
alongside the urban working class poor, chose to take matters into their own hands and 
continued to oppose those whom they considered as the primary source of their lack of 
material and political sustainability: the U.S.-Philippine colonial state.  The 
contradictions between the visual fantasies of U.S.-Philippine friendship and the 
everyday realities of socioeconomic inequality proved to be vital sources for the radical 
politicization of the poor and working class since the Philippine-American War. 
In turn, the radical politicization of the poor and working class facilitated the 
anxieties of the U.S.-Philippine colonial state. Henceforth, during the 1930s, as the 
Philippines underwent a massive transition from colonial state to commonwealth, 
Philippine officials were as anxious as ever in enforcing their political authority despite—
and because of—this period of increasingly informal colonial rule in the Philippines. The 
U.S. congressional passage of the Tydings-McDuffie and Repatriation Acts of 1934 and 
1935, respectively, marked this transition from formal to informal colonial rule and the 
exclusion of Filipino immigrants from the continental US. Additionally, everyday acts of 
violence committed by W.A.S.P. laborers toward Filipino migrant laborers in California 
further reinforced the politics of exclusion of Filipinos during this period.
38
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THE CASE OF JESUS BAUTISTA 
 
One individual who fit this category of trans-local/trans-pacific Filipinos was 
Jesus Bautista. Bautista worked both as an enlistee and as a civilian for the U.S. Navy 
from the late 1920s to the early 1940s. Until the writing of this dissertation, this person‘s 
name and case file has never been mentioned or studied before in any field of historical 
scholarship. However, this name and person sparked the anxious hearts and minds of 
U.S. military officials following the Second World War. Bautista, along with thousands 
of others, was closely scrutinized during a time when the politics of recognition of the 
―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ were peaking in the Philippine Liberation Campaign of 1944 
and 1945. Bautista‘s previous interactions with the ―radical‖ Sakdalistas informed close 
and concealed surveillance. 
During the late 1920s and 1930s, Jesus Bautista was an enlistee in the United 
States Navy, and he rated as high as a first class machinist mate. In the mid-to-late 1930s, 
Bautista was known to become a member of the Sakdalistas. From 1942 to 1943, 
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Bautista worked as a civilian worker at the Navy Yard in Cavite during the Japanese 
military occupation. 
Several months after the end of the Second World War, on February 22, 1946, the 
United States military gave Bautista a recommendation for general court martial. The 
premise of this recommendation was Bautista‘s possible treason against the U.S. 
government because of his association with the Sakdalistas as a navy enlistee and 
because of his potential collaboration with the Japanese military as a civilian worker in 
World War II. 
As part of their investigation of Bautista‘s previous associations with the 
Sakdalistas, U.S. military officials interviewed a handful of Bautista‘s friends and former 
co-workers in Cavite. Each interviewed person offered considerably varying testimonies 
regarding Bautista‘s degree of involvement with the Sakdalistas. While some claimed 
that Bautista interacted with Sakdal leaders in passing and with lack of interest, others 
proclaimed the exact opposite: that Bautista was a full-fledged member of the Sakdalistas 
during the late 1930s and early 1940s. 
One such accusatory testimony came from Mariano Angel. Angel was an 
intelligence officer for the U.S.-allied South Central Luzon Saboteur Unit of the Guerilla 
Forces during the wartime and early postwar period. In Cavite City, Philippines, U.S. 
military officials brought Angel as a witness to address the extent of his association with 
Bautista, along with his knowledge of Bautista‘s associations with the Sakdalistas. In his 




Antonio, Cavite City to have worked for the Japanese Navy inside the Cavite Navy Yard 
as a Coppersmith. This man is a well known Sakdalista or Ganap.‖
39
 
Nevertheless, testimonies that contradicted Angel‘s led U.S. military officials to 
discontinue any further recommendation of Mr. Bautista for general court martial and 
treason owing to lack of sufficient evidence. In fact, one U.S. military official went so far 
as to clear any negative commentary regarding this case from Bautista‘s military record. 
For instance, this official discounted Bautista‘s family members‘ previous involvements 
with the Japanese military and the ―hearsay‖ testimonies of Bautista‘s colleagues. 
According to a correspondence letter by H.H. Good, Commander of the U.S. Naval 
Forces of the Philippines, to the Naval Board of Review: 
 
1. From a careful and detailed study of this record accompanied by further 
investigation it has been determined that there is insufficient proof available to 
support a charge of treason: holding intercourse with the enemy. The charges that 
subject‘s wife and daughters spread Japanese propaganda cannot be considered 
against subject. The mere fact that subject was employed as a machinist is 
insufficient to justify a charge of treason. None of the statements indicating 
adherence to the enemy allegedly made by the accused are accompanied by any 
overt act. Consequently they cannot be made basis of a charge of treason. Further 
these statements are not susceptible of proof because they are too indefinite as to 
time and place and are, in many cases, supported by only hearsay evidence. 
Accordingly, for the above reasons the subject man cannot be brought to trial 
without any possibilities of conviction. Inasmuch as trial would be futile it is 
deemed advisable to disapprove recommendation for same. 
 
2. In the Japanese boatyard Recommendation for trial by general court martial… is 
hereby disapproved. You will take necessary steps to remove all disabilities 
accruing to as a result of this charge and will clear subject man‘s record insofar as 
this charge is concerned.
40
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Significantly, Bautista became one of many local Filipinos who fell under close 
investigation by the Truman administration for past or living acts of treason against the 
U.S. government between September 1945 and June 1946. While the exact number of 
Filipinos who were under investigation for possible subversive collaborations is not listed 
in the recovered historical record, the amount of interest and investment that the Truman 
administration took to suppress the communist and other ―subversive‖ forces during this 
period were aplenty. On May 25, 1946, the Truman administration proposed Congress to 
implement an act that would provide military assistance to the Philippines, especially in 
response to the emerging communist movement and other possible political oppositions 
from the Philippines. Such military assistance included the training of Filipino personnel, 
as well as equipment, weaponry, and other provisions that would better equip these 
cooperatives for suppressing political resistance to the dominant paradigms of the ―U.S.-
Philippine nation‖ (at least for a five-year period). This act, known as H.R. 6572 (e.g. the 
Military Foreign Assistance Act), was formally introduced by a vice admiral to the 
Committee of Foreign Affairs on June 7, 1946, and later was passed unanimously by 
Congress on June 3 of the same year. 
It could also be suggested that such military assistance, provided by this Military 
Foreign Assistance Act, included the informal investigations of Jesus Bautista and other 
local Filipinos who sparked U.S. officials‘ suspicions of being possibly ―subversive‖ to 
their emerging ―U.S.-Philippine nation.‖ Financial and official assistance in such 
investigations might have been left ―off the record‖ within the Committee of Foreign 
Affairs hearings that led to the passage of the act. This was implied by the following 




Bloom to Vice Admiral Sherman: ―if there is anything that you think should be out of the 
record at that point please say so, and then the reporter will make a note of that…‖
41
 
Given that these investigations were never discussed during these hearings, it is likely 
that they were implemented informally and within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of 
American military officials in the Philippines during the Truman presidency. 
Nevertheless, with the passage of the Military Assistance Act of 1946, along with US 
officials‘ informal investigations of their Filipino civilian workers, officials felt more 
comfortable in securing their ideological partnership with the Philippines, an emerging 
sovereign nation that Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman noted as a ―‗keystone in the 
foundation of a base system essential to the security of the United States, its possessions, 
the Western Hemisphere, and the Philippines.‘‖
42
  
While the general conditions of global Cold War politics shaped the context 
behind these massive investigations in the Philippine archipelago, the question of 
Philippine independence provided another factor informing such inquiries. Nonetheless, 
despite these abundant and, in some cases, inconclusive investigations, the Philippine 
Independence Act was finally passed by U.S. Congress in 1946. This act thereby declared 
the Philippines ―independent‖ from the United States, hence defining the Philippines as a 
―sovereign‖ nation. The resolution of the Bautista case occurred amidst the broader 
declaration of Philippine Independence, and so it appeared that there was an increasing 
mutual sense of security and postwar bi-national friendship between these two 
independent nations during the Cold War. However, I argue that the ―resolution‖ of this 
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case signified the emergence of the Philippines as a newly sovereign nation under the 
auspices of a neo-colonial politics of a joint ―U.S.-Philippine nation.‖  
After clearance from further recommendation for general court martial trial, Jesus 
Bautista requested back pay in 1947. This proposed back pay consisted of unpaid labor 
and benefits during his tenure in the navy. While the U.S. Navy took care of any missing 
income or benefits due to Bautista as an enlistee in the 1930s, the USN never granted 
benefits due to Bautista during his tenure as a civilian worker in the early 1940s. The 
following letter by Bautista himself reported these details and concerns for his civilian 
benefits, along with the USN Board of Review‘s previous interrogations regarding his 
loyalty to the U.S.: 
... I have filed my application for arrears in pay sometime on May, 1945 and up to 
the present I have not received any information thereof as to what action has been 
taken. 
 
In view of the fact that two years had elapsed since I filed mine, I presumed this 
has been held for some reasons unknown to me. 
 
I was investigated several times at the Garita School accusing me that I belong to 
the Sakdalista Party, which charges were without foundation. 
 
I was also investigated by the Naval Intelligence Office and as a result thereof, I 
was cleared of the charges preferred against me and because such charges were 
without foundation, I was paid all monies due me as an enlisted man in the Naval 
Reserve. 
 
As a civilian employee of the US Navy Yard Cavite payment for my backpay was 
not paid, so I respectfully request that I be investigated in order that all wages due 
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Shortly after his request, however, U.S. military officials denied Bautista‘s request for the 
same reasons behind their initial recommendation of Bautista for court martial trial. Their 
first reason was Bautista‘s previous possible associations with the Sakdalistas and the 
Japanese military. Their second reason was the slight possibility of Bautista‘s treasonous 
activities against the U.S. government. On October 16, 1947, in a memorandum to the 
assistant secretary of the U.S. Navy, Commander James C. Bigler reported the following: 
… Records of Commander US Naval Forces Philippines disclose that the Board 
of Review to screen active, reserve, and retired naval personnel suspected of 
alleged collaboration, recommended the subject-named man for trial by general 
court martial. The convening authority disapproved the recommendation because 
of the insufficiency of proof available to support the charge of treason. However, 
records obviously reveal that: 
 
a. Bautista voluntarily worked for the Japanese in the Cavite Navy Yard 
in September 1942; 
 
b. That he left his employment in May 1943 because he heard that the 
Japanese were rounding all ex-servicemen; 
 
c. Before the war he attended three public meetings of the Sakdalista 
Party, but said ‗he never joined the party‘; 
 
d. Two of his daughters worked in a Japanese bar, and 
 
e. One of his daughters married a Japanese by the name of Okamina. 
 
… Bautista‘s activities during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines are 
considered derogatory to the established policy of the Navy Department. It is, 




In other words, the USN Board of Review‘s grounds for releasing Bautista from 
recommendation for trial were the same as those that USN Commander Bigler cited when 
he recommended and enforced the denial of benefits to Bautista. Therefore, like the 
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250,000 Filipino war veterans who fought for the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ after FDR‘s 
1941 recruitment decree, Bautista was denied benefits and back pay for the services he 
performed during the Second World War under the auspices of the 1946 Rescission Act. 
While Philippine sovereignty and wartime dissociation from the U.S. were the rhetorical 
logics for U.S. congressional disapproval of Filipino veteran benefits, possible treasons 
against the U.S. government provided the rhetorical basis for the denial of Bautista—and 
other Filipino civilian workers—from receiving back pay and benefits from the U.S. 
government. 
During this stage of emerging Philippine independence, fears of Filipino treason 
shaped U.S. policymakers‘ conceptualization of the Philippines as less ready for self-
government and national self-defense, and hence more likely to be swept up by prevalent 
―enemy‖ nations of the U.S. neo-imperial metropolis. These strategic conceptualizations, 
commonly reminiscent of racialist perceptions of Filipinos in the colonial period, 
facilitated U.S. officials‘ decisions to pass and enforce policies that only added more 
exceptions to the ideologically sovereign foundations of the Philippine Independence Act 
and the Philippine National Constitution. For instance, the Bell Trade Act, passed in 
1946, continued the uneven trade dependencies of the Philippines toward the U.S. for 
national and economic stability. The Military Bases Agreement, passed in 1947, enforced 
the retention of U.S. military bases in the Philippines for another ninety-nine years. In 
addition, the numerous revisions of the Military Bases Agreement throughout the 1950s 
reinforced the quantitative terms and conditions of Filipino enlistment into the U.S. 
Navy. While the enlistment of Filipinos in the U.S. Navy largely shifted from exclusion 




work as domestic servants for naval officers, as in the colonial period. These continuums 




LABOR MOVEMENTS, LAWS, AND POLICIES IN THE EARLY COLD WAR 
PERIOD OF THE “U.S.-PHILIPPINE NATION” 
 
Through militaristic, political, and economic measures, the U.S. was able to exert 
military control over Filipino laborers, particularly over those working within the military 
bases within and beyond the Philippines. Claiming responsibility for the creation and 
stability of the Philippine nation-state, U.S. officials felt it was necessary to maintain 
military presence—if not hegemony—in the Philippines. The mutual agreement of this 
contradiction between the ideality of Philippine sovereignty and the reality of U.S. 
military hegemony in the archipelago was no more evident than in the Military Bases 
Agreement between U.S. and Philippine officials on March 14, 1947. The Military Bases 
Agreement (MBA) allowed for the continuing U.S. military base presence in the 
Philippines for another ninety-nine years—free of rent. For U.S. officials, the Military 
Bases Agreement was instrumental in maintaining U.S. national security interests during 
the early stages of the Cold War—not just in the Philippines, but throughout the Asia-
Pacific as well.
46
 Simultaneously, the MBA allowed for the conditions of Philippine 
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During the course of the 1950s and 1960s, Filipino officials, civilians and laborers 
would contest the contradictory foundations in which the Military Bases Agreement was 
implemented, especially in matters of sovereignty and jurisdiction. More specifically, 
they would contest U.S. officials ―rights‖ to conduct trials on their personnel who 
committed assault crimes against Filipinos within or beyond the bases.  In my brief field 
research of such cases, these assault crimes by U.S. military personnel were normally 
brought under or transferred to U.S. jurisdiction, despite pleas by the local plaintiffs and 
their regional supporters to bring the accused to justice under the Philippine courts of 
law. Under U.S. jurisdiction, the ―defendants‖ of these crimes were often deported or 
transferred to the U.S., where they continued their enlistments in detention centers, 
awaited further trial in U.S. courts, or were merely discharged from the U.S. military 
without further trial under U.S. civil courts. This lenient politics of enlistment applied to 
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U.S. enlistees and officers who committed recorded crimes of assault and were tried 
under U.S. rather than Philippine jurisdiction.
48
  
Despite the fact that these crimes were committed on Philippine sovereign 
territory, U.S. jurisdiction over these cases was enforced under the 1947 Military Bases 
Agreement which directly contradicted with the Philippine Independence Act in 1946. 
Though periodical revisions were made to the agreement that apparently allowed more 
involvement by Philippine legal officials in these cases, U.S. military officials usually 
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overruled their interventions and transferred these cases to U.S. jurisdiction.
 49
 Thus, the 
enforcement of U.S. jurisdiction, over Philippine oversight, of such assault cases further 
illuminated the uneven and contradictory conditions of the U.S. and Philippine bi-
national relationship between the mid-1940s and mid-1960s. On one hand, the Garcia-
Bendesten talks in 1956 and other formal revisions of the MBA rhetorically enforced 
Philippine jurisdiction over crimes committed by Americans on Philippine soil. On the 
other, these written assurances would later be overturned, further reinforcing U.S. 
military control over Filipino workers and other locals on these bases in the Philippines.
50
 
U.S. military hegemony in the Philippines was exercised not only by U.S. 
officials, but especially in collaboration with Philippine military officials and personnel. 
Such collaborations were reinforced by the interventions of the Joint U.S. Military 
Advisory Group (JUSMAG). JUSMAG was a collaborative effort among branches of the 
U.S. military service to train the Armed Forces of the Philippines in combating political 
subversives of the U.S.-Philippine nation state. Thus, JUSMAG assisted the Philippine 
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Armed Forces in serving the interests of U.S. national security in the Philippines
51
, and 
they played a prevalent role in subduing political subversions among Filipino locals 
within and beyond the U.S. bases in the Philippines, especially during the late 1940s and 
early 1950s. 
Other treaties made between the U.S. and other Southeast Asian nations further 
solidified U.S. military control over the Philippines and the local workers in the bases. 
For example, in 1954, U.S. officials met with other Southeast Asian countries in Manila 
to implement more stringent and broader measures to secure U.S. national interests in 
Southeast Asia. What transpired from this series of meetings was the Manila Pact. This 
pact spurred the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). 
Comprising of officials from Australia, France, New Zealand, Thailand, England, and the 
Philippines, the U.S. founded SEATO in behalf of their ―‗regional defense of Asia.‘‖
52
 In 
other words, the Manila Pact and the subsequent creation of SEATO enforced the U.S.‘s 
―right‖ to draw the Philippines into any war in Southeast Asia on behalf of U.S. national 
interests. These developments also permitted the U.S. to collaborate with other Southeast 
Asian governments to suppress emergent politically subversive formations in the 
Philippine archipelago as well.
53
 Five years later, in 1959, Philippine Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs Felixberto Serrano corresponded with U.S. Ambassador Charles Bohlen 
in a two-year series of conferences that culminated in 1961. In this series of conferences, 
Bohlen and Serrano discussed the conditions of mutuality regarding U.S. military base 
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presence in the Philippines, as well as the degree of continuing American military 
assistance to the Philippines against foreign and domestic political subversives within the 
U.S.-Philippine nation state.  
What transpired from this two-year series of conferences was the Bohlen-Serrano 
Agreement. This agreement, in written form, reduced the lease of U.S. military presence 
in the Philippines from ninety-nine to twenty-five years, while simultaneously 
surrendering 118,000 hectares of land to the Philippine nation-state. Nevertheless, over 
time, these and other related agreements never came to material fruition, as the U.S. 
military maintained its hegemonic control over Filipino locals, including their workers in 
and beyond these bases in the Philippines. As stated by Philippine policy analyst Roland 
Simbulan, ―[i]n their daily encounters with the Americans in the bases, Filipino base 
employees have reported discriminatory treatment as in the inequality of salary scales 
between Filipino employees and their American counter-parts, security of tenure arbitrary 




In addition, the immediate aftermaths of World War II, coupled with the 
prevailing need for U.S. economic and military assistance to rehabilitate the Philippines, 
fostered the structural conditions for U.S. military exertion of control over the Philippine 
archipelago. The overwhelming sense of indebtedness felt by elite and non-elite Filipinos 
for U.S. ―liberation‖ and assistance, during and following the Second World War, further 
facilitated this structure of feeling among Filipinos for general assistance from U.S. 
officials in the economic and military rehabilitation of the Philippines. In 1946, U.S. 
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Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act, e.g. the Bell Bill, which aimed to provide 
economic aid to the Philippines, along with war and military reparations for the next 
twenty years.
55
 Additionally, the Military Assistance Act was passed by U.S. Congress to 
enforce the economic rehabilitation of the Philippines from the infrastructural aftermaths 
of the Second World War, and to provide more stringent measures to prevent the 
occupation of the Philippines by domestic and foreign ―subversives‖ to the U.S.-
Philippine nation state. 
Additionally, to further understand the applicable labor laws, policies, and 
movements that occurred in the early postwar period, one has to consider the 1947 
Military Bases Agreement (MBA), coupled with the MBA‘s amended revisions to the 
1946 Philippine Independence Act. The MBA allowed for the continuance of strategic 
U.S. military jurisdiction and base operations in the Philippines, as well as the limited 
inclusion of Filipino civilians and enlistees. However, the MBA ceased to address the 
applicability of Philippine labor laws to U.S. bases on Philippine national territory. 
This evident gap in the MBA left Philippine labor law more open to bilateral, if 
not unilateral, debate among elite and non-elite agents of both national governments. U.S. 
military officers and employers often argued for U.S. jurisdiction over Philippine labor 
laws on the bases. According to these U.S. officials, the U.S. already adhered to 
Philippine labor laws and policies. Hence, they considered the question of Philippine 
sovereignty on U.S. bases as irrelevant in the first place. Meanwhile, Philippine military, 
labor, and political officials often argued one or both of the following: one, the legal 
conditions of Philippine national sovereignty required its own interpretation of its labor 
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laws and policies to be practiced on U.S. bases in the Philippines; and two, given the fact 
that Philippine labor laws and policies were inherently ―copied from their American 
counterparts,‖ U.S. officials should unconditionally accept the applicability of local labor 
laws and policies on ‗their‘ military bases. These diverging interpretations of Philippine 
labor law on U.S. bases are further explored in the proceeding sections in this chapter as 
they transpired from the Bartolome Roldan case, as well as from other cases and 
subsequent proposals that contested the dominant paradigms of the ―U.S.-Philippine 
nation.‖ 
Philippine political officials such as Sergio Osmeña, the Philippine 
Commonwealth president following Manuel Quezon, did not have as much support from 
U.S. Washington officials as did succeeding presidents in the post-Independence period. 
Such backing by U.S. Washington officials was confirmed with Philippine presidential 
candidate Manuel Roxas‘s affirmation that he would continue ―friendly relations‖ with 
the U.S.—in terms of trade and aid—if Roxas was elected as president of the emerging 
sovereign nation. Subsequently, U.S. support almost certainly determined the election of 
Roxas, as with succeeding presidential candidates.
56
  This conditional backing by U.S. 
officials involved the active role of these Philippine presidents, and their political 
officials, in suppressing ―subversive‖ elements that stood against the political, economic, 
and social criteria of the U.S.-Philippine nation. For these elected political officials, they 
felt it crucial, if not necessary, that they publicly demonstrate absolute loyalty to the U.S. 
without any hint of denying U.S. claims to Philippine sovereignty. This was especially 
evident, arguably, in the outcome of the first Philippine national election in 1946, with 
Manuel Roxas becoming the Philippine national president. Such public claims of loyalty 
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to the U.S. were evident in Roxas‘s inauguration speech on July 4, 1946, when he urged 
the Filipinos to have ―‗absolute faith in the goodness of America.‘‖ According to Roxas, 
―‗to do otherwise… would be to foreswear all faith in democracy, in our future, and in 
ourselves… Our safest course, and I believe it is true for the rest of the world as well, is 
in the glistening wake of America whose sure advance with mighty prow breaks for 
smaller craft the waves of fear.‘‖
57
  
These threads of bi-national continuity and political suppression (especially 
toward the poor and laboring class) were prevalent in varying degrees with succeeding 
Philippine presidents and political officials in barrio, provincial, and national levels of the 
―sovereign‖ government. For instance, President Quirino, according to Dante G. 
Guevarra, initiated the passage of the Magna Carta of Labor in 1949. This provision was 
meant to promote productive and harmonious relations between employers and their 
employees under the revised rubric ―labor-management relations.‖ Nevertheless, 
provision and revision of labor-management relations never came to material fruition 
during Quirino‘s presidency.
58
 In fact, the opposite became true as President Quirino 
most explicitly exerted control over the Philippine labor masses with what came to be 
known as the ―Quirino-Figueras strategy‖. This strategy of curtailing mass labor 
movement involved what Guevera noted as ―the outright busting of the union and the 
abduction and murder of labor leaders.‖
59
 Nonetheless, arguably no Philippine president 
in the pre-Marcos era was as vigilant in bi-national collaboration with the U.S. and 
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structural coercion of subversive masses as Ramon Magsaysay (1949-1953). President 
Magsaysay‘s public and covert politico-military collaborations with the Eisenhower 
administration led to the diffusion and dissemination of one of the most profound 
wartime collaborators-turned-postwar antagonists of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖: the 
Hukbalahaps. While this insight is discussed in further analysis in chapter three, it is 
important to briefly note, in this overview, the bi-national measures of militarism 
employed by the Magsaysay administration in securing the U.S.-Philippine nation-state at 
the cost of the mass existence of the Hukbalahaps and other organizations that were seen 
as political opponents to this bi-national and neo-colonial enterprise. 
Philippine political officials during the presidency of Carlos Garcia (1957-1961) 
took similar acts to suppress any hints at intellectual subversion. Such measures were 
evident in the 1957 Anti-Subversion Act which succeeded, in many levels, in achieving 
this very outcome of compliance among the masses. According to Bienvenido Lumbera 
in ―From Colonizer to Liberator: How U.S. Colonialism Succeeded in Reinventing Itself 
after the Pacific War‖, a conference held by the University of the Philippines in Diliman 
proved how much impact this act and other measures by Philippine political officials had 
in securing the ―U.S.-Philippine nation-state‖ at the cost of silencing the masses to a 
significant degree. During this conference, for instance, the potential influence of such 
visiting journalists as radicals Renato Constantino, I.P. Soliongco, and Hernando Abaya, 
coupled with the request for the passage of a resolution/petition that protested against 
―military interference in intellectual affairs‖, was profoundly limited (to a certain degree) 
by the actual military surveillance of these conference speakers. Such military 








However, sovereign-based alliances between Philippine political officials and 
mass labor interests were more evident in the late 1950s. Undersecretary of Justice Jesus 
Barrera‘s alliance with one of the key labor cases, Bartolome Roldan et al, was just one 
example of these alliances between Philippine political officials and laborers during this 
period. This was evident in Barrera‘s open political stance that ―the Philippine 
Government has jurisdiction over the American Bases in the country,‖ including the 
jurisdiction to investigate labor conditions in Clark Air Force Base.
61
 The political 
positioning of this politico-legal official was notably referenced earlier in the November 
21, 1957 issue of the Manila Chronicle regarding the labor case of Bartolome Roldan. 
Shortly thereafter, Barrera‘s comments were referenced by U.S. military officials who 
became widely concerned about their approach to the Roldan case and the press coverage 
surrounding it. (More details on this case, including the emerging political shifts among 
labor officials, were evident in these correspondences concerning this particular case. 
Such details will be further assessed in chapter four.) 
 More grounds of commonality between the laboring Filipino masses and 
Philippine political officials were most evident during the Macapagal presidency (1961-
1965). His presidency allowed more relative room for organizing, mobilizing, and 
building among the Philippine labor masses. According to labor policy analyst Dante G. 
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Guevarra, ―it was only during the tenure of President Macapagal that the working class 
and peasantry somehow enjoyed a comparatively fair treatment and consideration.‖
62
 
This was evident through his policies of land reform, implementation of tenement 
housings, and other governmental projects that ―relieved the tension between the 
government and labor.‖
63
 Nevertheless, as with other Philippine presidents, Macapagal‘s 
ability to open more space for labor organization, mobility, and overall massive building 
was structurally limited by continual conditions of U.S. hegemony.  
Philippine military officials, especially during the postwar period, were 
instrumental in enforcing the policies of the Philippine-U.S. nation-state—policies that 
were carried out by Philippine political officials. Nevertheless, there were exceptions, 
particularly during the late 1950s. The Philippine military liaison officer of Subic Bay, 
for example, was one official who pleaded to U.S. counterparts for more equitable 
retirement benefits to a more inclusive populace of Filipino laborers. More specifically, 
in an October 17, 1958 letter of correspondence to the Philippine-United States Mutual 
Defense Board, the Philippine military liaison officer of Subic Bay reported ―that only a 
small portion of Filipino workers at the US Naval Base, Subic Bay are covered by the 
U.S. Federal Civil Service Retirement System.‖
64
 Conclusively, the Philippine military 
liaison officer held American officials more accountable for the uneven distribution of 
retirement benefits to Filipino civilian workers during this period. Aside from this and 
(likely) other exceptions, most of the Philippine military officials during the postwar 
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period were much more eager to cooperate with the U.S.-Philippine nation-state: at the 
cost of subjecting Filipino masses to economic exploitation and inequality. Such 
cooperation and subjection were just as prevalent within JUSMAG during the postwar 
period as within the Philippine constabulary during the colonial prewar period—
particularly in suppressing such ―subversives‖ to the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ as Amado 
Hernandez and others. 
Moreover, Philippine labor officials, especially during the early Cold War period 
(1945-1961), were often as instrumental in carrying out the ideological and material 
duties of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ as their military counterparts. These labor officials 
were not union members or leaders. Rather, they were an integral part of the Philippine 
national government. In addition, these officials mostly acted in direct collaboration with 
military, political, and diplomatic officials of the U.S. nation-state. For example, Pedro 
Magsalin, Assistant Secretary of Labor during the late 1940s, appeared to be in absolute 
cooperation with U.S. military officials in labor matters related to Filipino civilian 
workers in Guam. This was evidenced in his probable willingness to distribute false 
information to the press which would provide ―news‖ of positive labor conditions among 
civilian Filipino workers in Guam—instead of the material realities of exploitation 
shaping the everyday experience of these laborers on-base. This probable willingness was 
cited in a written memorandum by Lieutenant T.K. Cencebaugh, a civilian personnel 
officer, to the commanding officer at Sangley Point on February 26, 1948. In this 
memorandum, Cencebaugh recalled a conference held by Philippine Secretary of Labor 
Magsalin. During this conference, Magsalin met with U.S. naval officials and corporate 




meeting with U.S. military and corporate officials, Magsalin provided space for these 
officials to voice their concerns and dissatisfactions with the local Filipino press. This 




Nevertheless, by the early 1960s, some labor officials were deemed as ―less pro-
American‖ than they were in the previous decade. More specifically, some of these labor 
officials diverted from absolute loyalty to the U.S.-Philippine nation-state by being more 
responsive to the concerns of the civilian Filipino laborers. One labor official, in 
particular, was Bernadino Abes who by 1963 was the new labor secretary of the 
Philippines.
66
 Abes, according to U.S. labor attaché Norman Johnson, provided 
―professionally competent‖ but ―less pro-American leadership‖
67
 than this U.S. official 
had expected. The direct reasons for Johnson‘s declaration of Abes‘s leadership as ―less 
pro-American‖ were not stated in the written historical record. Nevertheless, evidence of 
Abes‘s increased budget for ―manpower counseling services‖ illustrated that Abes was 
more responsive to the needs of the Filipino laborers than to the statecraft of the U.S.-
Philippine nation-state. This alone arguably spurred this U.S. labor attaché to characterize 
Abes‘s leadership as ―less pro-American‖ than initially desired. In addition, according to 
Norman Johnson‘s report, Secretary of Labor Abes‘s active concerns, in regards to the 
welfare of Filipino civilian workers in Guam, were clearly demonstrated in Abes‘s 
instruction to the manager of the Manila Employment Office of the Philippines (at the 
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time), Emeraldo de Leon. Supposedly, Abes‘s order was for de Leon to visit Guam and 
report on such labor conditions in this U.S. militarized region of the Pacific.
68
 
By contrast, since the end of World War II, radically grassroots organizations like 
the Hukbalahaps argued not just for actual Philippine sovereignty of its U.S. bases, but 
especially for Philippine national sovereignty and the sweeping obliteration of U.S. 
hegemony in its entirety. Besides the key role that U.S. and Philippine officials and labor 
groups played in the imperial shaping of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖, it is imperative to 
consider the critical impact that the Huks had on Philippine worker movements, labor 
policies, and labor laws—as well as the measures that U.S. and Philippine labor, military, 
and political officials took to enforce their hegemony with all their privileged political 
might. Like the Sakdalistas who came before them, the Huks were a direct response to 
the post-Depression economic strife plaguing the Philippine archipelago. In addition, like 
the ideological framework of the Sakdals, the United Front platform guiding the 
grassroots ideology of the Huks was grounded in a sense of solidarity between 
themselves, the workers, and the peasantry for a classless, democratic, and sovereign 
Philippine nation. Their solidarity, in turn, stood in opposition to the hegemonic 
continuities of U.S. rule, along with the labor laws, policies, and negotiations that 
enforced the continuities of U.S. imperial hegemony in the Philippines. These historical 
developments transpired, in profound ways, at the cost of the socioeconomic welfare and 
broader political mobility of the workers and peasants. 
In 1945, after the U.S. Liberation Campaign and Japanese evacuation in the 
Philippines, a clear and sudden shift occurred in the Huks‘ ―United Front‖ policy.  In 
World War II, the Huks‘ sense of this ―United Front‖ entailed not just uniting with 
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workers and peasants in the classless sense, but also with U.S. and Philippine nationalism 
in the bi-national sense. Nonetheless, after the ―Good War,‖ the Huks continued to 
witness the following entangled triangulation. First, they encountered the ongoing 
economic strife in the Philippines from the devastations of World War II. For example, in 
the Cavite Province, one of the most exemplary sites of U.S.-Philippine military elite 
collaboration, the war had left the region ―with destroyed buildings, roads, bridges, and 
farms leaving the people in dismal poverty.‖
69
 Second, they observed the class 
distinctions and marginalization by elite agents of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation.‖ And 
third, the Huks experienced the ongoing national economic strife and class exclusions 
under the neo-imperial hegemony of the U.S. as an informal empire in the Philippines. In 
subsequence, the Huks shifted their politics of U.S. recognition from post-colonial 
collaboration to anti-colonial opposition. Witnessing this political shift among the Huks, 
U.S. officials took great lengths to keep a pro-U.S. sense of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ 
intact among Philippine elite officials through active bi-national collaboration against the 
Huks. Collaborative efforts between U.S. and Philippine officials sought the obliteration 
of the then-communist organization, along with the Huks‘ actual and potential allies in 
and beyond the Philippine archipelago. 
Informal and formal steps to dispose the Huks were threefold. First, during the 
Philippine presidency of Ramon Magsaysay, U.S. and Philippine officials, led by the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), distributed and propagated leaflets, pamphlets, and 
other propaganda to the non-elite workers and peasantry in Luzon and other provinces in 
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the Philippine archipelago—particularly in localities that were likely to be influenced by 
the Huks. Second, these officials formally collaborated, in the militaristic sense, through 
the formation and practices of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG). And 
thirdly, the mutual insurance of confidentiality in conducting these propagandistic and 
militaristic exercises was enforced in order to prevent further subversive acts of protest 
and revolution from taking place during this time of Cold War politics. 
By the mid-1950s, the Hukbalahaps were dissipated by the consensual and 
coercive modes of governance of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation.‖ The Huks‘ influence on 
workers and the peasantry greatly decreased over time as their radical politics—like the 
Sakdalistas before them—shifted toward a more moderate, liberal, and collaborative 
platform. This radical shift in Huk politics was none more evidenced than in the political 
neutralization of founder and leader Luis Taruc during the Magasaysay presidency in 
1953. Hence, the history of the Huks provided key lessons for the elite creators and 
enforcers of Philippine labor law, as well as for the non-elite laborers and peasantry. 
For the elite enforcers of Philippine labor law and policy, the rise and fall of the 
Huks meant that the U.S.-Philippine nation state‘s methods of consensual and coercive 
politics were effective and necessary in the suppression of what it perceived as savage 
acts of subversion and threat against its Cold War politics. Hence, to U.S. officials and 
their elite Philippine collaborationists, structural stability, security, and sustenance of the 
U.S.‘s empire statecraft remained intact: especially during a time when U.S. officials felt 








For the workers and peasantry impacted on the ground, the Huks‘ dissipation and 
the U.S.-Philippine nation-state‘s implementations meant clear limitations on how broad 
and ―anti-colonial‖ grassroots labor politics could be without the apparent cost of their 
social upbringing and cultural well-being. Thus, after the apparent demise of the Huks: 
moderate reformism, business trade unionism, and active participation in electoral 
politics became further prioritized over the anti-colonial lineage of the Sakdals and Huks 
since the 1930s. 
These political and radical shifts toward moderate reformism and electoral politics 
could be seen in the diffused leaderships of the Sakdals and Huks themselves. 
Nevertheless, these reformist politics were more than prevalent in the postwar period 
through the collaborationist activities of emerging labor and trade unions since 1950. 
These unions included the National Confederation of Trade Unions (NCTU), the 




However politically prevalent and business-oriented these labor unions were 
during the early Cold War, there were sporadic but critically significant individuals and 
groups who continued to contest the dominant and structural paradigms of the ―U.S.-
Philippine nation‖ and the U.S. informal empire. These ongoing contestations occurred 
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despite the fact that, according to cultural critic Theodore Gonzalves, they were 
expressed from ―an incredibly isolated and unpopular position‖ during that time.
72
 These 
politically charged—and inspiring—individuals who continued at all costs to resist the 
hegemonic foundations of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ and its informal empire included 
Senator Claro Recto, Justice Secretary Jose Diokno, Congress of Labor Chair Amado V. 
Hernandez, and a plentitude of others. Grassroots-based groups who provided parallel 
contributions at similar costs included the Partido Komunista ng Pilipino (PKP), the 
Philippine Workers Union, and Katipunang-Manggagawang Pilipino (KMP). 
While there were periodic signs of resistance toward the elite and collaborationist 
paradigms of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖, the dominant presence of the latter manifested 
in the establishment of Philippine labor departments, laws, and policies which one 
Philippine labor official coined as ―copies of their American counterparts.‖
73
 These 
departments and policies included the Philippine Department of Labor, the Philippine 
Department of Foreign Affairs, the Minimum Wage Act, Eight Hour Law, among 
countless other examples. It might be argued by such historians as Stanley Karnow that 
Philippine officials implemented these labor laws and policies to showcase two things: 
one, the modernization and westernization of the Philippines; and two, further political 
recognition of the Philippines as a sovereign nation under the modernist and westernized 
standards of the U.S. nation-state. These labor laws and policies, to a significant degree, 
further displayed the Philippines as a model ―former‖ colony, a newly sovereign nation, 
and (besides Japan) one of the staunchest U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific. 
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The historical impact that these Philippine labor laws, policies, and departments 
had on demonstrating Philippine sovereignty cannot be overstated. Nevertheless, these 
same exact labor laws, policies, and departments could clearly and suddenly be 
considered as obsolete—if not invalid—by U.S. military officials at any given time. This 
was especially the case if the applicability of Philippine labor law on the bases meant the 
potential criminalization of and further contestation against the elite and hegemonic 
practices of the imperial ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ in the neo-colonial period. The lacking 
applicability of Philippine military and labor laws on these bases consequently impacted 
the subjectivity of Filipino laborers in these militarized areas of the Philippines. The 
extent of such impact, from documented subjectivities of Luzon-based Filipinos within 
and near these militarized areas, will be examined in chapter three. 
Meanwhile, the next chapter shifts our attention to the Filipino enlisted workers in 
the U.S. Navy, particularly the degrees of inclusion and marginalization within 
militarized spaces in particular, and within the US nation-state in general. To what extent 
did Navy policies—and politics—of enlistment shape the recruitment and experience of 
enlisted Filipinos in the U.S. Navy, particularly during the World War II period? This 
















Filipino Nationals, Racial Minorities, and the Politics of U.S. Navy Enlistment in a 




It was late morning of August 6, 1945. Lunching aboard the U.S.S. Augusta on the way 
back to D.C. from the Potsdam Conference, President Harry Truman and Secretary of 
State Henry Stimson received illuminating news from the ship‘s captain and the U.S. 
Navy Department. The announcement was as follows: ―The Japanese port of Hiroshima 
had been bombed a few hours before, under perfect weather conditions and with no 
opposition.‖
74
 Soon after hearing the message, Truman relayed the news to the officers 
and crewmembers of the ship, including the mess officer who set the menu for his lunch 
and the enlisted Filipino stewards who had cooked and served the lunch to President 
Truman. In response to hearing the news, everyone cheered and clapped in patriotic 
celebration, including the white officers, the African American head steward, and the 
Filipino stewards aboard the ship.
75
 
For the U.S. President and white officers aboard this presidential yacht, this 
moment signified a victorious celebration of U.S. nationhood and values of liberty, 
democracy and freedom at home and abroad. For Japanese forces and citizens in their 
homeland during this wartime period, the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima, and Nagasaki 
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just two days later, marked one of the most devastating forms of dehumanization in 
Japanese, United States and global history in general. Meanwhile, for hundreds of 
thousands of American citizens of Japanese descent who were displaced as camp 
internees during World War II, this moment of U.S. national victory would eventually 
lead to less anti-Japanese sentiment within the U.S. 
For the Filipino nationals and other U.S. ethnic and racial minorities enlisted on 
the ship, this moment signified more of a celebratory resolution of a contradiction 
regarding their status and position in the navy, rather than a moment of consummate 
victory. These minoritized navy workers experienced and embodied the contradiction 
between their enlistment in the defense of ―freedom‖ and ―democracy‖, and their 
everyday experience of ethnic and racial exclusion, discrimination, and internment. 
Celebratory moments, like the multiracial celebration aboard Truman‘s presidential 
yacht, illustrated the resolution of their conflicting emotions stemmed from the nature of 
their work experience. Their ambivalences were further resolved by their inclusion in the 
U.S. nation-state, as signified by their very enlistment, citizenship, and promised access 
to veterans‘ benefits vis-à-vis the G.I. Bill. Ironically, however, this commonsensical and 
fraternal sense of resolution concealed and reinforced the structural realities of race, 
class, and gender discrimination within the civilian and military spaces of U.S. American 
popular culture. 
By examining the policies of enlisted Filipinos, and comparing their treatment to 
that afforded to other U.S. ethnic and racial minorities, this chapter assesses the origins of 
these contradictions between freedom and internment, between democracy and 




shaped the wartime and postwar articulations of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖, and the 
U.S. as an empire. In what ways did the policies and politics of U.S. Navy enlistment 
facilitate the agency of Filipino nationals and other U.S. racial and ethnic minorities 
within and despite the bi-national politics of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖? Drawing upon 
the perspectives and experiences of enlisted stewards and civilians concerned about their 
plight, this chapter examines the politics of the Navy‘s policies and the role of Navy 
Filipino enlistees in reinforcing the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ and the U.S. as a global 
empire. 
Three sections shape this chapter‘s structure and inquiries. The first section offers 
an additional overview of the primary concept that guides the historical and theoretical 
framework of this chapter: the politics of enlistment. The second section provides a 
historiographical and historical overview of the recruitment and enlistment of Filipinos in 
the U.S. Navy from the Philippine-American War in 1899 to World War II. The third 
section assesses the correspondences among and between the military and civilian 
spheres, and how these discourses shaped the conditions of enlistment among Filipinos 
and other U.S. racial and ethnic minorities—from 1941 to 1945. 
In this chapter, I make three overarching arguments. Firstly, the U.S. Navy (USN) 
informally continued to enlist Filipinos from the Philippines during the early 1940s, 
despite the fact that the status of the Philippines as an independent commonwealth 
officially prevented the Navy from doing so. Moreover, congressional revisions of the 
Nationality Act in 1940 officially permitted the naturalization of Filipinos after three 




promised citizenship for Filipinos after five years of service in the U.S. military.
76
 This 
condition of naval enlistment illuminated an additional contradiction in U.S.-Philippine 
relations between Philippine ―sovereignty‖ and U.S. military hegemony in the 
Philippines. Eventually, the official enlistment of Filipinos resumed in 1944 when the 
naval insular force was abolished and the USN began enlisting Filipinos this time as 
foreign nationals, along with enlistees from other countries (plus Guam).  
Secondly, the U.S. Navy exclusively placed minoritized enlistees as cooks, 
messmen, and stewards under restricted allowances and, oft times, degrading treatment. 
Whereas some naval officers preferred Filipino enlistees serving such needs, others 
preferred African Americans, Mexican Americans, and/or Chinese Americans as cooks, 
messmen, and stewards. Factors determining such preferences often were contingent 
upon regional dominance or dominant conceptualizations of at least one of these minority 
groups within the U.S. bases. While local bases and transnational military bureaus had 
conflicting racial and ethnic preferences for ―their‖ mess attendants, the continual politics 
and contradictions of enlistment among people of color in the U.S. Navy, coupled with 
the increasing U.S. wartime interventions abroad, materially transpired in the escalating 
recruitment of people of color into the U.S. Navy during World War II.  
And thirdly, the grievances and protests against these politics of minority 
enlistment were often voiced by civilian relatives of these enlistees, rather than the 
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enlistees themselves. These grievances were expressed in the form of written letters to 
naval officials. Nevertheless, the strategic responses by naval officials circumscribed the 
parameters of these grievances and thus facilitated the failure of these inquiries or, at the 
least, limited their scope. Examples of strategic responses ranged from naval officials‘ 
denials of such grievances to renaming the position of these enlistees‘ line of work to 
further conceal the practice of these grievances to the civilian public.  
 
The Politics of Enlistment 
 
As previously stated, I refer to the politics of enlistment as a continuation and departure 
from Paul Kramer‘s conceptualization of the politics of recognition in shaping the racial 
politics and politics of race in the history of colonial Philippines and U.S. empire-
building in general. Kramer argues that U.S. politicians, military officials, and other 
agents recognized Filipinos as both a part of and apart from the U.S. nation-state and its 
imperial project during the course of the American colonial period (circa 1901-1934). On 
the one hand, the politics of recognizing Filipinos as part of the U.S. nation and empire 
building project lay in U.S. racializing conceptions of Filipinos as ―childlike‖ and ―brown 
savages.‖ Through liberal colonial education and multicultural inclusion in the U.S. 
domestic nation-state, U.S. officials felt that Filipinos were potentially capable of being 
―reared‖ and ―modernized‖ under the American colonial project in the Philippines.  On 
the other hand, the politics of recognizing Filipinos as apart from the U.S. nation-state 
and empire building project stemmed in the competing racial conception of Filipinos as 
also ―childlike‖ and ―brown savages‖, and hence incapable of inclusion into the 




These common and competing politics of recognition shaped the U.S. discourses 
and policies on U.S.-Philippine relations during the American colonial period. Such 
policies included U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt‘s official declaration of the 
American colonial state in 1902, the timetable given for Philippine Independence in the 
1916 Jones Act, the declaration of the independent Philippine Commonwealth in the 
1934 Tydings-McDuffie Act, and the willing deportation of Filipinos in the U.S. through 
the 1935 Repatriation Act.  
Nevertheless, Kramer conflates recognition of civilian Filipinos with recognition 
of enlisted Filipinos. My study, however, focuses less on the desire of Filipino elites to 
prove their maturity and capacity for self-governance and more on the educated desire of 
Filipino enlistees to become American subjects and citizens. This shift in topical scope 
provides further insights into the liberal politics of recognition within the context of U.S. 
naval minority enlistment, especially Filipino enlistment. These politics of enlistment, 
I argue, applied more to the case of Filipino and other minority enlistees than to Filipino 
elites desiring to become national officials. More specifically, these politics of enlistment 
spoke more to two tensions adhering to the specific historical contexts of U.S. military 
Filipino enlistment. First tension was Filipinos seeing enlistment as a path toward an 
idealized vision of American freedom and democracy, but simultaneously facing 
discrimination.
77
 Second tension, which I will analyze, was Filipinos viewing enlistment 
as a source of their quest for American inclusion, but at the same time implicating 
involvement in the broader project of U.S. militarism and empire. Enlisted Filipinos 
would only be included in the U.S. imperial project if they pledged and demonstrated 
allegiance to the U.S. nation-state. If otherwise, their inclusion into the U.S. nation-state 
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would be more limited, if not prohibited. Therefore, the conditions for their inclusion 
were also conditions for their marginalization within the U.S. nation-state. In other 
words, the individual inclusion or citizenship aims of Filipinos in the Navy entailed 
supporting the broader imperial project of the U.S. that denied true national independence 
for the Philippines. This chapter, and overall dissertation, enhances our historical 
understanding of these politics of enlistment as they relate to Filipinos within the 
twentieth century military. 
 
Historiographical and Historical Overview of Filipino Enlistment in the U.S. Navy: 
From the Early to Mid-Twentieth Century 
 
The purpose of this historiographical and historical overview of Filipino enlistees in the 
U.S. military, and the navy in particular, is twofold. First is to provide a historical 
overview regarding Filipino enlistees settling in the U.S. Navy and civilian communities. 
And second is to effectively historicize the conditions of inclusion and marginalization of 
Filipino nationals as enlistees in the U.S. since the Philippine-American War in the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. 
With the exception of some sources about Filipino midshipmen in the Nimitz 
Library in Annapolis, Maryland, most of the research for this chapter comes from the 
materials I uncovered regarding enlisted Filipino naval workers at the National Archives 
and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland.
78
 These archives primarily 
contained correspondences by the Bureau of Naval Personnel between 1941 and 1945. 
These have been the most referenced archives by previous scholars who have researched 
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Navy Filipinos and other marginalized subjects in the U.S. Navy.
79
 Naval archivists have 
made these records most immediately available to the public, leading many previous 
scholars to conduct brief research on this group of archives.  Nevertheless, these scholars 
have tended to minimize citations of these and other printed archives. Rather, they have 
favored maximal recognition of oral histories and testimonials.
80
 
As Jesse Quinsaat, Fred Cordova, Kale Fajardo, and numerous other Philippine 
and Filipino American studies scholars have noted, the recruitment and enlistment of 
Navy Filipinos preceded the U.S. arrival on Philippine soil to fight ‗alongside‘ the 
Philippines in the Spanish-American War. During the Spanish colonial period in the 
Philippines, Filipinos were recruited from the Philippines as seamen in the Manila 
Galleon trade beginning in the eighteenth century.
81
 In the early 1900s, during and after 
the Philippine-American War, the U.S. Merchant Marine and U.S. Navy started to recruit 
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and enlist Filipinos from the Philippines.
82
 On April 1, 1901, U.S. President William 
McKinley ordered the enlistment of 500 Filipinos from the Philippines in what came to 
be known as the United States Navy Insular Force. The politics of recognition, in this 
context, served twofold. The first involved the recognition of these enlistees as servants 
of the U.S. Navy and of the U.S. body politic. The second purpose revolved around the 
state‘s recognition of these enlistees as soldiers of the U.S. Navy who would even fight 
against their own to implement and enforce the militarist formations and bases of the 
American colonial state in the Philippines during the Philippine-American War (1899-
1913). These bases included Sangley Point, Clark Air Force Base, Subic Bay, Samar in 
Baguio, among many others.
83
 
Similar presidential wartime policy facilitated Filipino national enlistment into the 
U.S. Navy and other branches of the U.S. military. In 1917, U.S. President Woodrow 
Wilson requested the enlistment and inclusion of 800 Filipino nationals into the U.S. 
Naval Insular Force to serve and fight for the U.S. abroad. Wilson announced his request 
soon after his official retreat from isolationism toward the war and foreign relations. 
Consequently, these enlisted Filipinos fought in behalf of the U.S. during the First World 
War.
84
 During the Second World War, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued an 
executive order that not only mandated the enlistment of at least 120,000 Filipino 
nationals into the U.S. Armed Forces, but also implemented the broader creation of an 
U.S.-Asian military alliance known as the United States Armed Forces of the Far East—
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otherwise known as USAFFE. President Roosevelt enacted this policy on July 26, 1941, 




Even during the pre- and post- war periods of the early twentieth century, the 
U.S.N. continued to enlist Filipino nationals in varying degrees. By 1917, there were 
2,000 enlisted Filipinos in the U.S. Navy serving alongside African American enlistees as 
cooks or messmen. During the course of U.S. involvement in the First World War, the 
number of Filipino enlistees increased significantly, reaching 6,000 by 1919. Shortly after 




Also during this period, Filipinos were recruited—if not transferred—from USN 
stations and ships to work as cooks for the U.S. president in the White House. As early as 
1928, enlisted Filipinos such as Sotero Abiva and Mariano Floresca were hired by U.S. 
navy officials to work for the U.S. president. Following the Second World War, there 
were more than thirty Filipinos serving U.S. President Truman in the White House, in his 
presidential trips abroad, and during his national electoral campaigns.
87
 
Besides enlisted cooks and soldier recruits, there were several Filipinos from the 
Philippines who migrated to the U.S. as students, or midshipmen, in the U.S. Naval 
Academy (USNA). As midshipmen, these enlistees were promising USNA students 
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training to become military officers. On August 29, 1916, United States Congress 
approved an act allowing a maximum of four Filipinos, specifically one per class, to 
receive instruction in the Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland.
88
 In 1925, the number 
of recruits increased by sixteen per year, thereby facilitating the official recruitment of 
one Filipino midshipman per year between 1919 and 1940. 
Because U.S. Congress prohibited these Filipino midshipmen graduates from 
entrance into the U.S. Navy, most of these graduates eventually became officers in the 
Philippine military. For instance, after graduating from the USNA on June 2, 1938, 
Marcelo Sulit Castillo, Jr. became colonel of the 16
th
 Battalion Combat Team in the 
General Headquarters of the Armed Forces in the Philippines (AFP). Moreover, in 1939, 
the Philippine Navy recruited Carlos Jesus Albert, from Lucena City, Luzon, as a captain 
shortly after Albert graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in June of that year. In the 
years following, Colonel Albert served as a detachment commander and training officer 
of the Offshore Patrol Base during WWII before becoming an armed forces attaché and 




Nevertheless, a few Filipino midshipmen graduates eventually settled in the U.S. 
during the early postwar period, working as corporate engineers or (in rare cases) as 
officers, or ensignees, of the U.S. military. Henry Harold Hemenway, who graduated on 
June 4, 1936, worked as a marine generator designer/engineer for the Foster Wheeler 
Corporation in Livingston, New Jersey from 1936 to 1939. From 1959 to 1964, 
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Hemenway became Vice President of Research and Engineering of the Graver Tank 
Division in the Transunion Corporation in Chicago. Also, in 1945, the U.S. Air Force 
enlisted Sergio Castro Molano as a colonel. Molano‘s stations of ensignment included 
Westover, England Air Force Base, the MacGuire, Japan Air Force Base, and the 




While Filipino nationals were continually serving the U.S. Navy as enlistees since 
the Philippine-American War, their inclusion was generally shaped by a form of racial 
paternalism. This form of racial paternalism involved enlisting both African Americans 
and Filipino nationals as cooks, messmen, and stewards. The enlistment of these subjects 
in such menial forms of labor was enforced in both public and private households of U.S. 
naval officers, or what one author has referred to as ―floating plantations.‖
91
 These 
practices of labor placement in the U.S. Navy also defined U.S. political discourses of 
race and citizenship. These political discourses, in turn, shaped varying and sporadic 
degrees of inclusion and marginalization of Filipino nationals within the U.S. national 
body politic. Examples included the recruitment of Philippine nationals as foreign aliens 
in the Philippine-American War (as stated in chapter one), as well as the placement of 
Filipino enlistees within the U.S. citizenry vis-à-vis the 1940 revisions of the Nationality 
Act. 
The congressional hearings and reports surrounding the 1940 Nationality Act, in 
particular, established similar terms and conditions of Filipino inclusion in the U.S. 
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nation-state: specifically among those who were enlisted in most branches of the US 
military (with exception to the US Army) during that period. As previously stated, 
Filipino enlistees who provided at least three years of wartime service were offered 
naturalization  and citizenship in the U.S. nation-state. Additionally, Filipinos who 
enlisted in U.S. vessels would be granted U.S. legal residence, and would be eligible for 
naturalization and citizenship after at least five years of military service. Nevertheless, 
these congressmen assumed that these Filipinos, along with other Asians, would be 
placed as messmen/stewards/cooks in the U.S. military, particularly those enlisted in the 
navy. As Congressman Butler articulated during the House of Representatives 
Subcommittee hearings regarding the 1940 Nationality Act: ―… a good many of these 
vessels at Asiatic stations take on Chinese, Filipinos, and so forth, as mess boys and 
employees of that character… They enlist them, and then later on the vessel they may 
come to the United States.‖
92
  
Moreover, the 1940 revisions of the Nationality Act added another layer to the 
politics of enlistment during this period: the enhancement of diplomatic and strategic 
alliance with Latin American regions, African American communities, and the Philippine 
Commonwealth. By granting naturalization and offering citizenship to enlisted persons 
from these specific origins and affiliations, U.S. officials felt more confident in their 
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diplomatic alliances with these indigenous regions and ethnic communities, especially as 




The Politics of U.S.N. Minority Enlistment: 1941-1945 
 
Before the formal U.S. naval recruitment of Filipino enlistees proceeded in 1944, U.S. 
naval official correspondence concerning potential Filipino enlistment started as early as 
1941. Such concerns were based from local and national demands for mess attendants. In 
a memorandum written to the chief of the Bureau of Navigation in Washington, DC, 
Commander H.W. Osterhaus requested that twelve additional mess attendants be 
stationed under his command in the Treasure Island military base in San Francisco. 
However, all surnames of the requested mess attendants were non-Filipino (based on the 
probable genealogy of their pronounced names): Bunting; Hornbill; Waxbill; Chatterer; 
Aloe; Catalpa; Ebony; Chinquapin; Grosbeak; Killdeer; Merit; and Rocket.
94
 
Nonetheless, during that same year in 1941, in a memorandum written by the 
Director of Enlisted Personnel to the Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, USN 
Captain H.A. Badt reported that the required quantity of messmen during that time was 
9,985. However, the actual amount of reported enlisted messmen, as of September 30, 
1941, was 9,208. In addition, by that time, ―only‖ 176 mess attendants were recruited. By 
June 30, 1942, Badt estimated that 12,700 total enlisted mess attendants would be 
requested and required. Subsequently, a total of 4,000 first mess attendants were 
requested between the end of September, 1941, and June 30, 1942 (i.e., approximately 
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 Overall, during the wartime period, more and more enlistees were being 
deployed in the infantry and armed forces. This left more and more vacancies in the mess 
branch. To fill this increasing vacancy, U.S. naval officials turned primarily to African 
Americans, and secondarily to Filipinos, Chamorros, and other minorities in the mess 
branch during this period. 
In order to address the increasing demand for mess attendants, the Director of 
Enlisted Personnel (H.A. Badt) made the recommendation to recruit a ―limited quota‖ of 
Filipino mess attendants from the Philippines into ‗Class V-6‘
96
 of the US Naval Reserve. 
Nevertheless, Badt immediately followed up on his recommendation by confirming his 
preference for ―sufficient Negroes‖ over Filipinos if African Americans were able to 
fulfill his ―limited quota.‖
97
 
In addition, the third and last request in his memorandum emphasized the 
following: 
3. If such enlistments are authorized it is recommended that these mess attendants 
pass through 3 weeks detentions in Cavite and then be transferred to ships of the 
Asiatic Fleet for training. It will be necessary to find out what facilities obtain in 




Whether he was referring to specifically Filipinos or African Americans in this 
last item was unclear. What might be clearer was Badt‘s association of Filipinos with 
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African Americans in his reference to messmen and messmen recruitment. Secondly, 
American recruits, possibly including African Americans, were shipped all the way to the 
Philippines, and elsewhere in Asia and the Pacific, for extensive ―detention‖ and training 
before official employment in their categorized term of duty. 
Overall, the general use for these boot camp detention centers was for newly 
recruited enlistees to be as physically and mentally fit as possible for veteran service. 
This included intensive full-time regiments that tested the disciplinary capabilities and 
endurance of the newly recruited enlistees. While the parallels between these military 
detention centers and the immigration detention centers, as that in Angel Island, are quite 
comparable and illuminating in the historical sense, the nature of these two types of 
detention centers were quite distinct. While the military detention center emphasized U.S. 
military service and preparation, the immigration detention center reinforced U.S. 
acculturation within the civilian nation-state. Despite the distinctive natures of the U.S. 
military and immigrant detention centers, the common intent and outcome of including 
minorities under conditions of subjugation (if not subservience) made these two types of 
detention centers quite parallel. Therefore, these specific and broader politics of 
enlistment applied to the experience of enlistment among African Americans—even 
during their time in the detention centers. 
In this period, the U.S. Navy‘s preference for African American enlistment rather 
than Filipino enlistment was also evident in different geographical and temporal contexts 
where demands for mess enlistees were increasing. For instance, in a September, 
24, 1941 memorandum to the chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Commandant A.C. Read 




the commandant pronounced training preparations of 70 newly enlisted mess attendants 
on a four-week basis. Second, he requested for more mess attendants to work in the mess 
branch of the Pensacola Naval Station. His third request adhered more to the racial 
politics of enlistment prevalent in this period: ―the Bureau is requested, when filling 
existing vacancies in the mess attendant complement of this station, to send Negroes, 
rather than Filipinos, especially in the cooks and stewards ratings.‖
99
 While it may have 
been cheaper for U.S. naval officials to hire massively available African American 
citizens within the U.S. rather than Filipino foreign nationals from the Philippine 
archipelago, the bottom line was that naval officials were formally restricted from 
enlisting Filipinos during the Philippine Commonwealth period. Based on that restriction 
alone, African Americans were more readily and legally available. 
Despite the fact that Filipinos in the Philippines were not yet allowed to be 
officially recruited in the U.S.N. during this time, those who were previously enlisted 
legally during the Philippine-American colonial period (1901-1934) were continually 
transferred within the circuits, or registers, of the U.S. naval stations and ships within 
both coasts of the continental United States. In some cases, messmen of other ethnicities 
were included in such policies of transfer as well. In a 1941 telegram to the Bureau of 
Naval Personnel (they had just changed their name from ―the Bureau of Navigation‖), the 
Immigration of Naturalization Services (INS) requested and likely received confirmation 
that the ‗present policy‘ of transferring messmen during that time was to ―transfer 
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The U.S. Navy‘s racial preference of mess attendant recruits was contingent upon 
the demographics surrounding the local base. For instance, in early 1942, an officer from 
the Naval Air Station in Corpus Christi, TX sent a brief telegram to the Bureau of Naval 
Personnel. In this telegram, the officer (whose name was not mentioned in the document) 
requested for more information on the ―races which can be enlisted [in the] messman 
branch.‖ In addition, this naval official directly articulated his ―desire [for] enlist[ed] 
white officers[,] stewards[,] and cooks[,] and men of Mexican extraction for messmen if 
applicable.‖ On the one hand, this document revealed the navy official‘s racial and ethnic 
preference for officer (white) and messmen recruits (white and or Mexican). On the other 
hand, it did not state as directly the logics behind its preference for white officers and 
white/Mexican messmen in this particular temporal and local geographical context. 
Nevertheless, given the historically high population of whites and Mexicans within 
Corpus Christi, one can suggest that the officers within this base historically had a 
conceptual preference and positive relationship with white officers and white/Mexican 
messmen on this particular base. 
On May 21 of that same year, the Bureau of Naval Personnel sent a telegram to 
the Naval Air Station in Corpus Christi, TX. In this telegram, the Bureau confirmed two 
things. One confirmation was that the ―enlistment [of] men of Mexican extraction […] 
[was] not approved. Secondly, the Bureau stated that the current instructions for 
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recruitment, during that time, permitted ―enlistment of negro […], filipino and chinese 
extraction only as messmen.‖
101
 
While this 1942 military document officially confirmed the naval bureau‘s lack of 
preference or approval for Mexican enlistments, it also suggested at least two patterns 
pertinent to the inclusionary and exclusionary politics of minority enlistment. First was 
the national inclusive enlistment (or preference) of Filipinos as messmen recruits before 
1944, alongside African American and Chinese men as well. Secondly was the concrete 
written evidence of the continual restriction of Filipino enlistees as ―only messmen,‖ 
along with African Americans and Chinese in this particular item of military 
correspondence. From a historiographical standpoint, this historical evidence countered 
Jesse Quinsaat‘s insight that Filipinos were not recruited as enlisted messmen during the 
Second World War until the watershed year in 1944, when the USN recruited more 
massive amounts of enlistees as messmen (Filipino and African American) from the 
Philippines. This historical complication and revision will be addressed in the next 
section of this chapter. 
In addition, the brief memo, from the Naval Bureau to the Corpus Christi base, 
illustrated the likely fact that local bases and transnational military bureaus had 
conflicting racial and ethnic preferences for ―their‖ mess attendants. The trans-local 
Naval Air Station in Corpus Christi desired Mexican enlistees from the civilian spaces 
immediately surrounding the base. However, the transnational-based Naval Bureau 
preferred the enlistment of Filipinos and Chinese enlistees to this particular base, as well 
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as to other militarized stations across the globe. Given the structural nature of superiority 
of the Bureau of Naval Personnel in matters of mess enlistments, it was more than likely 
that this and other naval stations enlisted more Filipino and Chinese as mess attendants, 
regardless of the civilian racial and ethnic demographic immediately surrounding the 
local militarized zone. 
Moreover, from a historical perspective, this item of evidence illuminated two 
points related to my overarching arguments. Firstly, local prejudices toward the messmen 
force varied from location to location so there was no clear, universal racial hierarchy of 
preference for messmen. And secondly, there appeared to be no direct reasons or logics 
as to why the Naval Bureau preferred particular racial or ethnic minorities as enlisted 
messmen in specific temporal and geographic contexts over others. Even one of the naval 
officials stationed in Corpus Christi asked the following question to the Bureau of Naval 
Personnel during that year in 1942: ―is there any reason why we can‘t enlist Mexican 
U.S. citizen[s] Mess Attendants?‖
102
 The Naval Bureau appeared to illustrate no clear and 
―logical‖ response to this Corpus Christi naval official‘s inquiry. Nevertheless, what is 
just as important to uncover was that during World War II, there began to be increasing 
pressure for the U.S. to develop more national standards for recruitment and enlistment of 
messmen personnel. These standards, as confirmed by the Bureau of Naval Personnel, 
would be determined in reaction to civilian responses to the working conditions and 
racial criteria of the mess men. These civilian responses are discussed in the section that 
follows. 
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“Inflammatory Matter”: Civilians and the Shifting Politics of Naval Minority 
Enlistment 
 
Civilian responses to the living and working conditions of enlisted messmen were 
prevalent as early as 1941. This was evident in a January 24, 1941 memo that the Bureau 
of Navigation in the Navy Department (later named the Bureau of Naval Personnel) 
received from the commander-in-chief of the United States Fleet of the USS New Mexico 
Flagship. In this memo, the commander expressed sincere concern about public press 
statements regarding the working and living conditions in the mess branch. Subsequently, 
rather than aim to solve the root of the problem itself (i.e., race and class discrimination), 
this commander proposed solutions so that there would be no press complaints about 
their treatment of the mess men.
103
 
Similar concerns by civilians were evident in a letter prepared by Rear Admiral 
and Assistant Chief of the Bureau L.E. Denfield. This letter, which was sent on October 
11, 1943 to U.S. Senator Arthur H. Vandenburg, was responding to the Senator‘s 
concerns about the forced placement of those enlisted as stewards.
104
 The next month in 
November, the Secretary of the Navy received a letter from Navy wife D.M. Salgado. In 
this letter, Salgado represented a ―collective body‖ of enlistees protesting against their 
placement and treatment as the ―Chief Officer‘s Steward‖ and ―Chief Officer‘s Cook.‖ 
Ms. Salgado‘s first complaint was that Filipinos and African Americans were the only 
assigned enlistees in that largely racially segregated position. Her second grievance was 
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the lack of respect given to these stewards by those ranked below them, as well as the 
ones ranked above them. Her third complaint was that these ―officer‘s chief stewards‖ 
lacked decent uniforms, unlike ranked chiefs from other branches of the USN. Lastly, her 
fourth grievance was that the officers were overworking these enlisted stewards, 
especially during the busy holiday celebrations.
105
  
More complaints about the general placement and treatment of stewards of color 
continued in January 1944, as conveyed by a civilian named Mrs. Gurley from Chula 
Vista, CA. In particular, she was concerned about the lack of uniform allowances for 
those named as ―Chief Cooks,‖ ―Chief Stewards‖ or ―Steward‘s Mates,‖ especially in 
comparison to ―Chief Petty Officers.‖
106
 In a reply letter to this particular civilian, U.S.N. 
Lieutenant Commander W.F. Calkins assured the U.S. Navy‘s positive—if not 
dignified—placement and treatment of enlistees of color as chief cooks and stewards.
107
 
By being named as chief cooks or stewards, the U.S.N. established and recognized these 
servicemen‘s duties in the branch that was then named the ―Steward‘s Mate Branch.‖
108
 
However, this lieutenant also emphasized the structural integrity of those placed in this 
branch of duty by proclaiming that ―it was not intended that cooks and stewards would 
exert military authority [italics mine] or assume the responsibility of petty officers, and, 
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therefore, they have not been classified as such.‖
109
 He also pointed out, nonetheless, that 
―all grades of cooks and stewards receive the same uniform allowances as chief petty 
officers, in view of similarity in type and hence cost of uniform.‖
110
 Calkin‘s final 
political response in this letter to Ms. Salgado‘s concerns was highlighted in the 
following statement: 
It is the considered opinion of this Bureau [of Naval Personnel] that the best 
interests of the service are served by the present policy, and you may be advised 
that no change is contemplated. The Bureau, however, appreciates the thought 




While the recognition—and structural politics—of enlistment were eminent in the 
lieutenant‘s response letter, more specific details shaping these structural recognitions 
and politics were highlighted in a letter written by another civilian woman named ―Miss 
Mildred I. Yemmans.‖ In her February 7, 1945 letter addressed to the Office of 
Dependency Benefits in New Jersey, Yemmans recalled a conversation she had with ―a 
group of colored sailors (enlisted men) who are rated as Steward‘s Mates.‖ In this 
conversation, the Steward‘s Mates claimed to her that ―they had to pay for their clothing 
and meals out of their regular pay.‖
112
 
Additionally, in her letter of inquiry, Ms. Yemmans relayed the following 
questions that directly confronted the politics of enlistment in regards to these stewards‘ 
mates, as previously highlighted in this chapter: 
(1) Do Steward‘s Mates pay for their clothing and meals out of their allotment? 
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(2) If so, why do Navy men have to pay for such things while the men in the Army do 
not? 
 
(3) Is it true that Negro […] Steward‘s Mates are replacing Philippino […] mess boys 
[…], who have returned to their own land to fight? 
 
(4) Who pays these Steward‘s Mates? Is it the U.S. Government or the Officers of the 
ships on which they work? 
 
(5) Is it true that said Steward‘s Mates are not members of the regular U.S. Navy, but 




After receiving this civilian woman‘s letter, U.S.N. Captain W.B. McHugh of the 
Plans and Operations Division attempted to address, if not clarify, Ms. Yemmans‘s 
questions. First, the U.S. captain proclaimed that steward‘s mates had to pay for uniform 
replacements, not for their initial uniforms. Second, he clarified that ―Negro […] 
steward‘s mates are not enlisted to replace Filipino Steward‘s mates.‖ Third, ―the United 
States Government pays Stewards‘ Mates.‖ And fourth, ―Steward‘s Mates are members 
of the United States Navy the same as all sailors are and receive the same benefits and 
privileges of any service man.‖
114
 
The USN Captain‘s response letter to Ms. Yemmans revealed some keen 
continuities and changes in this time period—particularly by comparison to the 1941-42 
period of enlistment. First, the 1944 and 1945 enlistments of African American and 
Filipino stewards increased dramatically, especially as demands for them to work 
overseas in U.S. global ship and base installations increased exponentially. Nevertheless, 
what the USN Captain‘s letter concealed to this concerned U.S. civilian citizen was the 
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private preferences and enlistments of Filipino males as domestic stewards in the homes 
of U.S. naval officials, in addition to U.S. naval officials‘ preference and enlistments of 
African American male stewards in different geographic and temporal contexts of the 
USN militarized space. It was clear to this naval official that the revelation of this 
information to Yemmen and other concerned civilians would not serve the overall 
interests of militarized stabilities in the USN space. Nevertheless, the limitations of 
Yemmans‘ and others‘ inquiries and protests in challenging these racial, gendered, and 
class-based injustices in the naval branch were just as evident. To echo the words of 




From “Cooks” to “Steward’s Mates”: Reinforcing the Politics of USN Minority 
Enlistment 
 
 Despite the limitations of civilian grievances, it was in the context of what navy 
officials perceived as the mess attendants‘ ―lack of efficiency,‖ coupled with civilian 
concerns for the welfare of the mess attendants that prompted the Bureau of Naval 
Personnel to ponder the mess conditions and to create suggestions for insuring stability 
and mess attendant efficiency on base. These suggestions were also intended to 
ameliorate civilians‘ concerns for the enlistees. In a January 20, 1943 memorandum to 
the Director of Mess Training, W.E. Moore, a military official in the Bureau of Naval 
Personnel, attributed the problem of mess attendant efficiency to several factors, largely 
regarding the issue of race. The Bureau‘s immediate concern was the circulation of 
newspaper publications read by African American mess attendants, particularly the 
Chicago Defender and ―several other Negro publications.‖ In the memorandum, Officer 
Moore claimed that the Chicago Defender, specifically, publicized civilian issues of 
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black employment that generated unrest among African American mess attendants who 
were dissatisfied with their labor conditions on base. According to this naval officer, their 
levels of unrest were attributed to their readings of such materials containing 
―inflammatory matter.‖ The naval official further stated that if not for the availability of 
these knowledge productions to the African American mess attendants, such situations of 
unrest and instability ―would not otherwise have occurred.‖
116
 
It is not clear, in these written historical records, the extent to which these ethnic 
news reports exposed the maltreatment of these African American enlistees, or the degree 
to which U.S. naval officers were successful in censoring these news reports in the 
militarized space. What is clearer from these records, nonetheless, is how anxious these 
naval officials were about the increased enlistment and visibility of African Americans as 
cooks/messmen/stewards, and the potential manifestations of their unrest through their 
access to these news reports. These anxieties, arguably, spurred not only further 
consideration for the placement of African Americans in other enlisted positions, but also 
the increasing preference for Filipinos and other minorities to fill these positions as 
cooks/messmen/stewards.  
In addition, one should not underestimate the impact that W.E. Moore had on 
influencing navy policy in matters of minority enlistment and the like. From reinforcing 
the racialist terms of minority enlistment during World War II to determining the neo-
colonial terms of health sanitation policy in U.S. bases in the Philippines during the 
postwar period, W.E. Moore arguably had just as much of a major impact on navy 
enlistment politics as he had on the politics of health sanitation in U.S. bases within the 
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Philippine archipelago (I will further discuss the related politics of health sanitation in the 
next chapter).  
Moreover, racial legacies and essentialist traces of 19
th
 century Social Darwinism 
permeated the logics of this naval officer who wrote this letter regarding African 
American and Filipino mess attendants. Besides the circulation of African American 
publications in their militarized spaces, W.E. Moore suggested the mess attendants‘ ―low 
intelligence‖ as a source of both their conflicts with officers and their ―lack of efficiency‖ 
in their work performance. Subsequently this naval official stated, ―if it were possible to 
raise the average intelligence of Negro recruit mess attendants above those that were 
brought in a year ago, and now being brought in, the mess attendant problem aboard ship 
would be made easier.‖
117
 Nevertheless, in his attempt to look at ―all interrelated factors‖ 
on this issue, Officer Moore also held some naval officers accountable for their conflicts 
with the mess men in this time period: 
A small percentage of officers have a poor attitude toward, and lack of 
consideration for, members of the messmen branch, be the Filipinos or Negroes. 
By and large, these officers are equally inconsiderate of other enlisted men 
outside the messman branch. In other words, most officers who can handle 
enlisted men can handle messmen well, and vice versa. It is true that a very 
limited number of officers, due to previous environment prior to entering the 
service, have had no experience whatever with servants of any sort, and do not 
treat them fairly. These few officers are found among newly graduated regulars as 




Nevertheless, officers like Moore were not looking  at the ―environments‖ 
informing and shaping the lives of the largely African American and Filipino mess 
attendants as they were when they were pondering the reasons for the lack of efficiency 
and intelligence among the white naval officers. This evident dichotomy between racialist 
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essentialism toward enlisted mess attendants and the sense of historical understanding 
towards their ―few‖ fellow officers shaped not only their politics of enlistment among 
mess attendants. This dichotomy also determined the actual proposals, practices, and 
policies of enlistment among racial and ethnic minorities at the time. In sum, the 
messmen of color, rather than the broader structures of racial hierarchy and prejudice, 
were viewed as the problem that needed correction. Officer Moore‘s recommendations 
for resolution included the extended education and institutional training of the USN 
captain assisting the president of the mess branch, as well as the officers whom the mess 
men served during this period. According to Moore, ―it is believed that the required 
reading and explanation of the Navy Training Course for Messman Branch at the Naval 
Academy and at the Indoctrination Schools would reduce the number of officers who are 
totally unfamiliar with the servant problem in general.‖
119
 
Another suggestion that Officer Moore proposed, which actually came to fruition 
later in this period, was changing the name of the ratings, which at the time were ―cooks‖ 
or ―messmen.‖ The purpose of the name change, to this naval official, was to improve the 
aforementioned working relationships between officers and messmen on base, and to 
secure the structural stability of the domestic confines of the navy space. In the 
memorandum, this naval officer (Moore) first suggested changing their name to 
―Officers‘ Mates.‖ However, he immediately discounted this recommendation because he 
believed that it was a misleading term for two reasons. Firstly, he thought that it did not 
―appropriately‖ define the mess attendants‘ working relationship with their superior 
officers. Second, he interpreted the name as not indicative in ―raising the question of 
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 In other words, Officer Moore did not believe that this term define 
clearly enough the racial, gendered, and class-based boundaries between the officers and 
―their‖ servants within this militarized and domestic space of the mess rooms and 
officers‘ headquarters. 
Subsequently, Moore offered that ―if any change of the rating is eventually made, 
the terms ‗Stewards‘ Mates‘ or ‗Stewards‘ Assistants are suggested.‖
121
 In order to 
support this claim, Moore—if not patronizingly—recalled his own experience and 
observations about the pride and collective sense of responsibility felt by the people 
designated to such positions, as well as the domestic and additional work required from 
it.
122
 Because U.S. naval officials largely restricted Filipino enlistees within these mess 
positions, they were in turn lumped together with African Americans when issues of 
politics, unrest, or policy regarding mess men were raised: especially during and 
following the Second World War.
123
 
Officer Moore‘s documented naval correspondence was historically vital because 
it spurred further discourse on the strategy of position name changing: particularly as a 
way of stabilizing and securing already-existent race and ethnic hierarchy in the U.S. 
Navy. Taking direct cue from Moore‘s suggestions, in February and March of that year 
(1943), officials within and beyond the naval branch of the U.S. military further 
corresponded and eventually approved the name changes among and regarding assigned 
mess men. On February 15, 1943, the Chief of Naval Personnel submitted the name 
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changes to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox for approval. Subsequently, the 
―Messman‘s Branch‖ became the ―Steward‘s Branch‖. The ―Officer‘s chief steward‖ 
became known as ―Chief Steward‖. The ―Officer‘s chief cook‖ became the ―Chief 
Cook‖. The ―Officer‘s steward, first class‖ became ―Steward‘s Mate, first class.‖ In 
addition, the same name changes applied to the second and third classes of the enlisted 
ranks in the U.S. Navy, and so on.
124
 However, collectively known as the 1943 Naval 
Appropriation Act, these policies created mostly changes in terminology, and not in the 




The name change reflected a desire for a boost in image and morale. Naval 
officials believed ―that assignment to this rating branch would be more desirable and 
would attract a better class of personnel…‖
126
 By making the mess branch more 
―desirable‖ to enlistees and new recruits, naval officials thought that the name change 
would enhance the image of the mess branch for those working within the branch, those 
recruited into the branch, and for concerned civilian citizens. Eleven days later, on 
February 26, 1943, the Secretary of the Navy transmitted an updated version of the 
approved memorandum to the Planning and Control Division of the Bureau of Naval 
Personnel. While this version confirmed the official name changes from the previous 
memorandum, this version also emphasized the conditions in which the name changes 
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did not apply. As previously stated, such conditions in which these name changes did not 
apply included these enlistees‘ previous terms of duty in their service records, health 
records, and pay accounts—up until the official date of the name change itself (February 
26, 1943). After the date of the name change, all official references to them would be 
made according to their newly named rank in file(s).
127
 
Another condition of the name changes was temporal-based. Naval officials 
considered the time period for the universal applicability of these name changes as 
―indefinite.‖ Because of this, they allowed (and in turn practiced) the interchangeability 
of the old and new names of these enlisted ranks. The purpose of this interchangeability, 
according to naval officials, was for ―establishing identity of men in the Steward‘s 
branch.‖
128
  Therefore, while naval officials rhetorically formalized the name changes in 
behalf of the enlistees and their concerned civilians, these same naval officials 
informally—if not contradictorily—permitted the discursive space (e.g. servicemen 
records, officers‘ correspondence) and material space (i.e. naval ships and stations) for 
the interchangeability between the old terms (mess attendants, officers‘ cooks, and so on) 
and new terms (e.g. steward‘s mates) of these minority enlistees. 
While the purpose behind this interchangeability, on paper, was to establish ―the 
identity of men in the steward‘s branch,‖ one can argue that such interchangeability was 
used more by the naval officials themselves to determine the stewards‘ identity and to 
enforce their own power as ―superiors.‖ Simultaneously and subsequently, the condition 
of interchangeability reinforced the class and race based boundaries between the subjects 
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of the mess steward‘s branch on the one hand, and the ensigned officers approving these 
―name changes‖ on the other, to continue in ―indefinite‖ time. These hierarchical 
boundaries, as evident from the written historical records, continued to racialize, 
feminize, and spatially segregate the people of color who were still restricted within the 
mess steward‘s branch. 
 
Wartime Demands for USN Minority Enlistment and the Politics of Diplomacy 
 
On June 25, 1941, Franklin Delano Roosevelt implemented Executive Order 8802. As a 
compromise between President Roosevelt and activists of the March on Washington, 
E.O. 8802 promised equal opportunity for employment within the U.S. defense industry 
in general: on the condition that the March on Washington drop its demand that the 
military be desegregated.129 While the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps integrated more 
African Americans during this period, the Army was not as accepting of integration. As 
for the Navy in particular, though it reopened African American enlistment for the first 
time since 1922, officials continued to place African Americans primarily in menial 
positions of labor as cooks and janitors—or, as messmen.
130
 Nevertheless, with the 
combined activisms of newspaper publications, grassroots organizing, and public policy 
implementation vis-à-vis the Double Victory Movement, more African Americans in 
particular became enlisted—however unevenly—in various branches of the U.S. military 
during this period. Thus, racial integration in the U.S. military became relatively more 
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It was within this dual context of African American enlistment in defense of U.S. 
and global ―democracy‖, countered with the conditions of minority discrimination that 
African Americans faced in the institutional and everyday workplace of the U.S. military, 
that prompted a united front of African American enlistees, civilians, and militant 
activists of the NAACP, the Pittsburgh Courier, and other allied groups and collectives 
in February 1942. On the one hand, this particular united front sought to defend ideas of 
American democracy abroad by promoting African American enlistment and honoring 
African American enlistees in the U.S. military, just like how the enlistment of other 
ethnic minorities (such as Irish and Japanese enlistees) were received within their 
respective communities during this period. On the other hand, this movement fought to 
enforce American democracy and social justice within a national domestic sphere that 
continued to reap the seeds of racial discrimination, segregation, and violence. These 
grassroots and national based mobilizations became known as the Double Victory 
Movement, which lasted over the duration of World War II.
132
 As a result of the Double 
Victory Movement, African American enlistments increased from 2,069 in 1940 to 
370,000 in 1942, to over 500,000 deployed overseas later in the war.
133
 Additionally, the 
                                                 
131
 The extent to which EO 8802 applied to civilian jobs within the military can be a topic for further 
research. Nevertheless, it should be noted that even after E.O. 8802 in 1941, it was still legal for the 
military to provide non-combat jobs on a ―separate but equal‖ basis. It would not be until President 
Truman‘s Executive Order 9981 in 1948 when the racial integration of the U.S. military would finally be 
officially enforced from the presidential level. Please see chapter five of this dissertation. 
 
132
 Richard E. Miller, The Messman Chronicles: African Americans in the U.S. Navy, 1932-1943 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004), 289-94. 
 
133
 Robin D.G. Kelley and Earl Lewis, To Make our World Anew: a History of African Americans (Oxford: 




third African American midshipman ever to join the U.S. Naval Academy in 1944 
became the first to graduate from that institution in 1948.
134
 Moreover, this movement 
propelled more vigilant measures to enforce racial integration in the military and civilian 
spheres during the postwar period.
135
 
Thus, these continual politics and tensions of enlistment regarding people of color 
in the U.S. Navy, coupled with the increasing U.S. wartime interventions abroad, 
materially transpired in the escalating recruitment of people of color into the U.S. Navy 
as early as in 1943. For example, on March 16, 1943, U.S. naval lieutenant Randall 
Jacobs ordered the Recruiting Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel to ―assign 1775 
Negro Inductees for Steward Mates during the month of April.‖
136
 
In addition, Lieutenant Jacobs requested for the recruitment of these African 
American ―inductees‖ on ―a percentage basis.‖ This meant that certain percentages of 
newly enlisted African Americans would be assigned to various commandants and chiefs 
of designated Naval Districts, Naval Commands, and Naval Operating Training 
Commands in proportions ranging from .8% to 34%.
137
 The conditions behind the 
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Assignment of Enlistment Percentage of 1,175 African 
American Recruits 
Commandant of the First Naval District 10.3% 
Commandant in the Third Naval District 4.3% 
Commandant in the Fourth Naval District 3.8% 
Commandant in the Fifth Naval District 12.8% 
Commandant in the Sixth Naval District 0.8% 
Commandant in the Seventh Naval District 0.8% 
Commandant in the Eighth Naval District 0.8% 
Commandant in the Ninth Naval District 1.3% 
Commandant in the Eleventh Naval District 2.6% 
Commandant in the Thirteenth Naval District 5.2% 
Commandant in the Potomac River Naval 
Command 
0.8% 
Commandant in the Severn River Naval 
Command 
0.6% 
Chief of the Naval Air Operational Training 
Command 
34.0% 
Chief of the Naval Air Operational 
Intermediate Training Command 
12.7% 
Chief of the Naval Air Operational Training 
Command 
2.9% 





The historical evidence above illustrated the U.S. Bureau of Naval Personnel‘s 
racial and ethnic preference for African Americans as navy stewards in quantitatively 
varying yet significant levels. With the increasing demand for steward enlistment, 
coupled with the increasing pressure for African American integration in the U.S. 
military, U.S. officials likely mediated both demands by officially enlisting African 




Nevertheless, the liberal inclusion and recognition of African Americans primarily as 
messmen, cooks, and stewards only further solidified the marginalized status of this 
ethnic group in the U.S. military. This tension between the increasing demand for 
inclusion of African American enlistees and the expecting placement of African 
American enlistees as primarily cooks/messmen/stewards reinforced the racial 
inequalities cemented in the U.S. military since the birth of the American republic. While 
the massive racial integration of African Americans and other minorities was not made as 
official until Truman‘s executive order in 1948, imminent signs of racial integration were 
happening earlier that decade, but under limiting conditions. 
Continual demands for steward enlistments persisted in August of 1943. For 
instance, in August 5
th
 of that year, the chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel sent a 
memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy requesting the assignment of more enlisted 
stewards to the naval station in Manchester, Washington.
139
 Three weeks later, on August 
27, the bureau made another request for more steward assignments in the Naval 
Receiving Station and Naval Barracks in Washington, DC, the Naval Section Bases in 
Corpus Christi, TX and Panama City, FL, and the Advance Naval Base Personnel Depot 
in Camp Allen within the Naval Operating Base in Norfolk, VA.
140
 
Based on the military correspondences cited earlier, one can claim that the Bureau 
of Naval Personnel‘s continuing enlistment of racial and ethnic minorities, as mess 
                                                 
139
 Chief of Naval Personnel to Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, ―Subject: Assignment of Enlisted Men 
of the Stewards‘ Branch Ashore,‖ Memorandum, Washington, DC; 5 August 1943, pp. 1-2; Record Group 




 L.E. Denfield, Chief of Naval Personnel to Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, ―Subject: Assignment of 
Enlisted Men of the Stewards‘ Branch Ashore,‖ Memorandum, Washington, DC; 27 August 1943, p. 1; 
Record Group No. 24, Stack Area 470; Box Number 901; Row 53; Compartment No. 05, Shelf No. 2; 




attendants/stewards, between 1941 and 1943 still included Filipinos. Nevertheless, 
despite the potentially countering evidence, the general historical consensus was that 
between 1934 and 1944, the USN officially prohibited the enlistment of Filipino 
nationals into its general branch. However, there were some very interesting exceptions. 
For instance, naval officers who preferred the mess services of Filipino nationals sought 
private and informal alternatives to recruit Filipino nationals. Such requests, during this 
period, meant that these Filipino ―recruits‖ had to be retired, on fleet reserve, or on 
inactive duty after at least twenty years of USN service.  
Rear Admiral McIntyre, chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, made one 
such request to the Bureau of Naval Personnel for a Filipino steward in early September 
1943. Shortly thereafter, on September 21, 1943, the Bureau of Naval Personnel sent a 
memorandum to the Third and Fifth Naval Districts, which requested ―that a list of 
names, ratings, and home address[es] of all Filipino retired or fleet reserve cooks and 
stewards who are on inactive duty… be reported to the Bureau, in order that such a list be 
turned over to Admiral McIntyre.‖
141
 
Ten days later, the Bureau sent a memo to Rear Admiral McIntyre that provided 
four names (―Maurecio,‖ ―Jose and Garcia,‖ ―Florentinn‖) along with a list of ―filipino 
cooks and stewards who are not on active duty and who reside in the Third and Fifth 
Naval Districts.‖
142
 While this actual list (or copy of) was not included in this written 
historical record, this brief series of correspondences illustrated the fact that Filipinos 
                                                 
141
 Chief of Naval Personnel to Commandants of the Third and Fifth Naval Districts, ―Subject: Retired or 
Fleet Reserve Cook or Steward, Availability for Private Employment,‖ Memorandum, Washington, DC; 21 
September 1943, p. 1; Record Group No. 24, Stack Area 470; Box Number 901; Row 53; Compartment 
No. 05, Shelf No. 2; NARA, College Park. 
 
142
 Military Bureau [of Naval Personnel] to RT McIntire, USN Rear Admiral, ―Pursuant to your request…‖ 
Memorandum, Washington, DC; 1 October 1943, p. 1; Record Group No. 24, Stack Area 470; Box 




continued to be in the mental and circular registers of U.S. naval officers during this 
period, despite the prohibition of enlistment of Filipinos from the Philippines. 
Naval officials‘ continuing enlistment of Filipinos, through private means, 
illustrated the continual politics of enlistment in a period when official recruitment of 
Filipinos in the Navy was formally restricted. By U.S. officials continuing Filipino 
enlistment by informal and private means during the Philippine Commonwealth period, 
the U.S. was continuing to operate as an informal empire in the Philippines. Despite U.S. 
national self-conceptions as a democracy and shining deacon seeking to ―overthrow the 
tyrants‖, U.S. officials‘ informal preference and private recruitment of Filipino enlistees 
illustrated intimate threads of the continuing colonial relationship between the U.S. and 
the Philippines. Not only does this historical evidence counter J. Quinsaat‘s and other 
previous scholars‘ chronology of Filipino enlistment, but more importantly, it alludes to 
ongoing colonial sentiments that these U.S. officials had for Filipinos ―serving‖ them in 
the intimate space of the mess branch. These colonial sentiments, in turn, manifested in 
the continuing enlistment of Filipino mess men by informal and private means. 
This continual preference for Filipino enlistment not only applied to U.S. naval 
officers, but even to the U.S. president. While the history of White House recruitment of 
Filipino enlistees can be traced to the American colonial period in the Philippines, the 
physical and celebratory presence of Filipinos in the White House became more prevalent 
during Harry S. Truman‘s presidency (1945-1953). In 1945, between twenty-five and 
thirty Filipino stewards, much of whom were previously on inactive duty as retirees or on 
fleet reserve, served the U.S. president.
143
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Filipino White House stewards even became embroiled in diplomatic relations as 
allied leaders from other nations specifically requested their domestic services during the 
twilight year of World War II. In his memorandum for the naval aide to the U.S. 
president, U.S. Naval Reserve Rear Admiral A.F. Carter reported on a meeting that 
occurred between President FDR and Arab leader King Ibn Saud following the Yalta 
Conference. In this meeting, King Saud pronounced his pleasure with the luncheon 
prepared for him by FDR‘s Filipino White House Stewards. In particular, King Saud 
stressed that it was the first meal he had eaten in a long time which did not aggravate a 
stomach ailment that had plagued him for several years.
144
 
Subsequently, in preparation for a meeting with local representatives of the Arab 
American Oil Company during that same month, King Saud requested that the same meal 
he had in his meeting with FDR (rice and curry) be prepared for him in this meeting with 
the Arab American Oil Company, particularly by the same cook who prepared that 
luncheon (i.e. one of FDR‘s Filipino stewards). However, when the ―improbability of 
securing the same cook who prepared the luncheon‖ was brought to King Saud‘s 
attention, the USN rear admiral observed and reported on the Arab American officials‘ 
suggestion that the White House staff or USN ―recruit a good cook, either Filipino or 
Chinese, and dispatch him to Arabia after a possible short indoctrination period at the 
hands of the Navy cooks on the Potomac [FDR‘s Presidential yacht].‖
145
 Thus, given the 
diplomatic implications of this Arab leader‘s preference for meals prepared by FDR‘s 
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Filipino stewards, the rear admiral offered the following suggestion: ―In view of the 
desirability of further promoting and cementing our relations with Saudi Arabia, it is 




Shortly after receiving the correspondence letter, the Naval Aide to the President, 
James K. Vardaman, Jr., wrote back to Rear Admiral A.F. Carter expressing his 
affirmation of Carter‘s and King Saud‘s request: 
The Naval Aide will be glad to have the cooks on the Potomac show any cook 
you designate how to prepare rice and currie which, as you know, has been a 
fairly standard Navy meal.  
 





Whether these Filipino ―cooks on the Potomac‖ made this a standard meal by 
suggesting to their mess officer that this meal be served (or vice versa), or whether they 
just learned how to cook something that was already standard, such possibilities were not 
concretely evident in the written historical record—however likely they may have been. 
What I think is important to point out, nonetheless, is the following. First, these officers 
had immense trust in these Filipino stewards to make this dish for this Arab leader. And 
second, these officials would rather have these Filipino stewards make the dish than any 
other cooks for the King‘s associates. These indications suggest the intimate relationship 
between the white naval officers and the White House Filipino stewards during this time 
in World War II. Despite formal classification as foreign nationals, Filipinos came to be 
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known by U.S. officials as the most trusted ―allies‖ of the U.S. during the war. In no 
other space was this relationship status more intimately evident than in the White House. 
Also, whether this request was actually fulfilled was not lucidly evident in the 
U.S. national historical records. Nonetheless, what were more evident were two things. 
One, this Arab leader respectively preferred the hiring of a cook of Philippine descent in 
his meeting with Arab American officials. And two, this Arab leader‘s request displayed 
the emergent politics of Filipino steward enlistment in furthering U.S. diplomatic 
relations during the Second World War. This emergent politics was not only prevalent in 
this request and served meal, but also through these stewards‘ continuing services to the 
U.S. presidential staff during the Potsdam Conference and in other events relating to U.S. 
war and foreign policy. However, what cannot be stressed enough were the tensions 
shaping these politics of enlistment, especially considering the racial and gendered 
conditions shaping this essentially unequal bi-national relationship between the U.S. and 
the Philippines. 
Nonetheless, in the bi-national sense, 1944 and 1945 were watershed years in 
U.S.-Philippine relations. This emergent bi-national relationship transpired from a 
common disdain for the daily atrocities committed by Japanese military forces in the 
Philippines, coupled with the increasing fervor among barely surviving Filipinos—in 
their local provinces—for the return of General MacArthur‘s allied forces to aid in the 
evacuation of Japanese forces from the archipelago. Conscious of the increasing political 
national fervor in the Philippines for the U.S.‘s return, U.S.-based Filipino regiments who 
were training in Australia, along with General MacArthur‘s soldiers of the U.S. Armed 




Campaign. It was within this historical context of allied U.S.-Philippine bi-national 
patriotism, vis-à-vis the Philippine Liberation Campaign, that the U.S. Navy resumed 
official enlistment of Filipino stewards in 1944. 
Thus, in terms of ethnic minority enlistments, 1944 and 1945 were watershed 
years as well. This was not only true for Filipino enlistees, but also for Chamorro 
enlistees. In a September 21, 1944 memorandum, C.C. Hartman, U.S.N. Captain and 
Assistant Director of Enlisted Personnel, acknowledged the Bureau of Naval Personnel‘s 
authorization of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific to recruit Filipinos [from the 
Philippines] and Chamorros [from Guam]. This U.S.N. Captain followed up on his point 




Hartman‘s first argument was that Filipino and Chamorro enlistees would fulfill 
the drastically increasing demand for U.S.N. steward‘s mates between October 1944 and 
January 1945 (4,982 specifically) within and across U.S. military bases in the Asia- 
Pacific, Trans-Atlantic, and elsewhere in a U.S. naval global scale. During that time, the 
quantitative demands for stewards consistently exceeded the number of stewards 
outputted from the Bainbridge Naval Training Center in Maryland by sixty-one. To fill 
the gap between the demand and supply of stewards, Captain Hartman requested the 
hiring of Filipino and Chamorro enlistees.
149
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Also, Hartman felt that it would be more immediately convenient for U.S. Naval 
Bases in the Pacific Ocean to recruit ―native labor‖ to fulfill the increasing demand for 
stewards within these militarized areas.
150
 Subsequently, various U.S. naval fleets within 
and across the transpacific enlisted Filipinos for six-year assignments within the general 
U.S. naval force over the last several months of the Second World War.
151
  
Thus, 1944 and 1945 were indeed ―watershed‖ years in the transoceanic theatres 
of U.S. military enlistment during World War II. In addition, the same was true for other 
U.S. racial and ethnic minorities enlisted in the U.S. Armed Forces. This inclusive—if 
not celebratory—politics of enlistment culminated in the congressional passage of the 
G.I. Bill in 1944. The G.I. Bill was a main source of what George Lipsitz recalled as the 
―possessive investment in whiteness.‖
152
 While I discuss some of the postwar and 
contemporary legacies of the G.I. Bill in chapter five, it cannot be overstated how much 
impact the G.I. Bill, coupled with the 1940 Nationality Act that promised U.S. citizenship 
after three years of military service, had on informing and shaping the wartime enlistment 
of U.S. racial/ethnic minorities and foreign nationals in general. Promised benefits of the 
1944 G.I. Bill, for these wartime veterans, included subsidized navy housing and 
residence within these bases, retirement pensions, free or paid college education grants, 
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public college tuition fee waivers for their familial descendents under the age of twenty-
four, postwar civilian employment services and training, mortgage loan guarantees for 
home purchases, and cash payments for the honorably discharged and unemployed. For 
these enlisted U.S. racial/ethnic groups and foreign nationals, therefore, the G.I. Bill 
provided material means for U.S. citizenship and/or upward financial mobility. While the 
1946 Rescission Act barred allied Philippine national soldiers from obtaining similar 
benefits, for others enlisted as foreign nationals: the promises of the G.I. Bill were more 
likely to be realized. 
For many Japanese Americans, 1944 and 1945 marked watershed years to a 
certain degree as well. By 1944, the U.S. government had begun to release Japanese 
American communities from wartime concentration camps (along with German 
Americans). In addition, the U.S. Armed Forces started to recruit individuals of this 
ethnicity into the 442
nd
 Regimental Combat Team. The 442
nd
 played a vital role in the 
U.S. liberation campaigns in the European theater. These enlistees fought for a country 
that displaced them from their homes to prison-like internment camps. Nonetheless, their 
veteran services, like that of Filipinos and other U.S. racial and ethnic minorities, 
illustrated their reconciliation of this tension between displacement and enlistment during 
the Second World War.  
1944 and 1945 also marked watershed years for segments of the Chinese 
American, Native American and African American communities. For Chinese 
Americans, their relatives in China were finally able to migrate to the U.S. after the U.S. 
government finally repealed the Exclusion Act in 1943. It was also in 1944 that the 




Forces enlisted a number of Native Americans as ―code talkers.‖ Even amongst large 
segments of the African American community, the 1942 Double Victory Movement, 
coupled with momentums gained from the 1943 March in Washington, led to the 
escalation of African American enlistment into different branches of the U.S. military to 
fight in the war.
153
 
And last but not least, Filipino stewards benefited from these watershed years in 
two ways. First, the U.S. Navy again started to enlist stewards from its bases in the 
Philippine archipelago, as they did from 1901 to 1934. Nevertheless, what distinguished 
the politics of previous wartime and prewar enlistments from that of World War II was 
this: rather than the U.S. enlisting these Filipino nationals into a segregated naval insular 
force, the U.S. was now enlisting them into the general U.S. naval force. It was during 
these watershed years, starting in 1944, that the U.S. Navy abolished the insular force 
altogether. Secondly, this revised politics of enlistment, for newly recruited Filipino 
stewards, meant that they gained greater geopolitical access to the U.S. nation-state and 
in the emerging bi-national polities of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation.‖ Like other U.S. 
racial/ethnic minorities and foreign nationals (but unlike their civilian worker 
counterparts in Asia and the Pacific, whose cases I will further assess in chapter three), 
these revised politics of enlistment, for Navy Filipinos, meant that access to U.S. 
citizenship and upward financial mobility within the U.S. nation-state was more likely 
within reach. 
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Postcolonial USN Filipino Subjectivities and the Reinforcement of U.S. 
Militarization in the Philippines: 1942-1953 
 
 
On January 31, 1946, Cenon Trias, intelligence personnel for a naval commander in 
Manila, provided three key details to U.S. intelligence officer Eng. McCullough 
regarding a potential Sakdalista and Japanese ―collaborator‖ named Jesus Bautista. First 
detail: that Bautista ―had been a member of the Sakdalista Party since 1939.‖ Second: 
that according to Bautista‘s military ID, Bautista ―participated actively with pro-Japanese 
elements whose activities were greatly against the United States government.‖ And third 
detail: within Bautista‘s ID, there were specific references which spurred his empirical 
observations that his ID ―was printed during the Japanese occupation‖ and that ―Japanese 
‗character‘ [was] also printed on his identification card.‖
154
 
Like the board of review memo acknowledged in the first chapter, Personnel 
Trias‘s correspondence letter was transmitted on January 31, 1946: less than six months 
before U.S. formal declaration of Philippine Independence, and less than eight months 
before the board of review official stopped further investigation of Jesus Bautista. 
Nonetheless, whereas the board memo was written from the ruling and privileged 
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position of the U.S. white male officer, the personnel correspondence letter was written 
from the subjugated and collaborative position of a U.S. Navy intelligence personnel of 
Philippine descent: Cenon Trias. 
Reflecting on and departing from Trias‘s memorandum, this chapter takes on a 
deeper inquiry into what it meant to be ―Filipino‖ within and despite the institutional 
reinforcement of U.S. militarization in the Philippines following the Second World War. 
In particular, I examine two distinct and overlapping groups of written historical records: 
first, a group of testimonies from 1945 to 1946 by Navy Filipinos who spoke out against 
Jesus Bautista or remained neutral; second, a series of correspondence letters between 
navy civilian employee Leonicio F. Arceo and U.S. naval officers in November of 1953. 
Drawing upon these two primary archival files, I address the following questions that 
shape the historical and textual analysis of this chapter. One: how did wartime and 
postcolonial Navy Filipinos formulate and articulate their subjectivities during the 
Philippines‘ transition toward and beyond formal independence? Two, to what extent did 
these civilian Navy Filipinos exercise agency within and despite the structural 
hegemonies of the Japanese and U.S. imperial nation-states? And three, how can these 
evidentiary revelations of wartime and postcolonial subjectivity be understood in the 
larger transpacific statecraft of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ and globalized Cold War 
politics? 
This chapter also assesses the ways in which Filipino subjectivities—and 
interpretations of such by U.S. officials—shaped the militarized areas bordering the 
―U.S.-Philippine Nation‖, particularly during the early postwar period. While the U.S. 




officials also implemented restrictions of what I call trans-local permeability among its 
own personnel and officers in civilian or ―native‖ Philippine territories. Despite the fact 
that Filipino civilian workers were being integrated into a relatively more diverse 
plethora of positions in the U.S. military during this period (including, in part, handling 
classified correspondences), evidentiary conceptualizations of Filipinos in U.S. military 
officials‘ health sanitation reports further enforced trans-local restrictions of mobility 
among Filipinos and American personnel during this period. Besides the cases of civilian 
workers Jesus Bautista and Leonicio Arceo, primary sources that I cover for this section 
range from military official correspondences regarding health and infrastructural 
sanitation policies, to a series of letters regarding a military personnel deserter, to 
memorandums concerning the hiring of Filipino civilians to handle classified 
correspondence matter.  
By investigating these uncovered cases and record groups, I argue that during and 
following the Second World War, dominant formations of Filipino subjectivity shifted 
from an intense form of racialized anti-Japanese xenophobia to an emphasis on Philippine 
sovereignty and jurisdiction. This particular transition occurred both in the national and 
individual level. Despite this shift from latter wartime (1942-1945) to early postcolonial 
(1946-1953) Filipino subject formations, common threads binding these distinctive 
subjectivities were threefold: one, an intense and commonsensical allegiance to the U.S.-
Philippine nation-state; two, a rhetorical and exaggerated sense of opposition toward 
anyone or anything potentially representing ideological opposition to the U.S. global 
nation-state; and three, a structural sense of anxiety among U.S. officials that reinforced 




Philippine relations. Such militaristic reinforcements were exercised by policing and 
disciplining political ―subversives‖; through public and infrastructural sanitation policies; 
by imposing particular limitations on the range of duties of Filipino civilian labor; and by 
prompting terms/conditions of disposability regarding hired Filipino civilian workers, 
despite the relative increase in the plethora of positions of work in which these workers 
were being included during this period. 
 
“Alleged Collaborator”: Revisiting Wartime and Postcolonial Exercises of Filipino 
Subjectivity in the Jesus Bautista Case Testimonials 
 
During the prewar period, U.S. and Philippine colonial officials largely defined 
―political subversives‖ in the Philippines as local and trans-local based Filipinos with 
perceived or real political commitments with groups who fought for Philippine 
independence apart from U.S. governance. As mentioned, these groups included the 
Sakdalistas, Ganaps, and other radical groups in the trans-pacific. Even Filipinos with 
perceived political allegiances to the Japanese government fell under the ―subversive 
category‖ during the pre-war period, but not nearly to the extent that they did during the 
Second World War. 
Jesus Bautista was one such person who, in the eyes of the political and military 
agents of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation,‖ dangerously fell under both characteristics of the 
―political subversive.‖ Well before the formal implementation of the board of review, 
U.S. military officials had their eyes on Bautista. Between May 17 and November 25, 
1945, naval lieutenants H.H. Cofield and G.R. McLean, along with Lt. Commander J.J. 
Reynolds, conducted a series of interviews of largely retired enlisted and civilian navy 




Casiano Ablola, former first class officer‘s steward; Juan Artana, former first class 
enlistee; Luis Pagtacan, retired second class engineman; Sixto Franco, active first class 
machinist mate; and Cenon Trias, active first class steward mate. 
Some historically compelling logics and themes transpired from this series of 
interviews conducted by the U.S. military—particularly the ―severity‖ of Bautista‘s 
family‘s involvement with the Sakdalistas and their collaboration with the Japanese 
government. While these logics of inquiry revealed and shaped the early postwar peak of 
the ―U.S.-Philippine nation,‖ they also articulated—if not aligned with—the intimate 
continuities between the wartime and postwar conditions of Filipino subjectivity in and 
beyond the U.S. Navy. 
One prevalent theme in these testimonies, as mentioned in the last chapter, was 
the extent of Bautista‘s involvement with the Sakdalistas. In addition, the degree of 
Bautista‘s success in recruiting other men into the Sakdalistas was another theme. Some, 
including first class enlistee Miguel Samson, testified that Bautista, along with another 
navy enlistee, Juan de los Reyes, ―tried to get [him] to join the Sakdalista Party about 
1939 and many time[s] since.‖ He also voiced that Bautista, along with first class 
officer‘s steward I. Ablola, were ―the only Sakdalista in San Roque, [Cavite 
Province].‖
155
 Former first class enlistee Juan Artana went so far as to identify Bautista as 
―a well-known Sakdalista.‖
156
 Luis Pagtacan, a former shipmate of Jesus Bautista after 
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World War I, proclaimed that ―Bautista was a member of the Sakdalista Party and he 
even tried to get [him] to join the party in 1940.‖
157
  
Sixto Franco, who claimed to be navy shipmates with Bautista from 1917 
onwards, stated that he ―knew that Bautista was a Sakdalista at least as far as 1938.‖
158
 
His testimony also offered a peculiar, if not odd, ―evidentiary‖ statement: ―I never talked 
with Bautista about [his involvement with the Sakdalistas] but he associated with 
Feliciano Tormis who had talked pro-Japanese to me.‖
159
 Nevertheless, what exactly 
defined ―pro-Japanese‖ talk, in this period of U.S.-Philippine relations, was not as evident 
in that noted conversation as it was in his memory of a dialogue he had with another navy 
mate regarding the subject of Bautista: 
Panegeton F1/c (a retired Navy man whose first name I do not recall) told me he 
heard Bautista tell the Japanese that all the US Navy men and those Filipinos who 
refused to work for the Japs should all be killed. This conversation occurred in 
Bautista‘s home and was overheard by Panegeton who was just outside the house. 




Other testimonies by former navy mates of Bautista also illuminated the degree to 
which their rhetorical allegiance or opposition to the U.S. shaped the contours of the 
―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ during the wartime and early postwar period. Some, including 
Miguel Samson, revealed that in some conversations, Bautista told them that ―the 
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Americans would never come back. Japan controls all around.‖
161
 Juan Artana stressed 
that ―every time that this man have seen people gathered in the streets or barber shops, he 
always asked them what they were talking about. Then he would proceed telling them not 
to wait for the Americans as ‗they are defeated.‘‖
162
 
Moreover, the extent of Bautista‘s wartime ―collaboration‖ with the Japanese 
government was another prevalent theme shaping these testimonies. One measure of such 
―collaboration‖ was the time and duration of Bautista‘s employment in the Cavite Navy 
Yard, which shifted from U.S. to Japanese control in 1942.
163
 According to Luis 
Pagtacan‘s July 9, 1945 testimony, ―Bautista worked in the Japanese Navy Yard from the 
time of the Japanese occupation up to the last minute when the Japanese evacuated 
Cavite.‖
164
 And on June 4, 1945, Cenon Trias, who proclaimed to be one of Bautista‘s 
navy shipmates in the 1930s, noted that Bautista ―preferred the Japs to the Americans‖ 
and that he ―heard Bautista say he liked to work for the Japs
165
 than the Americans.‖
166
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Trias, in an undated memo, went so far as to note that Bautista, as a member of the Ganap 
Party, ―was obliged to work as a spy for which this party was recognized for. [Bautista] 
worked in the Navy Yard all during the Jap occupation. I saw him going to and from 
work daily. I lived less than a block from him at this time.‖
167
 
Meanwhile, the testimony by Juan Artana, discharged first class enlistee, provided 
more specific—if not dramatic—details on the extent of Bautista‘s ―collaboration‖ with 
the Japanese government. While assisting the intelligence division of the U.S. sanctioned 
Cavite City Guerillas, Artana articulated Bautista‘s active—if not ―forceful‖—efforts to 
recruit locals to join the Japanese government: 
This man [Bautista] has been known and going around the City of Cavite telling 
and intimidating the people that they must help and collaborate… Every time that 
this man have seen people gathered in the streets or barber shops, he always asked 




Intricately integrated with these logics of Bautista‘s ―political subversions‖ was 
the theme of family, particularly in the racial, interethnic, and heterornormative sense. 
Most, if not all of these testimonies noted Bautista‘s daughters openly interacting with 
Japanese males: one through marriage with a Japanese man, another through employment 
in a Japanese bar. At least one of these testimonials extended this family theme in the 
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political sense. Miguel Samson, on May 14, 1945, testified that Bautista‘s wife and 
daughter ―also spread Japanese propaganda.‖
169
 
One exception to the extremely accusatory nature of these testimonies was that 
from Casiano Ablola. Ablola was working in the civilian force as a security guard at 
Sangley Point in the time of his testimony on June 4, 1945. In his testimony, Ablola 
stated that ―Bautista had the reputation in the [military] community of being a member of 




In addition, Ablola provided a relatively deeper context behind Bautista‘s 
―collaboration‖ with the Japanese military. Ablola‘s emphasis on Bautista‘s obligations 
to support his family, and to insure his family‘s survival, perhaps resonated in the hearts 
and minds of the Board of Review: 
 
He [Bautista] worked as a machinist for the Japs during the latter part of 1942, 
during 1943, and 1944 until the Americans came back. He told me that he had to 
work there because he had a family to support. He has about 8 children—6 of 




And finally, the last part of Ablola‘s testimony provided arguably the most important 
evidence for U.S. military officials: ―[Bautista] never talked much and I never heard him 
make any statements against the Americans or the Philippine Government.‖
172
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While Ablola‘s testimony provided a more nuanced and supportive interpretation 
of Bautista‘s ―collaborations,‖ perhaps the most convincing testimony came from Jesus 
Bautista himself. On June 9, 1945, Bautista wrote a letter to U.S. military investigative 
officials. This letter reported his own personal background in the U.S. Navy, along with 
his plea of ―innocence‖ from any accusations of political subversion. The content and 
form of this letter is provided below in its entirety, followed by a close, nuanced, and 
historical reading of his testimony. 
 
Jesus Bautista Revisited 
 
I am Jesus BAUTISTA, MM1c, USN (Ret.) I was placed on inactive duty 29 
Aug. 1933 and retired for physical disability 30 Sept. 1940. I was working in the 
Cavite Navy Yard as a civilian machinist when the war broke out in 1941. I am 52 
years old and live in #19 Juan Luna St., San Roque, Cavite. I am not employed at 
the present. 
 
I was not interned by the Japs. I was held for 5 hours, questioned and released. 
This was in Jan. 1942. I was not employed from them until Sept. 1942. At that 
time I heard from some of the people who were working in the Navy Yard for the 
Japs that the Japs needed workers there and I went there and applied for a job. 
The Japs did not tell me that I had to go to work or threaten me if I did not work. I 
went to work because I needed the money and the ration of rice each day which 
they gave the workers in the Yard. Once a month they gave me soap, childrens 
clothes and firewood. I worked for the Japs as a laborer, sweeping the buildings. I 
did not tell them I was a Machinist. I had no glasses then and so would have been 
unable to do that sort of work as my hindsight is bad. 
 
I continued to work there from Sept. 1942 till May 1943. At this time I heard that 
the Japs were trying to locate all the Navy men. They did not know that I was a 
retired Navy man. I became afraid and ran away and hid at Imus, Cavite. I had no 
regular employment after that time. I fished some and raised a little garden. 
 
In October 1943 I sold my house at #1 Inoscientio St., San Roque, Cavite for 
4000 pesos (Jap money) and December 1943 I bought a smaller house at #19 Juan 
Luna St., San Roque, Cavite for 2000 pesos. 
 
My daughter PATRIA (now age 18) worked in a Jap bar on Salamaca St. from 
May 1943 to May 1944. About March 1944 she married a Japanese civilian by the 




my daughter and the rest of my family in San Roque for about 3 months. Then he 
and my daughter lived by themselves until Okamina fled with the other Japs. 
While living in my home Okamina contributed his rice ration and sometimes 
other food to the family food supply. I did not live in my house while Okimana 
was there. 
 
My daughter FEDARICA (now age 19) worked in the same Jap bar for about 6 
months prior to the time the Japs left. 
 
Before the war I went to some of the public meetings of the Sakdalista Party but I 
never joined the party. I went to 3 different such meetings.  I never talked politics 
or made any pro-Japanese or Anti-American statements. I never gave the Japs any 
information of any sort. 
 




Many details in Bautista‘s testimony overlapped with the others mentioned. For 
instance, Jesus Bautista did work in the Cavite Navy Yard as a civilian Navy worker 
during the Japanese occupation between September 1942 and May 1943. Bautista‘s 
daughters did work in a Japanese bar, with one of them marrying a male of Japanese 
descent. And Bautista did associate with the Sakdalistas. Nevertheless, the divergences 
within these testimonies illustrated various interpretations of how politically intimate 
Bautista and his family members were with the Japanese imperial government during 
wartime. Responses ranged widely from forcefully collaborative—at the expense of his 
people—to having been forced to work for the Japanese government to support his 
struggling family. 
One can spend an entire career sifting through written and oral archive collections 
to assess the ―truthfulness‖ or ―accuracy‖ of these testimonies. Nevertheless, what I am 
most interested in, for the analytical purposes and methodological scope of this chapter, 
are the politics of these divergences in these testimonies. In fact, one might even make 
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the bold assessment that military officials were not as concerned with the accuracies of 
these details as they were with the politics, or implications, of their testimonies. More 
specifically, I am interested in inquiring and assessing the details of these testimonies, 
and how these details conveyed politics of recognition that shaped the bi-national 
imaginaries and continuing inequalities of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖: vis-à-vis war, 
conquest, and neo-colonialism. Inquiring these divergences, via the politics of 
recognition and enlistment, can enable us to further extrapolate the ways in which these 
Filipinos articulated their wartime and postcolonial subjectivities in a largely oppositional 
sense, as well as the ways in which the performative nature of these testimonials fueled or 
amplified their subjectivist articulations. 
Consequently, in the eyes of these U.S. military officials, these Filipinos‘ 
testimonials—face to face—measured their political, military, and familial allegiance to 
the ―U.S.-Philippine nation.‖ Meanwhile, in the eyes of these Filipino personnel, the 
reception of their testimonies determined what might transpire if their politics were, in 
any way, shape, or form, contradictory to what these U.S. military officials expected as 
―patriotic.‖ In fact, it can be argued that there was no better articulation of wartime and 
postcolonial subjectivity than in the performance and politics of the formal testimonial. 
Therefore, for the purposes of this chapter, I am more interested in the politics of 
recognition exercised in these militarized subjects‘ testimonials than in the ―verity‖ of 
these testimonials. 
Nonetheless, from a public historical perspective, Jesus Bautista‘s personal 
history is a relatively unique and exceptional one, especially in comparison to narratives 




nation.‖ On the one hand, Bautista was not interned in Bataan or in any of the other 
Japanese concentration camps during that time. On the other hand, if Bautista had told 
Japanese officials that he had worked as an enlistee for the U.S. Navy, he probably would 
have been interned—or even put to death—given that at certain points these Japanese 
officials were rounding up former U.S. Navy veterans from their local barrios. While one 
can only speculate in hindsight, U.S. officials from the Board of Review likely found 
truth—if not sympathy—with Jesus Bautista‘s wartime condition, and with his testimony 
overall. Perhaps because of the content and context shaping Bautista‘s testimony, U.S. 
officials found the grounds of his shipmates‘ testimonials as ―insufficient‖ to put Bautista 
to trial for treason. 
 
“Out-of-Bounds” Areas: Militarized Policies of Bordering the “U.S.-Philippine 
Nation”, 1947-1952 
 
Despite such nuanced cases as Bautista‘s, the emergence of radical political 
―subversives‖, coupled with the prevalence of anti-colonial Philippine nationalisms, only 
increased anxieties among U.S. military and political officials and their Philippine elite 
collaborators. In turn, coincidentally or consequently, the U.S. Navy immediately stopped 
official recruitment of Filipinos from 1947 to 1952.
174
 During this period, U.S. officials 
implemented restrictions of what I call trans-local permeability among its own personnel 
and officers in civilian or ―native‖ Philippine territories. In turn, these officials prohibited 
points of enlisted entry among civilian Filipinos into its militarized bases in the 
archipelago. While USN stoppage of Filipino enlistment, during this five-year period, 
illustrated one method of restricted Filipino mobility, evidenced conceptions of 
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Philippine lands—and Filipino peoples—in U.S. military officials‘ health sanitation 
reports further facilitated and legally enforced such trans-local restrictions of mobility 
among Filipinos during the early neo-colonial period. 
On May 1, 1947, W.E. Moore, USN Commander of Naval Operating Base (NOB) 
Subic Bay, approved revisions in two sections of an instructional manual for a Pacific 
Fleet in Subic Bay. These two sections concerned ―port health regulations‖ and ―out-of-
bounds areas‖ in the militarized region. One revision in this document was his point of 
―caution‖ toward U.S. military personnel of ―Helminthiasis‖ and other diseases within 
the ―native‖ surroundings of Olongapo City. According to W.E. Moore:  
The natives have numerous types of parasites. Transference of these worm 
infestations may be made by: 
 
(a) Close contact with natives. 
(b) Eating food contaminated by natives, especially in native eating 
establishments. 




There has been occasional case of diphtheria among natives. Avoid the disease by 




This disease is fairly prevalent among natives and close contact with them is the 




Such warnings as these were also accompanied with the ―dangers‖ of ―native‖ Filipinos‘ 
foods and beverages: 
(a) Native foods and drinks are dangerous. Those foods and vegetables grown in, 
or near the ground are especially dangerous because of the presence of human 
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excreta. All fruits and vegetables handled by natives are dangerous for the 
same reasons. Their hands are contaminated—their sanitation in general is 
extremely poor.  
 
(b) Water, milk, and other beverages are dangerous because a large number of 
restraurants [misspelled in this document] and native homes do not treat 
liquids and they are usually contaminated by human excreta. 
 
(c) Native alcoholic beverages are extremely dangerous because some of them   
     contain poison. Men have died and some have been blinded by these poisonous  




While the verity of these ―insights‖ likely ranged from somewhat inaccurate to downright 
erroneous, the official author of these findings cited similar observations regarding the 
local gendered presence of venereal disease: ―Venereal Disease rate among prostitutes in 
this area is about 85%. These women have little or no knowledge of female hygiene and 
make no effort to avoid venereal disease.‖
177
 
After noting the ―dangers‖ of the local lands, peoples, and places surrounding the 
U.S. naval base, the U.S.N. captain suddenly—if not strategically—followed his 
revisions on the ―Port Health Regulations‖ with corrections he approved in the section on 
―out-of-bounds areas‖: ―these areas are changed from time to time; the Security Office 
should be contacted for current out-of-bounds areas…‖
178
 
Similar neo-colonial and orientalist conceptions of Philippine local lands, 
ingestible materials, and peoples were evident in an August 1948 disciplinary sub-board 
report by U.S.N. Commanding Officer (C.O.) F.C. Dickey on the local area surrounding 
Sangley Point. In his memorandum, C.O. Dickey reported the water in Cavite as ―still 
unfavorable.‖ Even the boiled water in the area was ―often contaminated‖ and the ―water 
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used at the ice plant [was] polluted.‖
179
 Nevertheless, what differentiated—if not 
contrasted—this Sangley Point memorandum from the Subic Bay correspondences was 
the observed extent to which local political officials near Sangley Point were 
―cooperative‖ with U.S. military officials regarding health and sex regulation. Whereas 
USN Commander Moore lamented the ―lack of cooperation on the part of the political 
authorities in Subic City‖
180
, Commander Dickey acknowledged the significant degree of 
―cooperation‖ by Cavite City local officials in efficiently regulating water contamination 
near Sangley Point. Dickey emphasized that the water ―contaminations‖ in Cavite were 
capable of being resolved or ―purified‖ with the conditional cooperation between local 
officials and military officers of the Sangley Point Naval Station: 
As a result the City Officials of Cavite are taking steps to chlorinate the water of 
the ice plant and to enforce the boiling regulation for public establishments. 
Pending receipt of a sufficient supply ashore, this station loaned a limited quantity 
of calcium hypochlorite to the City of Cavite. Water at the ice plant and that 




This exceptional theme of collaboration between Philippine local and U.S. military 
officials was also evident in a previous April 1948 memorandum by officials of the 
Sangley Point Disciplinary Sub-board. These officials included C.O. Dickey, Lieutenant 
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H.M. Gray, Lieutenant G.E. Wineinger, and Lt. T.B. Uber.
182
 In this memorandum, 
Dickey reported the numerically ―prevalent‖ rate of venereal disease among temporary 
and permanent personnel in and around Sangley Point: ―107.51… per thousand per 
annum.‖
183
 Nevertheless, the members of the disciplinary sub-board were quick to note 
that ―an intensified Venereal Disease control and educational program [was] being set up 
by a hospital corps officer who [had] recently reported abroad after completing special 
training in this field.‖
184
 They also reported on the evident functioning and efficiency of 
this hospital‘s establishment in reducing the VD infection rate based on the condition of 
―keeping infected girls of Cavite out of circulation.‖
185
 
In addition to and in support of the sub-board‘s report on local VD rates were 
U.S. officials‘ updates on the ―prevalence and control of prostitution.‖ In these updates, 
the disciplinary sub-board largely ―credited‖ the local Shore Patrol for effectively 
―regulating‖: ―Organized houses of prostitution are prevalent but they are under control 
and observation by Shore Patrol that large scale prostitution does not occur from this 
source.‖
186
 Appositionally, the report cautioned—if not with a degree of anxiety for the 
nighttime regulation of their transient and permanent naval personnel—that ―a common 
source of prostitution exists among waitresses and hostesses who work at bars and night 
clubs and whose actions are hard to control after working hours.‖ 
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Why were U.S. military officials still concerned about health sanitation in the 
Philippine archipelago, especially after the U.S.—under its standards of modernity and 
sovereignty—formally embraced Philippine independence by 1946? As numerous 
scholars in empire studies have pointed out
187
, the U.S. was relatively successful in its 
endeavors of furthering health sanitation within its colonies on a global scale, particularly 
in the Philippines and other areas of the ―American tropics‖, during the early twentieth 
century. However, with the Philippines in economic and infrastructural ruins during 
World War II, by the postwar period of U.S.-Philippine relations, health sanitation again 
became a subject of relatively major concern among U.S. military officials in particular, 
especially considering the fact that they were reintegrating their personnel in the 
Philippine archipelago.
188
 For these officials, they were just as concerned about the health 
and survival of their personnel in an archipelago that they still considered, 
conceptualized, and stereotyped as ―filthy‖ and ―diseased‖— just as they did in the early 
American colonial period in the Philippines. But while ―civilizing the natives‖ under the 
project of American modernity was a primary logic behind both public health and 
military officials‘ concerns about health sanitation during the colonial period, for U.S. 
military officials post-1945, their concerns about health sanitation were more exclusively 
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 It is also important to note that by the early 1950s, U.S. military officials sought to expand their 
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based on insuring the health, survival, and militarized production of their personnel, and 
much less at this time about civilizing their Filipino counterparts under the auspices of 
what Warwick Anderson noted as ―biomedical citizenship.‖ By maximizing the health, 
survival, and militarized production of their personnel, U.S. military officials felt more 
secure in enforcing their base installations in the Philippines—especially in political 
opposition against the ideological formations and imperialist expansions of global 
communisms during this stage of the Cold War. Therefore, officials‘ concerns about 
health sanitation for their personnel intertwined intricately with their anxious 
enforcement of military base presence in this sovereign and neo-colonial area of the Asia-
Pacific. 
The extent to which the revisions in these health sanitation reports facilitated and 
reshaped the ―out-of-bounds areas‖ cannot be determined by these archival evidences 
alone. Nevertheless, when closely and broadly juxtaposed with the materially intertwined 
legacies of war, militarism, and colonialism shaping neo-colonial U.S.-Philippine 
relations, then one can see the ways in which these health reports, along with these 
reported ―out-of-bounds areas‖ (otherwise known as the ―dead line‖ during the 
Philippine-American War), were key in regulating the interracial intercourse and 
permeability between U.S. military personnel and the surrounding local communities. 
These ―out-of-bounds‖ areas, for instance, surrounding these U.S. militarized sites 
included the following places in Olongapo province cornering Subic Bay: 
a. Banicain 








g. Maquinaya (Civilian Hill) 
h. West end of Manga Point (West of Coconut Grove) 
i. The portion of Manila Avenue between Simpson and Gil Streets, including the 





The orientalist logics shaping the Subic Bay health/sanitation reports and out-of-
bounds areas, during the late 1940s, also informed the sanitation reports and off-base 
housing policy within areas surrounding Sangley Point, particularly in the early 1950s. 
Such logics further demarcated the boundaries between the local and military sphere in 
and around Sangley Point as well. For instance, in early 1952, U.S. officials also 
complained about the sanitary conditions near Sangley Point, which they felt stemmed 
from the ―dirty‖ living conditions in Cavite City. Such complaints were evident in 
Medical Officer Robert Pennington Jr.‘s correspondence to the Sangley Point 
commanding officer regarding ―inspection of off-station housing‖ early that year. In his 
correspondence, Pennington, Jr. specifically noted the area of 34-A Radio Road, Cavite 
City, as ―unsatisfactory to this department because of the low sanitary level it 
presents.‖
190
 Pennington‘s complaints also included the following: 
 ‗a. Open surface ditch used in back yard for disposal of kitchen wastes. 
 
‗b. Inadequate protection against flying and crawling insects. 
 
‗c. Inadequate protection from rodents. 
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Pennington also took note of the ―notoriously-bad water service facilities in 
Cavite City‖ and the potential dangers that they posed to the officers and their 
dependents, given the waterline connection that links the water supply of Cavite City to 
that of Sangley Point.‖
192
 Subsequently, this medical officer recommended two things. 
First, he suggested further official inspection by the medical officer and public works 
officer of this housing facility in particular. Second, he requested an investigation and 
transformation of the overall health and sanitary conditions of all Navy housings in 
Cavite City generally. In response to the medical officer‘s complaint, J.C. Day, Jr.—
Public Works Officer, U.S. Naval Station, Sangley Point, immediately ordered the 
closing of that navy housing facility.
193
 However, Day, Jr. ceased to acknowledge or 
respond to Pennington‘s recommendation to inspect all the off-station navy housing 
facilities in Cavite City. While Day Jr.‘s apparent rejection of Pennington‘s second 
recommendation—whether for budgetary reasons, or for prevention of further public 
inquiry into personnel living conditions of off-base housing—was not evident in these 
written historical records, it is more important to note how these Subic Bay and Sangley 
Point sanitation reports were shaped over time by military officers, and how these reports 
demarcated boundaries between the military and the local spheres for these officers and 
personnel.  
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Additionally, it is important to note how these boundaries further established the 
―out-of-bounds‖ areas where military officers were largely disabled from trying local 
suspects accused of crimes against military personnel. Because of their inability to court 
martial local suspects within these ―out-of-bounds‖ areas, these officers strictly enforced 
these boundaries for themselves and their personnel during this stage of the Cold War. In 
other words, by enforcing these boundaries to protect their servicemen in a land (still) as 
―foreign‖ to them as the Philippines, these officials were just as concerned with 
regulating the physical mobility of their American personnel as they were with 
maintaining their view of Filipinos as their most loyal foreign allies. 
Nonetheless, U.S. officials‘ views of Filipinos as their staunchest allies, coupled 
with the continuing U.S. military presence in the Philippines, fostered the conditions of 
(relatively) increasing Filipino civilian inclusion into the U.S. militarized space during 
the late 1940s and early 1950s, particularly into positions that involved managing 
classified documents. In a June 28, 1949 memorandum, Sangley Point Commanding 
Officer J.H. Kuhl confirmed the integration of several Filipino civilians into lines of work 
that enabled them to handle classified materials regarding U.S. national security: Enrique 
Fernandez, Ricardo A. Fernandez, and Restituto Pugeda.
194
 Also, according to my 
findings from the written historical record, five more Filipinos were hired to work in 
similar positions to handle classified matter that pertained to U.S. national security: 
Raymond E. Lucio; Manuel Naycalo; Asterio ‗R‘ Viray on June 6, 1952; Ciriace R. 
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Reyes on July 11, 1952; and Abel J. Pelayo on July 11, 1952.
195
 More specifically, the 
duties of these workers involved ―handling classified matter‖ within divisions related to 
the United States National Defense, including the Special Operations Division, the 




The responsibilities of these workers entailed the following. Firstly, it required 
responsibility ―for the security protection of any document or thing containing 
information affecting the National Defense or other classified matter to which [they] may 
obtain access in any manner whatsoever.‖
197
 Additionally, their duties of ―security 
protection‖ required that they ―shall not in any manner reveal or divulge to any person 
any classified information of which [they] may gain knowledge except as may be 
specifically authorized by cognizant authority.‖
198
 And lastly, they ―shall not copy, 
photograph, sketch or otherwise duplicate any classified document, instrument, plan, 
writing or material to which [they] may gain access except as specifically ordered by 
competent authority in connection with [their] duties nor shall [they] willfully retain the 
same or fail to deliver it on demand to the responsible authority.‖
199
 
These individual recruitments signified a degree of emerging trust that these U.S. 
officials had with their Filipino workers during this period, especially in contrast to the 
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earlier stages of the postwar period. However, Philippine local citizens—particularly 
those residing close to the U.S. bases—continued to be perceived as ―security threats.‖ 
This was evident by the severe limitations placed on Filipino civilians who were hired to 
handle classified documents of the U.S. National Defense. Moreover, the plethora of 
other historical evidence in this chapter attests to this fact, particularly from the 
establishment and enforcement of the U.S. military‘s ―out-of-bounds‖ areas in relation to 
the surrounding localities. Factors shaping the U.S. military‘s ―out-of-bounds‖ areas 
rooted not only from its perceived ―prevalence‖ of STDs and ―infected‖ locals, but 
perhaps too in the physical prevalence of political ―subversives.‖ Additionally, the 
fundamental participation of their personnel‘s ―savage behavior,‖ especially while off-
duty, further spurred the evident anxieties of maintaining military hegemony in the 
Philippines. Such fundamental ―savage behavior‖ among military personnel included 
desertion, drug possession, drunkenness, consensual fornication, murder, rape, and other 
crimes that would have jeopardized these officers‘ chances of trying their personnel 
under American jurisdiction. 
Desertion, in particular, was relatively more common among U.S. military 
personnel than officials preferred. These cases of desertion were briefly recorded in 
station logs during this time, and researched by me in my field research. For the most 
part, records of these desertions were merely listed and not documented in extended 
detail. However, one case that I uncovered in my field research proved to be a 
considerable exception. This case regarded American U.S.N. enlistee Paul Lee 
Ridgeway. While records of this case consisted of brief correspondences among U.S. 




grandmother. This letter expressed deep concern about her grandson‘s whereabouts. For 
instance, Ridgeway‘s grandmother emphasized how ―scared‖ she was ―when he was out 
on his liberty.‖
200
 Also, she stressed the possibilities of what could have happened to him 
during his leave of absence: ―[There] are so many dangers and bad people… They might 
have got him and made way with him or has him somewhere and has him in a camp 
suffering and needing help.‖
201
 Moreover, she articulated her grandson‘s disciplined and 
religious nature in order to eliminate any possibility of Ridgeway‘s conscious desertion 
or tardiness from his duties as U.S. military personnel: ―Paul was such a good boy and 
never late in the things he was to do… he always went to Church with me and had been a 
member since quite young and he worked for his Lord…‖
202
  
All in all, Ms. Bland‘s letter illuminated some strategic logics and themes that she 
utilized to convince the U.S. military officials to retrieve Ridgeway back within her 
actual gaze. For instance, religion appeared to be a theme that Ms. Bland used to 
convince the officers of her grandson‘s purity, disciplined nature, and overall morale. By 
utilizing this religious rhetoric to the officers, Ms. Bland sought to denounce any 
possibility that Ridgeway may have deserted from the navy base: ―he was good and 
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This letter also demonstrated an emerging historical pattern that I have witnessed 
in these written historical records on navy enlistees. Civilian relatives of these navy 
enlistees often spoke out on behalf of the enlistees themselves, particularly people of 
color (as evidenced in chapter two). These navy enlistees largely suffered severe 
structural limitations on political mobilization and unionization. Therefore, it was the 
civilian relatives, guardians or associates of these enlistees who exerted more pressure on 
navy and other military officials to affirm fairness for these enlistees: monetarily, 
hierarchically, and morally. In more specific cases, concerns of these enlistees‘ relatives 
ranged from the working and living conditions of these enlistees, to ongoing requests for 
child support from these enlistees, and even to the whereabouts of these enlistees (as in 
the case of Ms. Luanna Bland). 
Moreover, in the case of Luanna Bland, what most distinguished her letter from 
some of the others that I uncovered in my field research was that it was written in behalf 
of a non-Filipino U.S. Navy enlistee. Evidence of this exception can be found not just in 
the probable genealogies of Luanna‘s and Paul‘s surnames (e.g., Bland and Ridgeway, 
respectively), but especially in Bland‘s concerns about her grandson‘s encounters with 




In addition, the third and last logic that I uncovered in this document was the 
exact same logic employed by U.S. military officials to enforce the ―out-of-bounds‖ areas 
among their personnel—the politics of sickness and health: ―He is all the one I have to 
stay with me. I am a widower have been a long time. I am here sick. I‘ve had rheumatic 
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fever and another operation depending I need him so bad.‖
205
 Whereas U.S.N. officials 
utilized knowledge productions of health and illness to regulate the physical mobility of 
their personnel, Ms. Bland personalized the politics of sickness and health to bring her 
enlisted grandson back into the physical realm of her social life. 
In comparison to the contents of Ms. Bland‘s letter, the details of military 
officials‘ correspondences provided a contrasting description of Paul Ridgeway‘s 
character and morale. Some of these correspondences pertained to Bland‘s letter itself. 
After receiving Ms. Bland‘s letter on January 14, 1952, the commanding officer of the 
Sangley Point Naval Air Station wrote to the C.O. of the Long Beach Naval Receiving 
Station regarding the letter from Paul Ridgeway‘s Grandmother. The contents of this 
CO‘s letter included the CO‘s file on Ridgeway‘s brief tour of duty, a copy of the letter 
from Ridgeway‘s grandmother, and a few points of resolution for U.S. officials regarding 
the case of Ridgeway. More specifically, the C.O. provided interpretive details about how 
Ridgeway‘s ―character had changed‖ since ―he left his grandmother‘s home,‖ and based 
on hearsay ―he followed the pattern of a number of men out there of taking unto 
themselves a native girl as a constant companion.‖  As for Ridgeway‘s deep religious 
faith and devotion, the C.O. of Sangley Point responded, ―You will not [tell] by the tone 
of his grandmother‘s letter that he was very religious and quite without a touch of sin. I 
don‘t remember him being a regular attendant at religious services.‖
206
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While the enlistee‘s grandmother illuminated gendered politics of religion, 
―otherness,‖ health, and familial matriarchy, the U.S.N. commander‘s response offered a 
different, if not oppositional, knowledge politics regarding the whereabouts and 
―character‖ of this individual enlistee. Also, this document spoke exactly to what this and 
other navy officials were ―afraid‖ of during that time in the early post-independence and 
Cold War period of U.S.-Philippine relations: the ―character change‖ among their 
personnel over time in their inevitable interactions with the ―other‖, which in this case 
happened to be ―native‖ Filipinos. The more interactions their personnel had with the 
―natives‖—particularly ―native‖ women—while off-duty and in ―out-of-bounds‖ areas, 
the more fearful officials felt that their militarized personnel might ―change.‖ Such 
―changes‖ that these officials feared were their personnel‘s social and sexual intimacies 
with the ―native other‖; and, subsequently, in their desertion from the U.S. military 
altogether. 
Such fears regarding their personnel arguably translated to their logics and 
politics of recognizing their ―changed‖ personnel as part of the ―other‖; and, hence to be 
of no further concern in the eyes of the U.S. military officials. This politics of fear, 
recognition, and exclusion were likely illuminated in the U.S.N. commander‘s 
contrasting—if not oppositional—remembrances of Enlistee Ridgeway‘s character: ―You 
will not [tell] by the tone of his grandmother‘s letter that he was very religious and quite 




The binary logics of this and arguably other deserters facilitated the structural 
bordering and ―stability‖ of the trans-local military bases, along with the physical and 
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political mobility of their personnel. In addition, these logics provided key points of 
departure from the wartime politics of recognition of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation.‖ The 
political targets among agents of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ largely shifted from 
―foreign occupier‖ in the wartime period (e.g., Japanese and other axis military forces) 
back to ―domestic personnel‖ (including Filipinos) considered as possible or ―definite‖ 
political subversives. Also, in a broader scale, U.S. nationalist conceptions of the wartime 
―foreigner‖ (e.g., Japanese and Japanese Americans) shifted from the racialized ―yellow 
peril‖ to the racialized ―model minority‖ within the U.S. national body politic. Like the 
Philippines, Japan was exceptionalized and essentialized as America‘s ―staunchest 
ally‖
208
, especially during a time when the U.S. sought to expand its alliances with other 
Asian nations against China, Korea, and other communist imperial forces. While the 
1950 Mutual Defense Treaty, for example, aimed to continue mutual-based military 
alliances between the U.S. and the Philippines, U.S. officials also hoped that this treaty 
would imply Philippine acceptance of U.S. ties with Japan as well.
209
  This remarkable 
conceptual shift in U.S. diplomacy transpired from two overlapping historical 
developments. First was the U.S.‘s military occupation and cultural colonialism of Japan 
between 1945 and 1953. And second, the hemispheric emergence and expansion of U.S. 
hegemony in the trans-local Asia Pacific.
210
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These two historical developments in U.S.-Japanese relations significantly 
impacted the political militarized formations of Navy Filipino subjectivity in the postwar 
and postcolonial period of the U.S. and Philippine relationship. On the one hand, wartime 
anti-Japanese sentiments remained ingrained in the memories of U.S.-Philippine 
nationalist subjectivities in varying degrees in the 1950s. On the other hand, these 
essentialist sentiments no longer had the same political leverage and believability as they 
did in the wartime period. Rather, during the early postwar period, militarized formations 
of postcolonial Filipino subjectivity were recognized by their evident obedience to their 
military ―superiors‖, their discursive allegiance to the U.S. nation-state, and the degrees 
of their marginalization within the militarized space by their superiors, particularly within 
their own homeland in the Philippines. 
Inclusion of Filipino civilian workers, vis-à-vis marginalization, was especially 
evident in the minutes of a Board of Governor‘s meeting for the Commissioned Officers‘ 
Mess. This meeting, held on October 6, 1952, confirmed their recommendation to hire a 
(Filipino) chief steward, or first class commissary steward, as a full-time manager of the 
Officers‘ Club. The assigned steward would be paid $75 per month, in addition to 
fulfilling their initial duties, for the managerial position. To the steward hired for the 
position, this additional assignment likely meant means of further financial sustenance for 
himself and his family who may have lived nearby the Sangley Point Naval Base, 
however low the additional salary may have been at the cost of working in another full-








These officials also considered other alternatives for lessening the budgetary costs 
of managing this officers‘ club. One alternative was the deduction of each of the present 
managers‘ salaries to twenty-five pesos per month, and reducing the waiters‘ pay to ten 
pesos per month. Another alternative that these officials discussed, especially if the new 
hired manager did not meet their expectations, was the replacement of the present waiters 
and managers with five Filipina waitresses. This option, according to these officials, 
would entail paying forty pesos per month to each of these waitresses and would ―save 
about $75.00 per month.‖
212
 
The direct reasons why these officials hired a new manager, rather than choose 
any of the other alternatives that they discussed, are not immediately evidenced in the 
written historical record. Nonetheless, it is important to note the evident budgetary logics 
for the terms and conditions of this additional hire, along with the other managerial 
alternatives that they discussed during their board meeting. To these officials, what was 
more important was hiring who they perceived to be as cheap and docile labor in order to 
successfully manage their officers‘ mess space—in this case, a full-time (Filipino) 
steward. According to J.R. Siefert, the chairman of the Commissioned Officers‘ Mess 
Board of Governors, the cost of hiring of a full-time (Filipino) civilian steward would ―be 
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about $70.00 less than would be necessary to hire a retired stewards mate‖
213
 who likely 
would have more time and availability to commit to the position on a full-time basis. 
Such budgetary logics also informed a brand of nationalism that would shape 
limited quotas and other restrictions on Asian immigration and migrant labor policy (as 
Mae Ngai, Gary Gerstle, and others have noted), and especially military Filipino labor 
policies and cases, between the late 1940s and early 1960s. On one level, budgetary 
logics facilitated specific policies as broad as the 1946 Rescission Act (which prohibited 
veterans‘ benefits to 250,000 Filipino soldiers who served for the U.S. in World War II). 
On another level, these logics seemingly determined the outcome of particular labor cases 
filed by Filipino workers who have complained about their treatment in the U.S. Navy. 
One related case, in particular, pertained to a series of events that occurred 
between October 13 and October 20, 1952. During this period, three Filipino civilian 
workers, Alex P. Pagkaliwangan, from 1
st
 St, San Antonio, Cavite City; Pedro C. Moya, 
P. Pio St., from Caridad, Cavite City; and Papaya G. Gandia, from Kawit, Cavite, all of 
whom were cement workers in the Public Works Department at Sangley Point, set up 
huts by using eight carpentry jacks to secure the beams of the hut—as ordered by their 
supervisor, Mariano Montefalcon. On October 17, 1952, the jacks that they used to set up 
the hut were stolen, and three days later these three employees were given discharge 
papers, while their other co-workers were retained or reenlisted. Based from this series of 
events, these three workers organized to write a formal complaint letter on October 29 in 
that same year. In this letter, they stressed that they ―became victims of unfounded and 
groundless suspicion without giving [them] a fair and due investigation.‖ In turn, they 
gave the following rendition of their complaint: ―We regret to reiterate that we became 
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victims of unfounded and groundless suspicion so much so that we were given discharge 
papers.‖
214
 In response to their complaint letter, Sangley Point Commanding Officer S.P. 
Weller notably evaded the issue of the stolen jacks and instead emphasized two things: 
the need to lay off Filipino workers during this time because of budgetary constraints; 
and the possibility of their reenlistment. In his November 1952 correspondence to these 
workers, Weller emphasized that Pakgaliwangan, Moya, and Gandia were discharged ―as 
reduction in force‖ and that ―[their] rights to re-employment at this activity are not in any 
way prejudiced.‖
215
 Weller also stated that ―in the event a need exists for personnel with 
your qualifications, you will be considered for employment…‖
216
  
As the Weller correspondence illustrates, budgetary logics, or budgetary 
nationalism, were utilized by officials (consciously or not) to marginalize Filipino 
civilian workers in stewardship positions, as well as to terminate their employment under 
actual or possible grounds of discrimination. Despite the communal efforts by these 
workers to deliver a formal letter of complaint, officials usually dismissed such claims 
made by Filipino civilian workers, sometimes under grounds or logics of ―budgetary 
constraints.‖ In the following section, I narrate and assess the case of an individual 
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Filipino civilian worker who arguably was hired as the new manager of the same officers‘ 
mess branch that was headlined in the Sangley Point board of governor‘s October 1952 
meeting (although this connection is only speculative at the moment). The particular case 
of this civilian worker, Leonicio Arceo, demonstrates the ways in which the ideological 
foundations and uneven realities of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ operated on the ground 
level, especially in frequent everyday encounters between U.S. officers and their Filipino 
civilian workers. 
 
Politics of Recognition and Enlistment: the Case of Leonicio F. Arceo 
 
On October 14, 1953, two upper level superiors, Mess Manager Mr. Pineda and 
Lieutenant Commander D.R. Nixon, gave Leonico Arceo an order. They ordered Arceo 
to replace one of his co-workers as full-time manager of the Food Services Department of 
the Officers‘ Mess. This full-time position was also meant to be an addition to, rather 
than replacement of, his existing full-time work as storeroom keeper. As storeroom 
keeper, Arceo was already involved in the handling and organizing of paper work related 
to the stock employee branch, the packaged liquor store, the bar, and other relative 
divisions of the Officers‘ Mess. In response to these demanding requests by his manager 
and lieutenant commander, Arceo stressed that he would not be able to fulfill the double 
duties as food service manager and as storeroom keeper of the Officers‘ Mess with equal 
attention and efficiency.
217
 Nevertheless, over the next four weeks, Arceo resolved this 
double bind by working full-time in his duties as mess storeroom keeper while fulfilling 
his assignments as food service manager. 
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Arceo‘s sense and practice of prioritization towards his storeroom keeping duties 
eventually caught up with him. This was evidenced by the looming threats by Lt. Cmdr. 
Dixon to Leo Arceo. These threats begged for Arceo‘s dismissal if Arceo did not 
consistently meet the duties of his additional full-time work as food service manager.
218
 
Thus, Arceo‘s sense and act of resolve conflicted with the inevitably unmet demands of 
Lt. Cmdr. Dixon and his orders. This conflict between Arceo and Dixon came to a sudden 
head on the morning of November 11, 1953. During that morning, LCDR Dixon asked 
Arceo if his assigned tasks, as food service manager, were ―up-to-date‖ in accordance to 
the LCDR‘s own standards. Arceo‘s response, according to his written testimony, was 
that he was still handling the required paperwork of his initially fulltime interdisciplinary 
work as storekeeper. Therefore, Arceo was understandably unable to complete those 
tasks commanded by Lt. Cmdr. Dixon. 
According to Arceo‘s testimony, after hearing Arceo‘s plea for a downscaled 
workload, Dixon called Arceo a certain word. This word was the exact synonym of one 
used repeatedly and degradingly to describe and conceptualize ―native‖ Filipinos, the 
―native‖ food, and the ―native‖ land that they defined as ―out-of-bounds‖ for U.S. 
military officials and enlisted personnel to spend off-duty hours. This word that Dixon 
called Mr. Arceo was ―shit.‖
219
 
As noted earlier in this chapter, such name calling by this U.S. military official 
was reminiscent, if not reflective, of the echoing conceptualizations of Filipino ―natives‖ 
by U.S. health sanitation officials during this neocolonial period of U.S.-Philippine 
relations, as well as the colonial period of U.S. hegemony in the Philippines. Such 
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orientalist conceptualizations and applications by these officials, according to colonial 
historian Warwick Anderson, was prevalent in U.S. health sanitation officials‘ 
stereotypical depictions of Filipinos as ―dirty‖, ―filthy‖, ―contaminated‖, or ―diseased‖ in 
order to facilitate and enforce projects of sanitation and subsequent displacement of 
Filipino bodies from their communal homes. 
These conceptualizations and practices likely transpired in the language used by 
such leading U.S. military officials as Lt. Cmdr. Dixon to reinforce the intimate 
conditions of inequality that shaped the Officers‘ Mess Room. These inherent conditions 
of inequality privileged the power of the U.S. military officials and enforced the 
subjugation of the local civilian personnel. Despite the fact that these local civilian 
laborers were included within the spatial boundaries of the U.S. military base, the 
boundaries and conditions of Filipino exclusion were articulated, imposed, and concealed 
at any time under the terms of the U.S. American military officials. In the meantime, 
according to empire historian Nayan Shah, similar projects and policies were enacted by 
health officials in the U.S. in order to displace, segregate, and marginalize trans-pacific 
Chinese immigrants in San Francisco during the first half of the twentieth century. 
Enactments of these conditions were evidenced in Dixon‘s reaction to Arceo‘s 
acts of postcolonial ―insubordination‖: he fired him immediately from both positions as 
storekeeper and food service manager of the Officers‘ Mess. Shortly after hearing news 
of his forced resignation, Arceo packed up all his belongings inside the Mess and left 
them in a local store just outside the Main Gate of Sangley Point. Arceo then traveled to 
Batangas, just across town from Sangley Point. As for whom he stayed with, who his 




evident thus far in the written historical record. What was clear was at some point 
between his forced deportation from the base and his subsequent arrival in Batangas, 
Arceo wrote a series of compelling letters to F.F. Gill, the commanding officer at Sangley 
Point. This series of letters emphasized his case and ―appeal for justice, gentleman 
dealings and fairness.‖  This quoted phrase provided the title for Arceo‘s first letter to 
military officials on November 11, 1953.  
In this letter that Arceo proclaimed as his ―modest proposal for justice,‖ Arceo 
pleaded the case of his unjust firing to this military official. As having been ―wantonly 
humiliated, insulted, and oppressed‖ upon his firing, Arceo stressed that he was a 
―humble Filipino ever desirous… to serve the American Government and the American 
people.‖ Subsequently, Arceo requested for assistance by Commanding Officer Gill, 
whom he complimented as ―veritable‖ and willfully assumed ―would mercifully grant 
justice to any human being irrespective of race and color‖. Moreover, in this letter, Arceo 
described his specific case in full detail to C.O. Gill: from his initial duties as full-time 
storekeeper, to his additional assignment as full-time service manager, to the disrespect 
bestowed upon him by his official superiors during the course of his two full-time labor 
duties as storekeeper and service manager.
220
  
One can argue that the contents of Arceo‘s letter, along with the act of Arceo 
writing the letter himself, were an exercise and politics of self-recognition. In addition, 
one can assess these contents and form of action as articulations of his own postcolonial 
subject position as a subjugated and excluded ―native‖ Filipino civilian within the borders 
of a U.S. militarized space situated on his homeland: the Philippines. As evidenced in 
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Arceo‘s case, these spatial borders were especially enforced within the intimate confines 
of the Officers‘ Mess, despite the fact that Arceo likely knew not what his subjugation 
and exclusion meant in terms of the U.S.-Philippine neo-colonial relationship.
221
 Take, 
for instance, the first statement in Arceo‘s letter: 
I seek shelter within the folds of your good office, I, having been wantonly 
humiliated, insulted, and oppressed. I still entertain the serious belief that your 
respectable self as a veritable American would mercifully grant justice to any 
human being irrespective of race and color. I am a humble Filipino ever desirous 




 ―I seek shelter within the folds of your good office…‖ This phrase connoted a 
particular contradiction in Arceo‘s postcolonial subjectivity. This contradiction was 
evidenced by Arceo‘s ―modest‖ request for ―shelter‖ or protection from the very same 
office and institution that excluded him from such ―shelter‖ and ―protection‖ in the first 
place: the officers‘ mess and the U.S. Navy. The officers‘ mess and the U.S. Navy were 
the institutional targets of Arceo‘s inquiry, resolve, and possible resistance that shaped 
this momentary shift in his own postcolonial subjectivity. The potential awareness of the 
co-dependence between his own subject condition and the existing hegemony of the U.S. 
militarized space also pointed toward what Sarita Echavez See alludes to as the 
―improbability‖ of postcoloniality. More specifically, within the contents of his letter, the 
rising ―improbability‖ of Arceo‘s postcolonial subjectivity almost surfaced: from the 
historical depths of his personal experience to the written page of the letter. This written 
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articulation of his experience was evidenced in the second half of the first sentence: ―… I, 
having been wantonly humiliated, insulted and oppressed…‖
223
 
Another note of relevance from this letter was the mutually constitutive 
formations of Arceo‘s politics of enlistment. These mutually constitutive formations 
consisted of two things. First, the racially inclusive ideal of justice that represented 
Arceo‘s colonized epistemology of U.S. American modernity and nationalism. And 
second, the racially exclusive and exploitative practices that largely shaped Arceo‘s 
experience and writings as a civilian laborer and migrant in his own homeland: the 
Philippines. Without the blanketing ideology of racial inclusion, this politics of restriction 
would likely have been less imminent, if not existent. 
In addition, the letter displayed textual evidence of Arceo‘s cultural self-
identification with hiya, a Tagalog- and Filipino-based practice of shame, or humility. 
This cultural practice was evident in the way that Arceo referred to himself as a ―humble‖ 
Filipino or his ―humble self.‖ These self-references were not only notable in the 
statement above, but also in all three of the letters he sent to the U.S.N. captain in his 
―modest proposal for justice.‖
224
 
Besides this gesture of hiya vis-à-vis humility, there was a second dimension of 
this cultural term and practice: the act of shaming others. This latter meaning of hiya 
implied a more anti-postcolonial form of resistance by shaming his superiors. This 
exercise of shame was evident in these letters through Arceo‘s written recollection of 
each and every recorded incident in which he felt unfairly treated during his U.S.N. 
civilian tenure. Consider, for example, Arceo‘s description of his firing: 
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[C.O.] Mr. Dixon entered the office and ask me if I had made the work of the 
Food Service activity up-to-date. I told him that I was still busy entering in the 
Stock Cards of the Packaged Liquor and Bar, their respective sales and 
consumption respectively (which he found me exercising that official function 
befitting my actual work). I was reasoning to him in a very respectfully and 
gentlemanly way as an inferior employee as my humble self would do to a 
Superior Officer, but I was powerless to move his human instinct. Instead, 
however, I received the severest blow and insult from him, calling me ‗shit,‘ 
besides, driving my humble self like a hungry dog. He told me that I was fired and 




This latter practice of hiya was further exemplified by Arceo‘s references of himself as 
―powerless‖, the recollection of his superior officer‘s treatment of him as ―a hungry dog‖, 
and of his officer‘s ―harsh‖ and ―beastly‖ treatment of him, leading to what Arceo 
recalled as his ―forced severance from the service.‖
226
 
 The following day, on November 12, 1953, enough temporal, geographical, and 
emotional distance provided Arceo the chance to compose two things. First and foremost, 
he composed himself. Secondly, a follow-up letter to address any corrections that he felt 
needed to be articulated after the first one. These ―corrections‖ might have especially 
been made after encountering his former co-worker and his Catholic God. These details 
were confirmed in the second letter he sent to U.S. military officials. Considerably briefer 
than his first letter, the second one is as follows: 
Everything has now come to light with me. When previously all was dark and 
gloomy, now God has enable[d] me to comprehend and see the light. 
 
I wish to apologize for everything that transpired formerly, seeing and 
comprehending now as I do that all were the fruits of Mr. P.M. Pineda‘s 
(Manager) Mismanagement, both activities of the Club and men altogether, and 
partly misunderstanding my humble self. 
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Mr. Villamiel whom I have the lucky privilege of meeting and conferring this 
morning has enable me to see the light in a wider and clearer perspective, and for 
which I reiterate my apology to you for my seemingly fabricated insubordination 
which convinced as I am now were all caused by the Manager‘s faultless personal 
and official shortcomings. 
 
I take this opportunity of thanking you for whatever assistance you have extended 
my humble behalf, which I would have the optimistic privilege of reciprocating 
you in the future with something in my power possibly good also. 
 




Whether because of proclaimed divine intervention or increased temporal distance from 
the time of his termination, the content of Arceo‘s second letter re-presented a shift back 
to a postcolonial practice of hiya that emphasized a more honorable form of shame:  
humility. While considerably evident in the first letter, this honorable act of hiya was 
even more amplified in the second one, particularly through Arceo‘s reverb of the 
following noun and verbal conjugation that illuminated the religious and re-visionary 
tone of this second letter: ―apology.‖ This prevalent form of hiya did not detract, 
nonetheless, from the latter form of hiya: passing shame. While Arceo‘s passing of shame 
was still evident in his second letter, it was displayed in a more forgiving, tactful, and 
diplomatic tone than in the first: ―… I reiterate my apology… for my seemingly 
fabricated insubordination which convinced as I am now were all caused by the 
Manager‘s [Lt. Cmdr. Dixon‘s] faultless personal and official shortcomings.‖ 
Besides the ―divine‖ intervention and redemptive direction toward a more 
humbled postcolonial sense of hiya, the last paragraph in this second letter articulated a 
postcolonial display of utang na loob. This other Tagalog-based linguistic and cultural 
term essentially means ―inner debt.‖ The conditions of this sense of ―inner debt‖ were—
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and are—defined by the mutual sense of agreement between two parties. As these two 
letters illustrated, Arceo offered his interpretation and imposition of utang na loob by 
establishing the terms of mutual reciprocity between himself as a ―humble Filipino‖ and 
the U.S. military officials who will have extended ―whatever assistance‖ to his ―humble 
behalf.‖ By doing so, Arceo was practicing the improbability of Filipino postcoloniality. 
The improbable conditions of postcoloniality were set by Arceo‘s—not the U.S. 
officials‘—attempt to establish a mutually equal relationship between him—a ―native‖ 
Filipino national—and his military officials of the U.S. empire nation-statecraft. 
However, such conditions of improbable postcoloniality also defined its 
probability. This was evident by the means in which the informal conditions of 
improbability were established. These conditions involved the unawareness, if not 
postcolonial amnesia—of the colonial legacies of inequality shaping the postcolonial 
U.S.-Philippine relationship. In the context of Arceo‘s case, these terms were shaped by 
two factors. First, they illuminated the disposability of Arceo himself as a human being in 
the imperial eyes of the U.S. military officers and agents. And secondly, the degrees of 
probability of U.S. military officers and agents in enforcing the structural integrity of 
their own superior subject positions in relation to the Filipino ―foreign‖ nationals, in and 
beyond the U.S. militaristic bases of empire. 
Similar attempts by military officials to secure their structural integrity were 
evident in Arceo‘s case in the name of bureaucracy. After Arceo sent his two letters to 
the U.S.N. captain at Sangley Point, the letters were sent back to Arceo due to 
―bureaucratic changes‖ in the mail department of the officers‘ mess. The direct root of 




conscious confirmation of Arceo‘s termination—was not as clear in the written historical 
record. What was relatively clearer, nonetheless, was Arceo‘s subtle suspicion that the 
latter possibility might have been the case. This probable suspicion transpired in his 
likely recognition of the impossibility of mutual negotiation between himself and U.S. 
military officials to resolve what he felt was his unfair workload, treatment, and 
termination from the U.S. naval civilian force. In turn, Arceo‘s recognition of 
impossibility reignited Arceo‘s feelings of being unjustly subjugated by his fellow 
employees and employers in the officers‘ mess. Such re-ignitions remained in Arceo‘s 
third letter, which I phrase below in its entirety: 
Permit me to forward you copies of my letters surrounding my forced, oppressive, 
and dictatorial severance from the service in my humble capacity as an employee 
of the Officers‘ Mess (Open) and of which you have all supervision and control. I 
am submitting to you all the issues involved for your impartial consideration and 
perusal and with it goes my optimistic anticipation that justice and fair deal 
should take its rightful course. Copy of my first letter addressed to your honorable 
sir which I requested an intermediary was not delivered to you at my own 
personal request accounted for the charge of development as hinted to me by the 
Chief Accountant and of which I would be privileged to present to you my second 




From Batangas, Arceo sent all three letters to the corrected mailing address on November 
22, 1953. During this time, Arceo realized the impossibility of mutual negotiations 
between himself and agents of the U.S. military. Additionally, the agential, bureaucratic, 
and structural conditions of impossibility were even more evident in the subsequent 
written correspondence between U.S.N. Captain Gill and Lieutenant Commander Dixon 
regarding Leonicio Arceo. As a result of this correspondence, Lt. Cmdr. Dixon wrote his 
letter of resolution to Capt. Gill on December 2, 1953. I have displayed this letter below 
in its entirety: 
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As Treasurer of the Officer‘s Club, US Naval Station, Sangley Point, I don‘t 
believe it necessary to answer the letter of Mr. Arcia [Arceo‘s name is misspelled 
in this document]. As he stated he was insubordinate, which I believe is sufficient 
enough, but in order to clarify his dismissal, the following was used as a basis of 
his discharge from the Officer‘s Club: 
 
1. Insubordinate 
2. Wouldn‘t take orders 
3. Used the Club as his home 
4. Wouldn‘t take any work, wherein the storeroom job he had only 
required approximately four hours a day. 
5. When he was confronted for not working during regular working 
hours, he used to say ‗All work and no play makes Jack a dull boy‘ 
6. He was fired 3 times but wouldn‘t leave, which necessitated calling the 







Dixon likely felt a strong degree of sincerity about his accusations toward Arceo‘s 
insubordination and his subsequent termination of Arceo‘s civilian employment in the 
U.S. Navy. After all, to Dixon, the politics of employing Filipinos like Arceo, as civilian 
workers, was largely defined by these workers‘ abilities to successfully fulfill their duties, 
regardless of how menial, taxing, or marginal they may have been in the naval work 
space. With Arceo failing to meet these duties, Dixon likely felt obligated, as a superior 
military official, to take disciplinary measures—not only in taking his own actions into 
accountability, but in maintaining and enforcing the structural integrity of his naval 
service branch.  By not doing so, Dixon probably felt that he would be failing in his own 
duties as a (white) military official. Additionally, it is likely that Dixon felt Arceo was 
already well-aware of the work that was in store for him before ―choosing‖ to take upon 
the dual position as storeroom keeper and food service manager. Given his subject 
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position as a U.S. official, what mattered more to Dixon was Arceo‘s ability to fulfill his 
duties, rather than consider seriously the structural obstacles that may have prevented 
Arceo from successfully handling two jobs as storeroom keeper and food service 
manager. Therefore, any slight or major deviation from fulfilling his required duties or 
scheduled attendance would likely be considered as ―insubordinate‖: regardless of the 
degrees of impossibility of fulfilling each and every task of this dual position. Along 
these lines of thought, any sign of resistance by Arceo would be even further considered 
by Dixon as ―not taking orders‖ and would provide more grounds for Arceo‘s 
termination. 
However, as evidenced in the contents of this letter, Lt. Cmdr. Dixon‘s primary 
preference was not to reply at all to Arceo‘s lettered grievances. That way, Arceo‘s case 
would abruptly be dropped from further correspondence in the written historical record. 
These preferences were especially evident given two likely possibilities. First possibility 
being that Arceo was actually unfairly subjugated, vilified, and disposed from the U.S.N. 
civilian force. Second possibility: that Lt. Cmdr. Dixon himself fabricated the conditions 
of Arceo‘s termination. Examples of such likely fabrication were illuminated in particular 
examples from the letter text. One citation was Dixon‘s miscalculation of Arceo‘s 
recorded daily work hours (four rather than eight). The next citation was Dixon‘s likely 
misconstruing, if not fabrication, of Arceo‘s statement ―All work and no play makes Jack 
a dull boy.‖ This statement alone was a completely unlikely remark that Arceo would 
make, especially given Arceo‘s letter writing style, along with the likelihood that the 
phrase would be something that Dixon himself would say. Such likelihood was imminent 




overall content and form of Dixon‘s brief response letter. Therefore, with no further 
evidence of this case in the written historical record, there would be much less likelihood 
that this case would be circulated in any sort of public context, nor would there be 
likelihood that these officials would hold any accountability for the immense workloads 
and maltreatment that may have been bestowed upon Arceo as a U.S.N. civilian worker. 
Moreover, the strategic framings and suppressions of Arceo‘s ―voice‖ in Dixon‘s 
letter spoke to what Paul A. Kramer and Stuart MacIntyre referred to as the ―politics of 
recognition.‖ As stated earlier, in Blood and Government, Kramer defined the politics of 
recognition as the parametrical meanings in which U.S. policymakers included Filipinos 
in the U.S. national body politic, particularly through the pacification and subjugation of 
Filipinos during the Philippine-American War and the U.S. colonial period. In the case of 
Lt. Cmdr. Dixon‘s response letter, there was a politics of recognition and enlistment of 
such Filipinos as Leonicio Arceo. Such politics of recognition and enlistment manifested 
in the uneven degrees of inclusion—and exclusion—of Filipinos as civilian workers in 
the U.S. military bases. 
Nevertheless, I would also argue that the politics of recognition and enlistment 
were defined by their very contradiction within the context of the neo-colonial U.S.-
Philippine relationship. In other words, the recognition of Philippine sovereignty and 
nationhood, in the eyes and epistemologies of U.S. military policymakers, relied heavily 
upon the very lack of recognition of independence from Philippine local and nationalist 
perspectives. Therefore, to U.S. military officials, the politics of enlisting such Filipinos 
as Arceo meant the very subjugation and restriction of these laborers. While more 




in significant levels until the latter 1950s, for Arceo and other Filipino laborers in the 
earlier half of this decade, individual or communal based letter writing to U.S. officials 
was seen as a more appropriate outlet to express their grievances. 
Thus, in the ―individual‖ case of Arceo, the politics of enlistment placed upon 
Arceo informed and shaped this Filipino worker‘s subversive act by writing his trilogy of 
letters to these U.S. military officials. In addition, the subversive nature of his response 
was amplified by proclaiming power upon his American superiors. Arceo expressed this 
form of proclamation by his articulation of utang na loob. Therefore, while the hiring, 
exploitation, and firing of Arceo exemplified exercise of military officials‘ politics of 
recognition and enlistment, Arceo exercised his own politics of enlistment through his 
intrepid defiance of his military superiors. By these acts of defiance, Arceo further 
exemplified the improbability of his postcolonial condition, and the probable paradigm 
shift toward an anti-colonial frame of mind. 
Arceo‘s intrepid acts of resistance were not lost upon Lt. Cmdr. Dixon. Dixon, in 
turn, exercised his own power and structured privilege by providing the following 
response to his colleague Captain F.F. Gill: ―I don‘t believe it is necessary to answer to 
the letter of Mr. Arcia…‖ By denying the content and form of Arceo‘s letters, including 
the correct spelling of Arceo‘s last name, Dixon therefore discounted any relevance of 
not just Arceo‘s letters, but Arceo as a person as well. While further inquiries and 
theories on the relationship between knowledge, power, privilege, and subjugation can be 
examined as a separate project on the Arceo case, the following questions may now be 
asked within the structure, method and scope of this chapter: What was it about Arceo‘s 




―without merit‖? Was it the actual details that Arceo highlighted that led to Arceo‘s 
forced resignation? Or was it the mere fact that a person like Arceo was already 
considered by U.S. military officials as an ―inferior‖ (by race and class) who was outside 
the U.S. national, political, and—even more ironically—military body politic? 
If all the above were the case during this period—and much likely so—then in the 
eyes of the U.S. American military officials, Arceo (along with the rest of the 9,985 
Filipino civilian workers
230
) had absolutely no political leverage in matters regarding 
their own local working conditions and livelihood inside the U.S. bases within their 
homeland. Additionally, for these Filipino civilian workers, the only way they would be 
able to be included within the domestic U.S. nation-state—and U.S. citizenship for that 
matter—was through actual enlistment in the U.S. Navy. And even through actual naval 
enlistment, neither U.S. citizenship nor equal opportunity would be guaranteed. 
Nevertheless, while such distinguished and related enlistment cases have been 
extensively discussed in the second chapter, for this chapter in particular it is important 
for us to understand the uneven and unequal politics of recognition: both for U.S. military 
officials employing Filipino civilians, as well as for ―their‖ Filipino civilian workers 




On November 10, 1953, F.F. Gill, the Commanding Officer (C.O.) in  
Sangley Point, wrote a letter to the C.O. in the U.S. Naval Forces of the Philippines, 
located in Manila. The primary subject of this correspondence was Sangley Point, 
particularly the degree of strategic importance of Sangley Point to U.S. global military 
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operations, and the ―problems‖ that continued to plague the base in relation to the 
surrounding local community. In this letter, Gill first emphasized that Sangley Point was 
―the most important US Naval installation in the world,‖ and the base was a ―‗Major 
Outpost‘ in the ‗Frontiers of American Diplomacy‘ in South East Asia.‖
231
 Secondly, Gill 
intricately tied or anchored Sangley Point—as a military outpost—with all Southeast 
Asian nations, including the ―Australians, Indonesians, the British in Malaya and Hong 
Kong, the Burmese, the Thailanders, the French in Indo-China, the Free Chinese of 
Formosa and the Filipinos.‖
232
 Thirdly, C.O. Gill pointed out how vital Sangley Point 
would be for the U.S. if their war in Vietnam were to escalate to ―hotter‖ proportions 
(which it eventually did). Fourth, this U.S. official‘s correspondence letter emphasized 
that the mission of Sangley Point, as a naval base, was to ―provide facilities to support, 
fleet reconnaissance, anti-submarine, transport and utility aircraft operations and to 
provide essential support for ComNavPhil, Fleet Units, Military Assistance Groups and 
Naval Attaches in Southeast Asia.‖
233
 Fifth, Gill stressed the role of the base in managing 
affairs in Cavite City, especially to ―detect and control ‗Black Market‘ violations‖ 
234
 that 
he felt was evident given the ―nature‖ of the locals who were living within close 
proximity to the American naval base. In addition to what he considered as the ―health 
and sanitation problems‖ that were prevalent in Cavite City and hence affected the base 
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in Sangley Point, Gill stressed—in perhaps metaphorical terms—that if officials want ―to 
exterminate insects on the Point [they] have to ‗swat flies‘ in Cavite City.‖
235
 
There are several pertinent things to point out in this letter, especially in regards 
to the chapter‘s scope and method, and particularly in regards to the politics of what was 
not recognized in this correspondence. First, C.O. Gill wrote this letter during a time that 
Arceo and other Filipino civilian workers continued to be subjugated and marginalized in 
Sangley Point and other U.S. military bases within their own homeland in the Philippines. 
On the one hand, these Filipino civilian workers continued to be included in these 
militarized spaces in the Philippines between the late 1940s and early 1950s, despite the 
fact that U.S. officials banned Filipino enlistment in the US Navy during most of this 
period. On the other hand, Gill‘s correspondence ceased to acknowledge the visible 
presence of these Filipino civilian workers within these spaces, and especially the 
pertinent role that they played in making the Sangley Point Naval Base ―the most 
important US Naval installation in the world‖, as stated by this navy official. Second, the 
content of this letter revealed the ways in which the U.S. military continued to demarcate 
its boundaries in relation to the surrounding local communities, specifically within the 
realm of health and sanitation policy. Third, this letter exemplified, especially to U.S. 
officials, how the raving importance of Sangley Point—and likely other U.S. military 
bases in the Philippines—often relied upon their politics of non-recognition of these 
Filipino civilian workers and the contributions that these Filipinos have made to the U.S. 
militarized landscape in the Philippines.  
Nonetheless, such case studies as those of Jesus Bautista, Leonicio Arceo, and 
others allow us to gain a better sense of the ways in which the shifting politics of 
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enlistment reinforced and destabilized the bi-nationalities of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖, 
as exercised in the U.S. militarized space within the Philippines during the Second World 
War and the early postwar period. These case studies, and others assessed in this chapter, 
exemplified how Filipinos responded individually to the structural limitations shaped by 
the mass atrocities of World War II, coupled with U.S. officials‘ anxieties concerning the 
eventuality of Philippine independence. In varying degrees, these structural limitations 
facilitated the wartime and postwar subjectivities among Filipinos in the Philippines, 
especially for those like Jesus Bautista and Leonicio Arceo who worked and lived within 
closest proximities to and from the U.S. militarized base. Because they lived and worked 
within the borders of these bases in the Philippines, their physical and political 
movements were severely limited and subject to close scrutiny under U.S. American 
jurisdiction. While the conditions of U.S. American jurisdiction directly contradicted 
with nationalist terms of Philippine sovereignty, such conditions were largely 
uncontested—in the national sense—until the latter 1950s. Contestations of these terms 
and conditions of American hegemony existed more collectively and publicly in the case 
of Filipino civilian worker Bartolome P. Roldan and others within the Philippines—and 
elsewhere in Asia and the Pacific. This and other cases are further explored in the next 
chapter. 
All in all, despite their exclusion from the American colonial subject to national 
citizen narrative
236
, these U.S.N. Filipino civilian workers were part of the militarized 
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labor industrial complex that have been oft overlooked by previous scholars. Such 
individual cases as Jesus Bautista and Leonicio Arceo, among others, provide us brief 
ports of entry into further understanding the logics that military officials used to employ 
and restrict Filipino civilians and servicemen in the U.S. militarized space. And just as 
importantly, these cases give us a deeper and broader overview of how these Filipino 
civilian workers responded to military officials‘ policies and politics of enlistment in 
ways that expressed varying degrees of postcolonial subjectivity. While infinitely similar 
cases are yet to be found in the written and oral historical records, this project is just the 
beginning or starting point for future study of such cases stored in the archived files and 









Politics of Recognition and Jurisdiction in the Postwar “U.S.-Philippine Nation”: 
the Case of Bartolome P. Roldan and other “Troublesome Matters” in Neo-Colonial 





On May 11, 1960 in Manila, U.S. Embassy Representative J. Graham Parsons sent a 
letter and series of dispatches to John N. Irwin, Assistant Secretary of International 
Security Affairs. In the letter, Parsons expressed sincere concern for further clarification 
and resolution of ―Bartolome Roldan et al‖, a labor case in Clark Air Force Base that had 
been ―hanging fire for years‖ since 1956. The U.S. Embassy representative warned that 
this labor case was part and parcel of the increasing emergence of Filipino labor unions 
on U.S. military bases in the Philippines and the unions‘ increasing support from 
Philippine national officials. Based from the evident and broader concerns of this labor 
case, Parsons strongly recommended that it would be ―of the United States interest for the 
Air Force to agree on an early disposition of this long-standing case.‖ To conclude his 
letter, Parsons urgently underlined this military labor case as a ―troublesome matter.‖
237
 
What was it about this specific labor case that concerned this U.S. Embassy 
official enough to write this letter and series of dispatches to the International Security 
Affairs division of the U.S. Department of Defense, calling for ―early disposition‖ of the 
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labor case itself? More specifically, what was it about this labor case that made it part and 
parcel of the increasing emergence and prevalence of Filipino labor unions on U.S. 
military bases in the Philippines? And in subsequence, how did U.S. officials respond to 
the developments and potentialities of this and other related cases in ways that reinforced 
the imperial bi-nationalities of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖? 
This chapter will address these questions in the following three sections. First, I 
provide a narrative and analytical introduction to the labor case of Bartolome P. Roldan 
on Clark Air Base in the Pampangas Province. Who was Bartolome P. Roldan? In what 
line of work was he positioned with in relation to the civilian and enlisted Filipino 
laborers studied in previous chapters? When and how long did he work on Clark Air 
Force Base before getting fired by his U.S. military superiors? Why was he fired in the 
first place, and how did his forced resignation lead to the actual and possible 
transpirations of a greater labor union movement against U.S. military jurisdiction and 
governance? 
The second section of this chapter historicizes and theorizes the surfacing 
anxieties among U.S. military officials regarding this emerging ―troublesome‖ case of 
Bartolome Roldan. Why were U.S. officials so concerned about this case in the first 
place? To what extent did their concerns reflect a deeper and broader history of U.S. 
militarism as a dominant, preceding, and concurrent extension of colonialism in the 
Philippines—and elsewhere in Asia and the Pacific— since the late nineteenth century? 
And how did these concerns among officials rearticulate in ways that further cemented 




The third section of this chapter assesses the cases and policies related to the 
Roldan case, and to the marginal and broader issues regarding militarized Filipino 
civilian workers elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific. These related cases occurred primarily in 
Hawaii and California. Meanwhile, the policy I focus most in this section is a proposal by 
Philippine officials for a U.S.-Philippine Labor Committee. In what ways did such cases 
and policies relate to, and depart from, the emergence and trajectories of the Roldan case? 
To what extent did these Philippine proponents, American opponents and civilian 
benefactors of these labor issues—within such militarized terrains in the trans-pacific—
operate within and despite of the bi-national politics of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖? 
With this three-section format shaping and structuring this chapter, I make three 
primary arguments that provide continuing threads from previous chapters. First, like 
Jesus Bautista and Leonicio Arceo, the case of Bartolome P. Roldan and others illustrated 
how postcolonial articulations of Filipino subjectivity and resistance often operated 
within and despite the continuing hegemonic presence of U.S. militarism and politics of 
the ―U.S.-Philippine nation.‖ Second, despite their largely legal, reformist, and 
cooperative pivots within U.S. military jurisdiction on Philippine soil, the anxieties 
evidenced in J. Graham Parsons‘ and other military officials‘ correspondences 
illuminated the prevalent degrees in which the informal contradictions and militarized 
formations of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ were in danger of being destabilized and 
possibly overcome. And thirdly, the possible dangers of destabilization, unraveling, and 
Philippine transformation of the militarized ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ structured the 
feelings of anxiety, rearticulated logics of hegemonic stability, and secured the gradual 




Simultaneously and subsequently, nonetheless, such reactions by U.S. military, 
diplomatic, and political officials urgently spawned, broadened, and reinforced U.S. 
officials‘ concerns of political mobilizations by Filipino civilian workers within (and 
despite) the hegemonic presence of the militarized ―U.S.-Philippine nation.‖ 
 
Section One: Case of Bartolome Roldan et al 
 
Like most—if not all—Filipino civilian workers uncovered in these written historical 
records, little is known about Bartolome Roldan other than the tenure and aftermath of 
his forced resignation at Clark Air Force Base. Such chronicled details regarding this 
individual and his affiliates were written by and recorded from the viewpoint of U.S. and 
Philippine officials. In other words, the epistemological voice and subject position of 
Bartolome Roldan himself have remained largely absent—if not erased—from these 
military, political, labor, and diplomatic correspondences that shape the written historical 
records of this case file. 
Nevertheless, while the origins and aftermaths of these recorded gaps appear 
beyond the scope of this chapter, what were clearer from these labor case files were 
twofold. First, the immediate aftermaths of Roldan‘s tenure and termination as a Clark 
Base civilian worker were evident in these written historical records. And second, 
Roldan‘s organized labor protests against the U.S. government endured the course of the 
latter 1950s and early 1960s. By historical and textual based readings of these 
developments, we can better assess the ways in which Roldan and his affiliates navigated 
through the neo-colonial conditions of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ and the continual 




During the mid-1950s, Bartolome Roldan worked as a civilian security guard. 
Working eight-hour days at minimum, Roldan also was required to work overtime and 
holidays. Despite being mandated to work overtime and holidays, Roldan was not paid 
for this extra menial and daunting labor. In addition, he and the other security guards 
were required to pay for their own uniform allowances. In 1956, shortly after Roldan 
voiced his grievances to Clark Air Base officials, Roldan was forced to resign with 
unpaid separation allowances, owing to what Clark Air Base officials claimed were 
―defamatory comments‖ made to his military superiors, and for ―soliciting bribes.‖
238
 
Whether or not these accusations of verbal profanity, bribery, and insubordination 
were actually true remain unknown in the written historical record. Worth pointing out, 
nonetheless, were the parallel framed logics behind the firing of Roldan to that of Arceo 
three years earlier in 1953. Like Arceo, Roldan was accused of being insubordinate to his 
military superiors. However, what distinguished Roldan‘s response from Arceo‘s was 
that soon after being forced to resign, Roldan took his initial case—and revised complaint 
of his ―unfair dismissal‖—to the Presidential Complaints and Action Committee 
(P.C.A.C.). Shortly thereafter, either upon recommendation of—or lack of response 
from—the P.C.A.C., Roldan brought his case to the Philippine Department of Labor. 
Subsequently, Roldan‘s complaint reached the office of Ruben F. Santos, chief of the 
wage administration in the Department of Labor. 
While Santos‘s initial reaction to Roldan‘s file was not as evident in the written 
historical record, what was clear was Santos‘s desire to further investigate the details and 
trends relating to Roldan‘s termination on Clark Air Force Base. On May 21, 1956, 
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Santos wrote a correspondence letter to the commanding general of Clark AFB. In this 
letter, Santos requested permission to investigate ―within the area the complaint lodged 
by Bartolome P. Roldan against the base.‖
239
 Several days after the letter reached the 
Clark AFB commanding general, base agents forwarded the request to the Philippine 
Department of Foreign Affairs. Soon afterwards, the Philippine Department of Foreign 
Affairs forwarded Santos‘s letter to the American Embassy.
240
 Such evident transnational 
transmission and correspondence of this case proved the national and international 
attention to this case in the postwar period of U.S.-Philippine relations. The transnational 
registers of this case stood in contrast to the Bautista and Arceo cases. Unlike the Roldan 
case, the Bautista and Arceo cases never circulated outside the private transnational 
circuits of U.S. military correspondence. This evidentiary distinction displayed the ways 
in which the politics of military labor organizing largely shifted from individual- to 
collective-based during the course of the 1950s. Many on-base Filipino laborers, in this 
period, learned that they needed to voice their grievances not only to American military 
officials, but especially to Philippine national officials as well. By sending their labor 
complaints to Philippine national officials, American officials were more likely to take 
their grievances into relative consideration. 
 
Section Two: “If the claim were processed that far”: Structural Responses and 
Reinforcements by the U.S. Government on the Roldan Case 
 
Subsequently, several Clark Air Force officials took the forwarded requests from 
Philippine officials into closer consideration and conducted their own brief investigations 
on the on-base living wage—and living conditions—of the local civilian workers. After 









their brief investigations, the U.S. Chief of Civilian Personnel at Clark Air Force Base 
concluded that Bartolome Roldan ―probably has sufficient basis for this claim to gain 
favorable consideration by the [U.S.] General Accounting Office if the claim were 
processed that far.‖ Nevertheless, in his lettered response, the U.S. Chief of Civilian 
Personnel at Clark A.F.B. also noted that ―such action would result in 660 similar claims 
by fellow guards involving ‗a tremendous amount of money,‘ and would ‗affect future 
manpower requirements‘ as well as ‗public relations at this time.‘‖
241
 While the 
Philippine Department of Labor showed general national support for his case, by the time 
it reached Clark A.F.B. and the U.S. Embassy, the potential bi-national support for this 
case gave way to exclusionary logics and practices of budgetary nationalism. This was 
the exact same logic that informed and shaped the 1946 Rescission Act. This Rescission 
Act, in particular, prohibited due benefits to the 250,000+ Filipino veterans who served in 
World War II because of two factors. First, the U.S. did not have the economic resources 
to pay livable benefits to each of these 250,000+ Filipino nationals. Secondly, U.S. 
Congress, by the early postwar period, no longer viewed these Filipino veterans as part of 
the U.S. military, or even part of the U.S. national body politic. Hence, they did not want, 
in any degree, to prioritize this item in its national budget. 
Besides noted budgetary nationalism shaping the U.S. chief‘s politics of 
exclusion, the chief‘s letter cited references from the U.S. Air Force Manual to advise 
officers that all duties performed by Roldan and the 660 other workers were ―part of the 
job requirements within the established tour of duty,‖ and that ―[Roldan et al] will be 






considered in a pay status until they check out at the expiration of the shift.‖
242
 This was 
also evident in his second memorandum to U.S. officials that followed on July 20, 1956. 
However, such pay status, according to U.S. military and diplomatic officials, 
apparently did not include overtime pay, holiday allowances, uniform allowances, or 
even severance pay. On July 26, 1956, representatives of the U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, 
and U.S. Embassy met in part to discuss what transpired and became ―evident‖ in the 
Roldan case. From the meeting, they reached a consensus that ―the Roldan claims were 
without merit and that it should be pointed out in the reply to the Philippine government 
that U.S. policies were consistent with local labor customs and practice.‖
243
 
What is important to note, in this note of correspondence between U.S. military 
and political representatives, is that they reached such a consensus without the consent of 
or collaborative dialogue with Philippine Government official representatives. Although 
it is true that much of local labor customs and practice were consistent if not ―copies of 
their American counterparts‖
244
, the mere fact was that eight-hour workdays, overtime 
pay, paid holidays, and uniform allowances were part of American labor law and 
established by the radical U.S. American labor movements in the 1930s.
245
 The Eight 
Hour and Minimum Wage Laws were parallel to the labor laws enacted by the Philippine 
national government after the official declaration of Philippine independence on July 4, 
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1946. Nevertheless, the mere fact that such claims made by Bartolome Roldan were 
being rejected by American military and political officials proved the very inconsistency 
between U.S. labor policy and Philippine ‗local‘ labor law on U.S. bases in the 
Philippines. 
This point of inconsistency, or even contradiction, between American labor law 
and ―copies of their American counterparts‖ was not lost upon this anonymous U.S. 
Embassy representative who met with U.S. Navy and Air Force officials. After their July 
26 meeting, the embassy official recommended that ―any reply to the question of 
permitting an investigation of the base by the Philippine Department of Labor—and the 
general question of applicability of Philippine labor law—should be avoided in the 




To add further slight to the agency of Philippine officials and the applicability of 
Philippine law, this U.S. Embassy official proclaimed that Washington gave Clark Air 
Base the authority to waive Air Force instructions regarding the Philippine Department of 
Labor and Philippine labor law on the grounds that ―U.S. Air Force practice [in the case 
of Roldan] was [already in] conformity with local labor custom and practice.‖ In other 
words, Washington officials gave Clark A.F.B. officers the liberty and privilege to 
discard instructive information on how to handle, if not accommodate to, Philippine local 
labor law and practice. These Washington and Clark base officials held a mutual sense of 
conformity to the commonsensical and hegemonic understanding that U.S. Air Force 
application of labor law, custom, and practice was inherently consistent with Philippine 
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sovereign law—even if the opposite may have been the case, or if Philippine officials 
might have interpreted otherwise. Thus, whether the Philippine locals or nationals 
interpreted such A.F.B. practices as ―in conformity‖ with the laws of their ―sovereign‖ 
territory appeared to be out of the question. The consensuses from the July 26, 1956 
meeting between U.S. officials only reinforced the unequal bi-national relationship 
between the U.S. and the Philippines. This unequal bi-national dynamic also solidified 
the hegemonic presence of U.S. Empire in the postcolonial Philippines. This unevenness 
was prevalent not only in the continuity of U.S. military base installations in the 
archipelago, but in the very continuing recruitment and mistreatment of Filipino civilian 
workers in the U.S. military. Hence, what was evident and enforced in the U.S. Embassy 
representative‘s recommendation was that such conditions of U.S.-Philippine relations 
would be enforced and stabilized under the commonsensical understanding that ―AF 
practice was in conformity with local labor custom and practice.‖
247
 
After the U.S. official‘s letter of recommendation received consent and 
confirmation from the rest of the U.S. Embassy, the letter was forwarded to the U.S. Air 
Force Headquarters on August 13, 1956, and then to the Philippine Department of 
Foreign Affairs on August 26, 1956. A representative from the Philippine Department of 
Foreign Affairs wrote a response to the U.S. Embassy‘s confirmation on November 16, 
1956. In this response letter, this Philippine representative emphasized that the U.S. 
Embassy never answered the Philippine Department of Labor‘s previous request for 
―permission to make an investigation of the Roldan case on the base itself.‖
248
 









The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs‘ citation of the U.S. Embassy not 
only revealed the U.S. Embassy‘s lack of response and consideration to diplomatic 
requests by the Philippine Labor Department, but in a broader spectrum it illuminated the 
unilateral condition of bi-nationality shaping the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖, and in turn, 
―Philippine sovereignty.‖ This unilateral sense of bi-nationality determined such labor 
cases as Roldan‘s, and simultaneously reinforced the structural foundations of the U.S. as 
an informal empire during the neo-colonial period of U.S.-Philippine relations. While it 
was true that the avoidance of the Philippine perspective in the Roldan case stood 
consistent with the confidential consensus of unilateralism among U.S. officials, U.S. 
officials‘ approach of avoidance was just one of several strategies utilized by U.S. 
officials in numerous correspondences with Philippine officials who provided greater 
support for Bartolome Roldan, along with the other 300+ security guards who eventually 
joined him in 1958 in a petition and lawsuit against the U.S. government.
249
 The petition 
and lawsuit led by Bartolome P. Roldan are further discussed and assessed in the next 
section that follows. 
 
Section Three: Historical Manifestations and Legacies of “Bartolome P. Roldan et 
al” 
 
Designed by Bartolome P. Roldan, the case petition and lawsuit were signed by ninety-
two other petitioners who pleaded for overtime pay, severance pay, and clothing 
allowances that were never given to them during their tenure as civilian workers in the 
U.S. military force. Unlike the ―closed‖ individual case of Leonicio F. Arceo five years 
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earlier, this petition by Roldan and his associates was supported by, and stood in alliance 
with, the following institutions and organizations: the [Philippine] Court of Industrial 
Organizations; the Philippine National Government; and delegates of the Clark Labor 
Base Organization, which included Roldan and the petitioners themselves. The petition 
was then sent to the U.S. Embassy and other U.S. government agencies in the 
Philippines. Signers of the petition requested the permission of these U.S. representatives 
for the case to be tried under Philippine law and jurisprudence. Previously dismissed in 
the mid-1950s, this plea further illuminated the unequal legal, militarist, and political 
conditions of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ and U.S.-Philippine nation-state building 
during the late 1950s. 
By the early 1960s, support for the petitioning efforts of Roldan‘s labor-based 
collective grew to public national and transnational proportions. This was evidenced by 
the acts of such Philippine government officials as then Philippine Justice Secretary Jose 
W. Diokno. These officials provided their own vocalized petitions to the U.S. Embassy 
for the welfare of these former Air Force Base civilian workers. These vocal 
pronouncements of support transpired in almost a dozen U.S.-based newspaper articles 
collected in the Roldan case file, including one from the February 10, 1961 issue of the 
Manila Times: 
Justice Secretary Jose W. Diokno has referred to U.S. embassy officials 
complaints arising from the dismissal of 7,000 Filipino employees and laborers 
from Clark Air Base, it was learned yesterday. 
 
The charges were forwarded to Diokno by provincial Fiscal Union C. Kayanan 
recently. 
 
The dismissed base personnel asked Kayanan to intervene on their behalf for the 





They also claimed that they were dismissed without any previous investigation or 
cause. 
 
Fiscal Kayanan said he has documents to prove that the dismissed Clark 
employees had not been paid the salary differentials due to them. 
 
It was also learned that the employees and laborers had earlier complained with 
the U.S. department of labor office in Hawaii, the US Air Force Pacific 
Commander, the legal department of the Philippine foreign office and the US 
embassy. 
 
Up to the present, however, no action was taken on their complaints by any of 
these offices, they charged. 
 




This newspaper article revealed some illuminating details that demonstrated the growing 
impact of the Roldan case by the early 1960s. Firstly, Roldan and his supporting cast sent 
their case to the local fiscal union official of the Pampanga province, the location of 
Clark Air Force Base. By this time, the case plaintiffs calculated a total of 7,000 Filipino 
civilian workers who were forced to resign under similar circumstances of maltreatment. 
Secondly, the provincial fiscal union official, C. Kayanan, forwarded the case to Jose 
Diokno, a prominent and legendary Philippine nationalist and human rights advocate who 
was national Justice Secretary during the time he heard about the Roldan case. After 
receiving word about Roldan et al, Diokno requested more explanation about the case 
from U.S. embassy officials. Diokno‘s request to embassy officials, coupled with the 
national press coverage and previous pleas to the U.S. Labor Department in Hawai‘i, 
demonstrated the trans-local, trans-pacific, and transnational circuits of this particular 
case, along with the parallel impact of this labor case on elite Philippine officials. 
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While Air Force base officials declined to give any official response to the 
growing (Philippine) national support of this case, Roldan et al remained a focal point of 
confidential scrutiny between—and among—U.S. and Philippine elite officials.
251
 Such 
private yet transnational concerns were made evident by previously noted 
correspondences between U.S. and Philippine political, labor, and military officials. 
Additionally, simultaneous and subsequent efforts were made by U.S. officials to 
contain—if not prevent—such cases from shifting over to Philippine labor and legal 
jurisprudence. These concerns among U.S. officials primarily stemmed out of fear of the 
potential loss of their hegemonic jurisprudence over the conceptual possibilities, concrete 
policies, and everyday practices of Philippine nationalism and sovereignty. Based from 
the underlying narrative of the 110 pages that comprise the Roldan case file, it appeared 
that U.S. officials‘ efforts for containment, prevention, and avoidance of Philippine legal 
military jurisprudence proved successful—to a large degree—by the increasingly 
sporadic, decreasing visibility, and archival death of the Roldan case from national, 
military, and legal discourse since 1961. 
Nevertheless, what were just as eminent from the Roldan case were the arising 
collective subjectivities of these Filipino civilian workers. This was evident in the greater 
degree of political leverage and international mobilization that Filipino civilian workers 
had during the latter 1950s—particularly within the context of the Roldan case. 
Subsequently, these Filipino civilian workers played a more crucial role in reshaping the 
conditions of U.S. jurisdiction in the Military Bases Agreement (1947), and Philippine 
―Sovereignty‖ on U.S. bases since 1946. In brief contrast, their enlisted counterparts had 
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relatively least political leverage and mobility—despite the fact that these navy enlistees 
were privileged with global mobility and opportunities for U.S. citizenship and veterans‘ 
benefits. Nonetheless, while Filipino civilian workers did not have similar opportunities 
for upward mobility as their enlisted counterparts, they did have greater access to local, 
national, and transpacific political mobility. These civilian workers‘ heightened political 
mobility were not only illuminated in the case of Bartolome Roldan, but also in other 
civilian labor cases in the Philippines, Okinawa, Guam, Hawai‘i, and California
252
, as 
well as in a proposal by Philippine officials for a U.S.-Philippine Labor Committee to 
oversee Roldan‘s and other related military labor cases.
253
 
These cases and issues, in addition, were part and parcel of the growing urban and 
military labor movements in the mid-late 1950s after the business unionization of labor 
organizations, and individual modes of grievance, in the first half of the decade. During 
the early 1950s, the lack of Philippine response to the Bandung Conference, on a national 
level, was part and parcel of the Philippine trajectory toward trade and business 
unionization. In his written correspondence to the U.S. Embassy in Manila, labor attaché 
Norman Johnson reported on the extent of Philippine involvement and collaboration with 
the planning and execution of the Bandung Conference in 1955: which was none. 
According to Norman Johnson, the Philippine Trade Unions Council (PTUC), an affiliate 
of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), ignored notifications 
and requests by Indonesian labor officials regarding the Bandung Conference. This Afro-
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Asian labor conference just as openly denounced global colonialism, neo-colonialism, 
and neo-imperialism as they wholly embraced the emerging and prominent Third World 
decolonization movements in the early postwar period.
254
 The Philippine (national) lack 
of response, coupled with this U.S. official‘s relative satisfaction thereof, exemplified the 
national shift among Philippine unions from anti-colonial and communist-based 
formations to a collaborationist and compliant politics with the bi-national elite 
formations of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation.‖ 
The arrests, sentencing, and life imprisonments of Amado V. Hernandez from the 
Congress of Labor (CLO), Jose Nava from the Philippine Workers‘ Federation, and other 
prominent radical labor activists and groups extremely limited the radical socio-spatial 
formations and political mobility of Filipino laborers in the early 1950s. In direct 
consequence and subsequence, business trade unionist organizations held more 
prominence and support from the U.S.-Philippine nation-state during this period, 
including the National Confederation of Trade Unions (N.A.C.T.U.).
255
 Led by Philippine 
Secretary of Labor Jose Figueras, the N.A.C.T.U. played a key role in influencing the 
anti-Communist and business unionist politics of many labor unions at the time, while 
simultaneously further limiting the political mobility of such Filipino civilian workers 
and enlistees as Leonicio Arceo and Jesus Bautista, respectively.  
Nevertheless, while the collaborationist Philippine labor unions gained more 
momentum and prominence at the cost of political neutralization, that did not mean, in 
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any way, shape or form, that radical labor unions were militaristically exterminated or 
nonexistent in the Philippines during this period. In fact, the opposite was true, and U.S. 
officials knew it too. For example, the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions 
(PAFLU) was one of a plethora of anti-colonial and nationalist labor organizations that 
remained prevalent and within direct surveillance of U.S. labor and diplomatic officials 
during this period. In the same report written by U.S. labor attaché Norman Johnson, the 
PAFLU., led by leftist labor activist Cipriano Cid, organized a labor strike against an 
American-owned company in Baguio called the Benguet Consolidated Incorporated Gold 
Mine. An estimated 6,000 employees were involved in the strike and followed the lead of 
the PAFLU. According to this U.S. diplomatic representative, this strike was ―an 
important example of bitter labor-management strife‖ that spread ―Anti-American 
propaganda directed at American Management by [the] PAFLU.‖ 
256
 
In the latter 1950s and early 1960s, the political landscapes shaping the 
presidential administrations of Carlos P. Garcia and Diosdado Macapagal evidenced 
more sympathetic attitudes towards the plights of Filipino military and civilian laborers. 
Such Philippine national politicians as Pampanga Congresswoman Juanita Nepucemeno, 
Vice President and Secretary of Foreign Affairs Emmanuel Pelaez, and others showed 
greater support for concerns pertaining to Filipino civilian laborers.
257
 This national shift 
in labor politics was evident in the prevalence of mobilizations as collective-based as the 










(mentioned) Roldan case, and in events as historically symbolic as the release of Amado 
Hernandez from imprisonment in 1956.
258
 
Such local, national, and transpacific political mobility was also evident between 
1957 and 1963 in the emerging discourses concerning Filipino naval civilians working on 
U.S. bases in the Philippines, Okinawa, and Guam. Within these places, tangible 
discussions emerged regarding a transpacific labor movement among Filipino farm 
workers in Hawai‘i and California for fairer wages, benefits, and overall treatment by 
ensigned U.S. military and civilian ―superiors.‖ In Guam and Okinawa, for instance, 
retirement benefits and forced deportation were primary issues concerning Filipino 
civilian workers stationed on U.S. military bases in these areas of the trans-pacific. Other 
points of union organization and mobility for these civilian workers included two things. 
Abuse of these workers by employers and recruiters provided one point of organized 
mobility. Another point of collective mobility, among these civilian workers, was the 
potential termination of their employment, given consistent complaints by local 
Chamorros about the U.S. military‘s persistent preference of hiring Filipino workers. This 
second concern was rooted in the multi-layered legacies of competing colonialisms in the 
Asia-Pacific, and hence what one empire studies historian might articulate as ―an 
analogous… manifestation of an international frontier.‖
259
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Another issue that raised concern among privileged agents of the ―U.S.-Philippine 
nation‖ was the conditions of immigration, labor, and settlement among Filipino farm 
workers in California. In a memo dispatched to military officials on November 15, 1957, 
U.S. labor attaché Jorma L. Kaukonen reported on a simple request made by Apolonio V. 
Castillo, who at the time was chief of manpower services in the Philippine Department of 
Labor. Castillo‘s request was to meet with Kaukonen to discuss the degree of Philippine 
labor law enforcement in U.S. bases as it applied to such cases as Bartolome Roldan‘s 
and the recruitment of Filipino farm workers to California. The memo stated that Castillo 
himself desired to postpone the Roldan case and the discussion of Philippine labor law on 
U.S. bases until after the next Philippine national elections in June of the following year 
in 1958. Such evidence of postponement from open discussion of the Roldan case only 
confirmed the approach of avoidance that was not only confidentially implemented by 
U.S. officials, but also by cooperative Philippine officials as well. While concerns about 
electoral politics seemed to have been a primary motive behind Castillo‘s brief 
recognition of this issue, it was this brand of Philippine national electoral politics that 
further confirmed the mutually inclusive conditions shaping the duality of Philippine 
sovereignty and U.S. Empire in this early postwar period. 
For Castillo, therefore, the prioritization of the farm worker recruitment cases 
served to provide a diplomatic smokescreen as a point of the bi-national continuum of the 
―U.S.-Philippine nation.‖ In addition, the relative privileging of this particular case 
illustrated the immediate relevance of this issue to the contingency of Filipino farm 
worker recruits whose corporate-based recruiter, Sanborn and the California Growers 




agreements made with the farm worker recruits. After hearing about this predicament, a 
group of still-employed Filipino farm workers took interest in recruiting these Filipinos 
themselves. For further assistance with their own recruitment of these Filipinos, this 
group appointed a lawyer named Richard L. Tracy and collaborated with two California-
based recruitment organizations. These organizations were the San Jose Growers 
Association and the Valley of Gardens Farm Labor Association of Fresno and Santa 
Maria respectively. These recruited farm workers were now being screened with the help 
of other Filipino workers in California and by recruitment organizations apparently not 
yet sanctioned by the U.S. Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (INS). 
Nevertheless, it was the INS itself that pulled the plug on this operation, ordering Castillo 
and the Philippine Department of Labor to ―drop the project.‖
260
 According to Castillo, 
the reason given to him by the Bureau for the stoppage of this alternative recruitment 
agency was this: ―the objection of the U.S. government to the involvement of a third 




Whether or not the requested meeting between Castillo and Kaukonen ever took 
place, or if anything directly manifested from the meeting itself, was not evidenced in the 
written historical record. However, what were evident from reading between the lines of 
these correspondences were the profound concerns among U.S. officials in discussing 
and handling the Roldan case. In addition, the proposed organization of a Filipino-based 
intermediary between Filipino labor recruits and U.S. corporate farm worker recruits 
brought upon a negative response by the INS: ―drop the project.‖ This commonplace 
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phrase, ―drop the project‖, was also a point of supplemental confirmation to the stance 
and approaches taken by U.S. military, labor, and political officials on similar proposals 
made by Philippine officials who might have been more sympathetic—or even 
empathetic—to cases of Filipino civilian workers on U.S. military bases in the 
Philippines and elsewhere in Asia and the Pacific. This particular phrase, ―drop the 
project‖, also applied to proposals introduced by Philippine officials, including the 
recommendation for a Philippine-U.S. Labor Committee that would be chosen by an 
actual mutual collaboration between Philippine and U.S. officials. 
U.S. officials‘ handling of the Roldan case (and related cases as well) was also 
indicative of the increased involvement of the U.S. National Security Council and 
International Security Affairs in stabilizing, enforcing, and expanding the U.S.-Philippine 
nation state. While the Truman administration used these U.S. departments more 
sparingly—most notably during the Korean War—the Eisenhower administration utilized 
them as central and expansive components in conducting matters of U.S. diplomatic, 
foreign, and militaristic policy. Starting in 1953, U.S. President Eisenhower expanded the 
U.S. National Security Council to include more direct involvement from a wider array of 
governmental agencies, including the Department of State and Department of Defense. 
These departments produced draft policy recommendations that were sent to the Planning 
Board division of the NSC. The Planning Board Division consisted of officials at the 
Assistant Secretary level, along with advisors from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
Central Intelligence Agency. The purpose of the Planning Board was to screen and revise 
the draft policy papers for the NSC. One of the assistant secretaries of this Planning 




received the urgent recommendation by U.S. Embassy Representative J. Graham Parsons 
for ―an early disposition of this long-standing case‖ of Roldan et al. Once again, the 
extent to which the Roldan case was discussed and resolved beyond the Planning Board 
of the N.S.C. and International Security Affairs is beyond the written historical record. 
Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the Roldan case was a ―troublesome matter‖ that, 
like other related cases and issues to be discussed in the next section, profoundly troubled 
U.S. nation-state officials and their Philippine national cooperatives. 
 
“Cognizance of Claims… ”: Proposal for a Joint U.S.-Philippine Labor 
Coordination Committee  
 
In 1960, Philippine Secretary of Labor Angel N. Castano—an avid supporter of the 
Roldan case—introduced and proposed the intermediary-based U.S.-Philippine Labor 
Coordination Committee. This proposal was a concrete manifestation of Castano‘s and 
the Philippine Department of Labor‘s proclaimed ―cognizance of claims against the U.S. 
government from employees of American military bases here [on Clark Air Force 
Base]‘‖
262
 three years earlier. One of these claims included the labor case of Bartolome P. 
Roldan. 
Like the Roldan case, however, little or no details have been uncovered thus far in 
the written historical record relating to the actual point of view of Castano and the 
Department of Labor for their proposal of this committee other than how U.S. military 
officials interpreted the intent and support of these Philippine officials, as well as the 
broader implications of the possible creation of such an actual bi-national labor 
committee. Nevertheless, what was evident thus far in the written historical record was 
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this: after a series of briefs between Philippine and U.S. officials, the U.S. Commander-
in-Chief (CINC) Pacific gave at least two recommendations to the U.S. Chief of 
Industrial Relations in a September 13, 1963 correspondence letter. First, ―no further 
efforts [shall] be made toward the establishment of a joint U.S.-Philippine Labor 
Coordination Committee‖. And second, ―current provisions for the stationing of the 
Philippine Military Liaison Officers at U.S. bases in the Philippines provides an effective 
two-way communication between management and the local national work force.‖
263
 
These two recommendations demonstrated the U.S. Pacific Commander-in-
Chief‘s relative trust in the existing dominant avenues of negotiations between U.S.-
based labor management and the Philippine national labor force, likely given that the 
interests of the Philippine military liaison officers and the appointed ―Civilian Advisory 
Councils‖ were much more in compliance with U.S. nation-state officials than with 
Philippine national officials‘ vision of the joint U.S.-Philippine labor committee. Such a 
committee provided an alternative conception of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ based on an 
actual mutual partnership of coordination, investigation, and decision-making between 
U.S. and Philippine officials, which of course lay in contradiction with the existent 
relationship already set in place since the Philippine-American War. To U.S. officials, the 
potential unraveling, cancellation, and dissipation of this relationship would have 
profoundly disrupted the existing stability of U.S.-Philippine relations. Such stability 
existed upon the terms and conditions of the U.S. as an empire in the Philippines. 
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What the U.S. Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific emphasized and supported in 
his recommendation, therefore, were two things. First, the Commander emphasized the 
pro-U.S. leanings of the intermediaries between U.S. labor management and the 
Philippine work force on U.S. bases in the Philippines. Second, he declared his own 
opposition against the Philippine nationalist politics of recognition, particularly 
nationalist politics that were critical or antagonistic to U.S. presence in the Philippines. 
To this U.S. commander, these Philippine nationalist politics of recognition were 
exercised not only among Philippine officials proposing the joint labor committee, but 
especially in these Philippine officials‘ selection process of the joint labor committee 
itself. Such U.S.-based advisory precautions were prevalent in the following details from 
the Pacific Commander-in-Chief‘s 1963 recommendation: 
… If the proposed committee is established, the selection of Filipino 
representatives would be extremely difficult. Experience with representative of 
the [Philippine] Department of Foreign Affairs and the [Philippine] Department of 
Labor indicates that a selection of committee members from either or both 
departments could result in differences which would make ineffective any efforts 
by the committee to effect Philippine-U.S. coordination… 
 
…Extreme concern [italics mine] would be generated at U.S. bases if certain 
representatives of the Department of Labor, whose pro-communist leanings have 
been indicated by investigative reports, were nominated to serve the committee… 
 
… If Filipino representatives were to accept pro-American recommendations, 
such recommendations would probably undergo extensive discussions before 
acceptance by the Department of Foreign Affairs or other Departments. If the 
Filipino representatives were anti-American, indiscriminate disclosure or 
committee selection and issuance of biased statements to the press and other 
sources would cause difficulty to management representatives of the U.S. Military 
bases would have no effective means of controlling such disclosures or of having 
statements corrected or retracted… 
 
…In conclusion, it is recommended that no further efforts be made to establish a 
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The U.S.-Pacific Commander in Chief‘s recommendation illuminated the ways in which 
Filipino military civilian labor were part and parcel of local, national, and transpacific 
attentions given to the issue of Philippine sovereignty on U.S. military bases. This issue 
arguably came under closer scrutiny among U.S. officials in the early Cold War period 
than during the colonial period, especially as Filipino labor movements became more in 
the public forefront of local, national and transpacific attention. The U.S.-Philippine 
nation-state‘s dissipation of groups with ―pro-communist leanings‖, such as the 
Hukbalahaps (Huks) by 1953, gave way to closer scrutiny among other Philippine leftist, 
radical, and ―subversive‖ groups and leaders. Such individuals included radical union 
leaders Cipriano Cid, Ignacio Lacsina, and other leftist labor unions from the urban areas 
of the Philippines, particularly in Manila. U.S. officials‘ concerns regarding such 
individuals and groups stemmed in the degree of their involvement in the Bandung 
Conference and other related anti-colonial conferences and movements around the globe, 
as well as the extent of their relationship with Bartolome P. Roldan‘s case and other 
prominent Philippine labor, political, and military officials who provided their support for 
the joint U.S.-Philippine Labor Coordination Committee. While the demise of the 
countryside Huks gave way to the emergence of their successor ng Partido Komunista ng 
Pilipino (P.K.P.), U.S. officials were more anxious about the influence of urban-based 
groups with potential or actual communist leanings on emerging military labor 
movements than the ones that resided in the countryside. The means and manifestations 
of U.S. officials‘ structural reinforcements of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖, as implicated 
in these cases, are further examined and assessed in the next section. 
 





Based on my findings from the correspondences among U.S. officials, at least five 
recommended strategies were implemented to prevent these transpacific labor alliances 
from coming to fruition. First, U.S. labor officials implemented and institutionalized 
postcolonial education programs in such educational institutions as the University of the 
Philippines-Diliman to teach ―native‖ civilian workers the ―spirit‖ of capitalism and the 
practice of investing in behalf of their labor and monetary productivity.
265
 Second, these 
U.S. officials exercised political recognition of potential and tangible bureaucratic—and 
consciously deliberate—responses toward Philippine labor activists and their diplomatic 
allies in order to shut down the momentum of such sociopolitical activity. Third, these 
U.S. labor officials recommended shutting down Philippine-based bi-national labor 
committees that sought to investigate the Filipino condition of civilian labor on U.S. 
military bases in the Philippines and elsewhere in the transpacific. Fourth, they supported 
the minimization of Philippine jurisdiction on U.S. military bases and their stationed 
personnel in the Philippines. And fifth, U.S. military, political, and diplomatic officials 
sought to prevent Filipino military civilian workers from seeing their own cases in ways 
that would challenge neocolonial discourses of ―Philippine sovereignty‖, ―labor 
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These five distinct and overlapping methods were, to a large degree, successfully 
implemented by political and military officials of the U.S. empire nation-state to maintain 
their hegemonic sense of structural integrity. These methodical implementations thus 
shaped and enforced the terms and collaborative conditions of post-1946 ―Philippine 
sovereignty‖ and ―Philippine nationalism‖—including the original and revised initiations 
of the Military Bases Agreement in 1947. In addition, these hegemonic practices played a 
major role in the relative dissipation of transpacific and transnational possibilities of 
Philippine military civilian labor mobilization. This was imminent in the dismissal of the 
Arceo, Roldan, and Bautista cases from confidential and public correspondence: the 
Arceo case in 1953; the Roldan case in 1963; and the Bautista case in 1964, as evidenced 
in the archival deaths of their respective cases in the written historical record. While the 
1964 emergence of Jose Maria Sison‘s youth-based Kabataang Makabayan (KM) 
organization would reignite the sparks of Philippine nationalist radicalism within urban, 
labor, and military sites, the dominant fantasy productions and implementations of the 




On October 10, 1962, Modesto M. Lumarque, President of the Filipino Employment 
Association, Okinawa (F.E.A.O.), wrote a memorandum to the Philippine Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs Emmanuel Pelaez. In this letter, Lumarque expressed sincere concern 
about the implications of the U.S. military‘s ―phase out‖ policy of Filipino civilian 
personnel. First implemented in 1955, the goal of this policy was ―reducing Filipino 
personnel to a zero balance come 1965‖ in order to increase available employment to 




personnel dropped from 2,000 to ―scarcely 600.‖ Nevertheless, what was important to 
point out in Lumarque‘s letter was threefold. First, Lumarque was less concerned, if not 
all, with the loss of employment retention and opportunities among Filipino civilians. 
Rather, he was more concerned with the fact that, like Roldan, Bautista, and Arceo, the 
Filipino laborers in Okinawa were not receiving any form of severance pay for their 
services, which often spanned fourteen years. Second, the letter displayed Lumarque‘s 
political recognition of support for the Filipino workers for their subsequent alleged 
allegiance to the U.S. for their civilian veteran services. And three, this memorandum 
evidenced Lumarque‘s elaborate point of comparison to ―other co-employees‖ privileged 
with U.S. citizenship. According to Lumarque:  
… [These] other co-employees… by reason of their American citizenship… could 
take it easy and avail the benefits of the U.S. Civil Service Pension System—get 
the deposit they made plus interest or wait till they reach retirement age and enjoy 





The specific ―co-employees with American citizenship‖ whom Lumarque was 
referring to are still largely unknown in the written historical record. Nevertheless, it is 
more than likely that Lumarque was alluding to one or both of the following. One, 
Lumarque might have been alluding to white American civilian management who had 
militarized authority over stationed Filipino civilian personnel, including Lumarque 
himself. Or two, he was referencing all American enlisted personnel with U.S. 
citizenship, including those of Philippine descent, stationed in the U.S. military base of 
Okinawa. While the outcome of the FEAO‘s labor case are yet to be seen in the written 
historical records, what can likely be determined, when reading between the lines of this 
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correspondence, were the methods in which such cases as this dissipated from the eyes of 
U.S. and Philippine state officials, especially in light of the alternative visions of 
contestation that this case might have brought against the imperial U.S.-Philippine 
nation-state, as previously assessed with other mentioned cases. 
In the meantime, what follows in the next chapter is a more elaborate and analytic 
version of the historical comparison that FEAO President Lumarque alluded to in his 
letter to the Foreign Affairs Department. This historical comparison is between Filipino 
civilian personnel and enlisted navy personnel of Philippine descent. What did it mean, in 
historical and political terms, that these different categorized groups of Filipino workers 
labored for the U.S. military under the bi-national politics of the ―U.S.-Philippine 
nation‖? What were the mutual degrees of their inclusion and marginalization in the U.S. 
Navy and other branches of the military following the Second World War? These 









The Inclusive Politics of Filipino Steward Enlistment:  Degrees of Inclusion, 
Upward Mobility, and Citizenship in the U.S. Nation-State 
 
 
Between 1944 and 1973, over 22,000 Filipinos joined the U.S. Navy as enlistees. While 
these Filipinos had educational experience in different fields of local professions, they 
opted for the U.S. Navy instead. Yearning to escape impoverished wartime conditions 
and ―see the world‖ while feeling obligated to financially support their trans-local 
families, these Filipinos enlisted in the U.S. Navy to fulfill these dreams of imperial 
geographic and upward mobility. Unlike their Filipino civilian and soldier counterparts, 
these navy enlistees had greater access to global geographic mobility, postcolonial 
settlement, U.S. citizenship, and veterans‘ benefits for themselves and their transnational 
families by joining the U.S. Navy. 
The domestic and global presence of Filipino enlistees in the U.S. Navy, coupled 
with the upward and geographic mobility of these enlistees as postcolonial settlers in the 
U.S. nation-state, only enhanced and enforced the imaginary bi-national allied status 
between the U.S. and the Philippine nation-states, as well as the actual subordinate 
politico-military position of the sovereign Philippines in relation to the U.S. imperial 
nation-state. This duality between the imagined and propagated bi-national status of the 
U.S.-Philippine relationship, and the actual unequal and paternalistic foundations shaping 
and enforcing this diplomatic relationship, defined what I have been noting as the ―U.S.-




American colonial state following the Spanish-American War in 1898, and the 
Philippine-American War from 1899-1902. The peak of this bi-national sense of alliance 
manifested in the Second World War and onwards in the post-1946 period of U.S.-
Philippine relations. These profound idealities and concrete realities of U.S.-Philippine 
relations existed in everyday and institutional contexts of political, military, and civil life. 
In addition, various degrees of this bi-national duality were commonly and especially 
prevalent in shaping the politics of Filipino enlistment in the U.S. military, and the U.S. 
navy in particular. 
This chapter looks at the divergent meanings of these politics of enlistment for 
Filipino enlistees on the one hand, and their U.S. commanding officers and officials on 
the other. For Filipino enlistees, the promising politics of enlistment entailed sustainable 
and successful means of attaining social and class mobility for themselves, their families, 
and communities of (often) suburban settlement within bi-national and trans-pacific 
circuits of the U.S.-Philippine nation-state. By enlisting in the U.S. Navy these Filipino 
enlistees were promised citizenship and G.I. benefits within the U.S. nation-state. With 
probable access to citizenship and G.I. benefits, these enlistees would be better able to 
assure their survival and mobility within the U.S. nation-state—not only for themselves, 
but for their families, communities, and their collective subjectivities as Filipino males. 
  For U.S. political and military officials, these liberal and inclusive politics of 
Filipino enlistment meant several things. First, as previously stated, these politics of 
enlistment indicated the continual enlistment of a group of foreign nationals whom they 
conceptualized as loyal, hardworking, and perhaps staunchest Asian allies of the U.S. 




multiracial inclusion of ―their‖ Filipino enlistees, particularly those in the White House, 
within the U.S. nation-state and for the global public to see. Public displays of Filipino 
stewards in the White House, in particular, further showcased the image of U.S. 
leadership in diplomacy, democracy, and minority inclusion. And thirdly, the politics of 
enlisting Filipinos meant the frequent clustering of these enlisted Filipinos with Japanese 
Americans as emerging ―model minorities‖ in U.S. national discourse. As part of the 
third wave of Filipino migration, which lasted from 1945 to 1965, more and more 
Filipinos were enlisted by U.S. officials under the historical and prevailing 
conceptualization of these foreign nationals as extremely loyal, hardworking, and 
subservient.  
Such conceptualizations largely informed the rehiring of Filipino enlistees during 
the Second World War. This is not only evidenced in the military correspondences cited 
in the last chapter, but it is especially reinforced in the newsreel coverage of the Bataan 
Death March. In January 1944, a series of newsreel footage documented Filipinos and 
U.S. Americans, dying of malnourishment and mistreatment by Japanese military 
personnel, marching sixty miles to the prison camp in Bataan. One of these newsreel 
pieces, titled ―America Shocked by Jap Brutality to War Prisoners,‖ showcased montages 
of that brutality to the homes of millions of U.S. Americans.
268
 On one level, these 
discursive images spurred massive American support for the ―liberation‖ of the 
Philippines during the last two years of the Second World War. On another level, these 
images of struggle and alliance between Filipinos and U.S. Americans, coupled with U.S. 
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military officials‘ preconceived notions of their ―hardworking‖ and ―loyal‖ Filipino 
laborers, catalyzed the model minority politics of enlisting Filipinos in the U.S. Navy—
during and beyond the Second World War. 
Newsreels also documented U.S. military officials‘ celebratory support for 
Japanese Americans who fought for the U.S. during the Second World War. However, 
unlike Bataan, national public and press coverage of such support for Japanese 
Americans, or Nisei, soldiers did not come to fruition until the end of the war. One of 
these national newsreels, ―Pres. Truman Honors Nisei Combat Group‖, recorded and 
broadcasted the July 1946 parade that commemorated the return of the 442
nd
 Regiment 
Combat Team, an all-Japanese force that fought in behalf of the U.S. In this parade, 500 
members of the 442
nd
 marched down Constitutional Avenue in Washington, DC. Their 
honorable march was followed by President Truman‘s tribute to these veterans: ―‗you 
fought not only the enemy but you fought prejudice. And you‘ve won. Keep up that fight 
and we‘ll continue to win. The next great republic stands just for what its constitution 
stands for: the welfare of all the people all the time.‘‖ The newsreel then ended with the 
narrator‘s definitive note: ―‗these soldiers: true Americans.‘‖
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While this and other newsreels ceased to reveal the forced displacement and 
internment of Japanese Americans, its celebratory recognition of the Nisei greatly 
influenced public opinion and ideology towards seeing these Japanese Americans, like 
Filipinos, as model minorities following the Second World War. While Naoko Shibusawa 
and John Dower might rightly argue that Japanese were becoming America‘s staunchest 
                                                 
269




allies after the Second World War
270
, I would also argue that Filipinos were undergoing a 
similar trajectory during the Second World War and onwards toward the postwar period. 
While U.S. officials‘ ethnoracial formations of Filipinos and Japanese could not be any 
more different during World War II, the trajectories between these two ethno racial 
formations converged over time, and especially during the early postwar period. As U.S. 
political officials celebrated Japanese Americans as model minorities in the civilian 
sphere, military officials—in many cases—conceptualized Filipinos as model minority 
enlistees within the military sphere. 
These model minority politics continued to facilitate Filipino enlistment during 
and beyond the early postwar period. Over time, these model minority politics of Filipino 
enlistment not only structured the hiring of postwar Filipino enlistees, but even previous 
scholars‘ studies regarding Filipino enlistees during the past thirty years. The historical 
model minority politics shaping these studies (including this chapter) have been 
scathingly critiqued by pioneering critical ethnic studies scholar E. San Juan, Jr. In After 
Postcolonialism: Remapping Philippine-U.S. Confrontations, San Juan comments on Yen 
Le Espiritu‘s book Filipino American Lives as one example of a scholarly text that 
practices the conflation of model minority and bi-national politics that San Juan coins as 
a ―new conceptual model of transnationalism‖: 
When post-1965 second- and third- generation Filipinos (mostly professionals) 
devise strategies to construct multiple and overlapping identities, thus presumably 
altering their rank in U.S. society, they succeed (for Espiritu) in resisting the 
dominant ideology of subordination by race, class, gender nationality, and so on. 
While the self-interpretation of Espiritu‘s informants does contain indices of flux 
rather than continuity, multilinear narratives, rather than one monologic strand, I 
think that it is not due to their overall success in elevating their country and 
culture of origin to equal status with the United States and its hegemonic 
                                                 
270
 See Naoko Shibusawa, America‟s Geisha Ally (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006); John 




prerogatives. This is the fatal mistake of the transnational model despite its 
gesture of acknowledging it: it assumes the parity of colonized/dominated peoples 




While my study focuses more on pre-1965 Filipino enlistees rather than the post-1965 
enlistees that shape Espiritu‘s findings and San Juan‘s critiques, there is at least one point 
of continuity that I think can be applied from E. San Juan‘s historiography of post-1965 
Navy Filipinos onto my own study on pre-1965 Filipino enlistees. This chapter, in 
particular, does trace the historical origins and outcomes of such bi-national formations. 
This is indicative in my analysis of the interactions between U.S. military officials and 
―their‖ enlisted Filipino laborers. Rather than assume the Philippines as having ―equal 
status‖ with the United States, I see the ―equal status‖ of the U.S.-Philippine relationship 
more as an imaginary than a reality. This imaginary, as I have argued throughout this 
dissertation, structured, reinforced, and concealed the inequalities between the U.S. and 
the Philippines: from the top level between U.S. and Philippine officials to the top-down 
level between U.S. officials and Filipino laborers. 
Given the inclusive historical and historiographical politics of U.S.N. Filipino 
enlistment, I emphasize the following arguments in this chapter.  Firstly, the ideological 
and bi-national alliances forged between the U.S. and Philippines facilitated the continual 
inclusive politics of enlistment, upward mobility, and U.S. citizenship among postwar 
Filipino enlistees. Nevertheless, beneath these success narratives lay daily experiences 
and realities of discrimination, spatial restrictions, and limited upward mobility within the 
militarized spaces of the U.S. Navy. While many of these Navy Filipinos endured 
relatively successful navy careers, their line of work was often strictly limited to cooking, 
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cleaning, and other menial forms of labor. And secondly, accounting for these cases of 
inclusive enlistment and upward mobility was the varying paternalistic bonds forged 
between Filipino enlistees and their ―superior‖ U.S. officers, however unequal the 
relationship really was.  If the officers, informally or formally, gained further knowledge 
of the (relatively) high degree of education already attained by his ―assigned‖ enlistee 
before joining the service, uneven possibilities existed for the enlistees to be reassigned to 
different lines of work that more closely aligned with their knowledge and skills, as well 
as to the relative desirability of the assigned stewards to those work positions. Thus, 
while these Navy Filipinos endured by becoming geographically mobile, attaining 
citizenship in the U.S. nation-state, and providing material sustenance for their trans-local 
and intergenerational families, racial paternalism in the U.S. Navy shaped and reinforced 
the everyday and institutional politics of Filipino enlistment. 
 
Degrees of Inclusion 
 
When U.S. Congress passed the Immigration Act in 1965, the immigration quota for 
Asians increased dramatically to 100,000 yearly—which also included middle- and 
upper-class Filipinos. While previous scholars have marked 1965 as the watershed year 
for Filipino and Asian immigration to the U.S.
272
, working-class and university-educated 
Filipinos already started to migrate to the U.S. and elsewhere around the world through 
the U.S. Navy well before then. In addition, the watershed years of U.S.-Philippine 
relations in World War II continued in parallel and uneven ways during the Cold War 
period. With the exception of a five-year period between 1947 and 1952, Filipino 
enlistment continued in the U.S. Navy. While concrete reasons for this five-year gap of 
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Filipino enlistment have not yet been found in the written or oral historical records, I 
further explore this historical question with the most relatively tangible evidence in this 
and the following chapter. As previously stated, nonetheless, between 1944 and 1973 the 
U.S. enlisted more than 22,000 Filipinos in the U.S. Navy, and the Philippines (other than 
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While numbers seem to increase drastically during the Vietnam War, one of the 
important things to note—from this chart—is that Navy Filipino enlistment decreased 
drastically during the latter peak of the Vietnam War between 1970 and 1972. One 
interpretation of this data is that before 1973, when Admiral Zumwalt officially 
decreased Filipino enlistment to 400 per year, Navy Filipino enlistment was already on 
the decline. 
As for the reasons or logics behind the decrease in Filipino enlistment during this 
three-year period, they have not yet been directly uncovered in the written historical 
record—neither by previous researchers (myself included), or arguably even the 
archivists themselves who, coincidentally, might have such data buried in the National 
Archives or other official archive collections. To uncover such relevant archival materials 
would likely entail another research trip to various branches in the U.S. National 
Archives—and even that would involve a massive investigation through files that have 
not been appropriately organized, classified, and declassified yet. 
Nonetheless, this institutional practice of enlistment exclusion was likely part and 
parcel of several overarching historical developments. First, with the official declaration 
of the Philippines as an independent nation-state on July 4, 1946, U.S. military and 
political officials implemented their own terms and conditions of what constituted 




elite agents of the Philippine nation-state). These particular terms and conditions also 
coincided with logics of budget nationalism, which foreground policies of exclusion 
toward certain racial and ethnic groups based on the emergent premises of national 
patriotism in cutting the federal budget and in restoring the U.S. national economy. The 
earliest post-1946 institutional policy of exclusion toward Filipinos arguably was the 
Rescission Act. This act restricted veterans‘ benefits to locals in the Philippines who 
served under the U.S. Armed Forces during World War II. Alas, it was under these 
historical conditions of post-1946 exclusion which set the political stage for barring 
Filipino naval enlistment between 1947 and 1952. In turn, it can be argued in this 
historical sense that these conditions of exclusion toward Filipinos also set the stage for 
further and broader restrictions toward foreigners and immigrants during the early 
postwar period, culminating in the plenary congressional passage of the 1952 
Immigration Act. 
Moreover, when juxtaposing this data with overarching historical evidence, one 
can argue that the overall decrease in U.S. Navy Filipino enlistment, between (and 
relatively since) 1970 and 1972, coincided with the general decrease and withdrawal of 
troops in Vietnam during the war in this Southeast Asian region. As early as 1970, the 
Nixon administration implemented the foreign policy of ―Vietnamization‖ which, 
coupled with secret diplomacies and sporadic bombings in North Vietnam and Cambodia, 
entailed gradual American troop withdrawal from Vietnam in exchange for American 
training of South Vietnamese forces in continual defense against ―enemy‖ forces. This 
policy of troop withdrawal likely complemented with decreases in minority enlistments, 




government officials who demanded withdrawal of troops and a peaceful and honorable 
end to what Daniel Ellsberg referenced as an ―illegitimate‖ war.
275
  
Another likely factor relevant to the decrease in Filipino enlistment was the 
massive increase of grassroots unrest and organizing among racialized and ethnic 
minorities. These mobilizations, which transpired under various forms of cultural and 
internationalist nationalisms among African Americans, Latina/o Americans, Native 
Americans, and Asian Americans, led to the necessary emergence of ethnic studies and 
interrelated interdisciplinary programs in universities and secondary schools throughout 
the United States. Consequently, these grassroots-based movements spurred exponential 
anxieties among U.S. political and military officials, most notably the Nixon 
administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation who were concerned about the 
actual and possible instabilities within the civilian and military spheres that can stem 
from these collective efforts.
276
 Based from evidences of instabilities in both spheres of 
the U.S. body politic, U.S. military officials were likely less than willing to enlist 
racialized and ethnic minorities into the branches of the U.S. military during this 
period—including Filipinos in the U.S. Navy. Although Navy Admiral Zumwalt formally 
expanded the horizontal and vertical mobility among Filipino stewards through renaming 
and broadening their line of work as ―seamen,‖ the simultaneous massive decrease in 
Filipino enlistments illuminated the fact that U.S. Navy officials were more comfortable 
with expanding the placement of already enlisted Filipinos to other duties and ratings 
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besides those affiliated with the steward branch upon the precondition that less and less 
Filipinos would be enlisted in the U.S. Navy in the first place. By 1992, when horizontal 
and vertical mobility—within the naval ranks and duties—was arguably at its peak 
among active Filipino enlistees, the U.S. government banned Filipino enlistment from the 
Philippines altogether. I further delineate and assess the implications of this dual 
relationship between U.S.N. Filipino upward mobility on the one hand, and downward 
trajectories of U.S.N. Filipino enlistment on the other, in the dissertation epilogue that 
covers Filipino enlistment and veterans‘ movements—from the Vietnam War to the post-
9/11 period. 
Nevertheless, it was since the 1950s that many of these Filipinos were 
transferred—if not promoted—by U.S. officials to different ranks, positions, and 
branches upon initial enlistment as stewards. For instance, one individual, Pedrito Sap-ay 
Aquintey, initially applied to the U.S. Navy in 1954 only to be suddenly reassigned to the 
U.S. Coast Guard shortly thereafter. Here was his testimony, as recorded in Our Uncles‟ 




Ramon Burdeos and David C. Orolfo were two other naval enlistees who were 
transferred to the Coast Guard. On October 30, 1955, after initial enlistment in the U.S.N. 
from Sangley Point, these two, along with one-hundred other newly enlisted Filipinos 
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were taken aboard the U.S.S. Barrett to San Francisco, CA. From San Francisco they 
transferred to Alameda, CA where they reported for Coast Guard boot camp.
278
 
After brief stints as stewards, some naval enlistees were able to transfer to other 
positions within the U.S. naval branch. One such case was Mario G. Gamboa. In late 
1959, Mr. Gamboa first enlisted in the U.S. naval force as a steward.
279
 A few years later, 
he requested for a change in his rating from ―mess management specialist‖ to 
―storekeeper specialist.‖ Thanks to a strongly supportive recommendation from his 
supervisor, his division and commanding officers approved his request. Shortly 
thereafter, Mr. Gamboa headed to storekeeper school where he received best possible 
preparation for his desired rating as storekeeper specialist. After successfully completing 
his training, Gamboa‘s commanding officers transferred him to the destroyer ship 
Shelton, where he worked as a storekeeper specialist.
280
 
Another person who made a successful request for a ratings change was David C. 
Orolfo. On January 29, 1963, enlisted as a stewardman (TN), Mr. Orolfo requested for a 
promotion in his enlistment to a ―seaman‖ (SN). His commanding officer (CO) at the 
time, chief training officer Felix X. Riley, approved Orolfo‘s request for the enlistment 
shift.
281
 Subsequently, the Coast Guard Personnel Division promoted Orolfo to second 
class yeoman by the mid-60s.
 282
 Factors leading to his promotion included his sustained 
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connection with his superior officer, along with his consistently hard work and 
disciplinary accommodations. 
The varying inclusions and recognitions of Filipino enlistees were prevalent in the 
White House as well. The White House was widely known to be the most powerful 
household in the entire globe where military, civilian, and political life converged for the 
whole world to see. In the White House, as many as twenty-five to thirty Filipino 
stewards assisted the Commander-in-Chief in the White House, and between ten and 
fifteen during his domestic and international presidential trips. During the Truman 
presidency, in particular, U.S. officials and journalists recognized and at times celebrated 
the inclusion and presence of these stewards in the White House. These historic sites of 
inclusion, recognition, and celebratory presence were evident in U.S. officials‘ deck logs 
of Truman‘s presidential trips, pictures taken by White House photographers of the 
stewards with U.S. officials, and the very duties of the Filipino stewards themselves.
283
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 Such present and celebrated instances were most noted in hindsight in the public papers of various 
U.S. officials and staff in the Harry S. Truman Library in Independence, Missouri, including the Mariano 
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Appendices A and B from this chapter contain photos of Filipino stewards who served in the White House 
during the Truman Presidency. Mess Officer Leo Roberts, along with twenty-five of the thirty-four Filipino 
stewards, are featured in the photograph featured in Appendix A. As for the nine other stewards, according 
to Roberts: 
 
5 stewards [were] at Camp Shanghai [now known as Camp David] and the other 4 apparently were 
on liberty (or leave) when photo was taken. These stewards were US citizens as the date was prior 
to the United States granting the Philippines their independence. My stewards were outstanding in 
every respect. Two of the stewards served President Roosevelt, Pres. Truman and later Pres. 
Eisenhower before he put the yacht out of commission. 
 
The photograph in Appendix B features Leo Roberts and two White House Chief Stewards at Camp 
Shangri-La (again, now know as Camp David): Chief Rangasa and Chief Pascual. According to Roberts, 
―Chief Rangasa [was] in charge of the Wardroom Officers Mess aboard the Williamsburg‖; and, Chief 
Pascual was someone whom Roberts ―always assigned to the First Lady when she was present.‖ The 




As previously noted, it is no coincidence that the hiring of Filipino veteran 
stewards in the White House began during the early American colonial period in the 
Philippines. The historical enlistment, recognition, and inclusion of Filipinos as stewards 
in the White House has been both a commonplace and exceptional practice of facilitating 
and enforcing the social, economic, and political inequalities of the ―U.S.-Philippine 
nation. Nevertheless, for many of the Filipino enlistees, especially those hired in the 
White House since World War II, this chance provided once-in-a-lifetime opportunities 
for them to work with the president of the United States. 
These Filipinos stewards not only worked for the U.S. president in the White 
House, but they also traveled with him all over the world. They assisted President 
Truman during his two-week vacations in Key West. Additionally, these Filipinos 
traveled with Truman during his national election campaigns and diplomatic trips abroad. 
For instance, during his 1948 re-election campaign President Truman brought four 
Filipino stewards with him on his train trips to and across Washington, DC; Ohio; 
Illinois; Nebraska; Montana; Wyoming; Idaho; Seattle, WA; Oregon; Berkeley, Davis, 
Sacramento, Santa Barbara, and Los Angeles, CA; Albuquerque, NM, Emporia, KS; 
Jefferson City, MO; and the Democratic National Convention in Philadelphia, PA in the 
months of June and July, 1948.
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 The national and local publics of these major U.S. 
                                                                                                                                                 
(seated), and the chief stewards (standing). The names of the commanding officers in the photograph, from 
left to right, are Chief Lyle, Commander Warden, and Commander Roberts. Chief Peralta, Chief Sepulchre, 
Chief Floresca, Chief Rangasa, and Chief Bautista are the stewards featured in this photograph. Leo 
Roberts provides the following written caption accompanying this photo in his public papers: ―From time 
to time the ship‘s doctor and I would drive up to Shangri-La and inspect the quarters, galleys, etc. Cdr. 
Horace W. Warden, MC, USN and I were joined by Chief Basin Lyle (in charge of Camp Shangri-La) for 
lunch on such a visit.‖ Photos courtesy of the Leo Roberts Papers, Folder: Album I, NARA Truman 








cities were able to witness his policies of multiracial liberal inclusion on visible and 
invisible display. Other than Truman‘s Executive Order 9981 that implemented formal 
racial integration in the U.S. military, or his support for the U.N. Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1948, or even in the extraterritorial re-acquisition of Guam and Samoa in 1947, 
such policies of liberal inclusion were no more evident than by the visible hiring and 
invisible status of Filipino stewards in the White House, and throughout Truman‘s two-
term presidency. 
During his diplomatic trips abroad, President Truman brought even more Filipino 
stewards with him for additional assistance in everyday affairs. Three years earlier, in 
July 1945, President Truman and his associates embarked on a multi-week journey 
aboard the U.S.S. Augusta to actively participate in one of the most crucial meetings in 
the history of U.S. foreign policy: the Potsdam Conference. In preparation for the trip, 
Truman brought not only his cabinet members, military officials, and media publicists, 
but ten Filipino enlistees as well to assist in the everyday affairs of these associates. Each 
of these ten Filipino enlistees was assigned to at least one U.S. official. Mr. Sotero Abiva, 
whose oral history is now celebrated by his genealogical descendents in the Filipino 
American national community
285
, was specifically designated to assist the President 
during this 1945 trip. In addition, Mr. Estrada was assigned to the Secretary of State; Mr. 
Benjamin Licodo to General Vaughn and Captain Vardaman; Armando Custodio to 
Secretary Ross and Captain McMahon; Mr. Mariano Floresca to a ―Mr. Matthews‖ and 
―Mr. Bohlen‖; and Mr. Olivares to a ―Mr. Canfil‖, Lieutenant William Rigdon, and 
Ensignee Fleener. Meanwhile, four Filipino enlistees were appointed to work solely and 
strictly in the galley of the U.S.S. Augusta during this trip. These stewards included 
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―headboy‖ Mr. Orig, Mr. Ordona, Mr. Bautista (no apparent resemblance or relation to 
civilian worker Jesus Bautista in chapter three), and Mr. Palomaria.
286
 
Once again, well before Admiral Zumwalt‘s 1973 shift towards broader inclusion 
of stewards as seamen, U.S. military officials enlisted and transferred Filipinos into 
different ranks and positions since the 1950s. For instance, in 1956, Navy steward Frank 
Cariaga Gonzalez, interviewed by the Hampton Roads division of the Filipino American 
National Historical Society in 2006, was able to convince naval personnel to switch his 
rating to storekeeper third class. Another Navy Filipino steward, Alberto Romen 
Asercion, was transferred to music navy school in the early 1960s soon after his 
commanding officer heard of his prodigal musical talents and knowledge gained in the 
Philippines. Confirming his decision to send Asercion to music navy school, the 
commanding officer said, ―We‘re not going to waste you.‖
287
 
Some commanding U.S. officers unofficially reassigned Filipinos to different 
positions before their official promotions. One case in particular was Len Monzon. After 
World War II, Mr. Monzon enlisted in Sangley Point and was assigned as a steward in 
the Naval Air Station in Barber‘s Point, Hawai‘i and later in San Diego, California.
288
 By 
the Korean War in the early 1950s, Mr. Monzon was working in the personnel office of 
the naval ship as a yeoman striker, or yeoman trainee, while still officially positioned as a 
navy steward. Eventually, by July 1951, Mr. Monzon‘s commanding officer formally 
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switched his rating from steward to yeoman, or seaman. By 1962, Mr. Monzon was 
promoted to chief yeoman.
289
 
At other times, U.S. officers took it upon themselves to insure the enlistment 
promotion of Filipino stewards toward positions that aligned more closely to the skilled 
knowledge and learned expertise of these Filipinos, as attained during their colonial 
education in the Philippines. For instance, after learning of navy steward Jeff Colet‘s 
successful completion of high school, Colet‘s captain told him: ―You don‘t belong in this 
[steward] department, why don‘t you change your rating to corpsman?‖ After Mr. Colet 
replied affirmatively but thought it was too late to reply, the commanding personnel 
promptly replied: ―‗it‘s never too late.‘‖
290
 
After a brief interview and accidental mix up of Mr. Colet‘s records, Jeff Colet‘s 
request was officially approved and he entered hospital corpsman school in Bainbridge, 
Maryland. After successfully completing hospital corpsman school, Mr. Colet officially 
became ranked on file as a hospital corpsman in 1956.
291
 In addition, when Mr. Alabado 
joined the U.S. Navy in 1959, commanding personnel initially enlisted him as a steward. 
Just several weeks later, after graduating from boot camp and successfully completing his 
steward training, Mr. Alabado‘s rating changed to first class engineman after 
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Nestor Enriquez was another successful example of vertical enlistment promotion 
from stewardship. When he joined the U.S. Navy in 1958, navy commanders first 
enlisted him as a steward. Just two years later, after considering his promotion request 
and witnessing his daily diligence, navy personnel approved Mr. Enriquez‘s enlistment 
change from steward in the mess hall to storekeeper in the supply department.
293
 Mr. 
Enriquez eventually entered submarine school in New London, Connecticut, where he 
became officially promoted as global submariner.
294
 
Some of these Filipino enlistees were also guerilla members or soldiers of the 
Philippine Armed Forces during the Second World War. One of these 250,000+ soldiers, 
Francisco Frias, who was interviewed by Fred and Dorothy Cordova in FANHS Seattle in 
the early 1980s, was a Philippine guerilla member at age fifteen during World War II 
before joining the U.S. Navy in 1946.
295
 Carlos Balmaceda, another Navy Filipino 
enlistee, was ranked as a second lieutenant in the Philippine Army before joining the U.S. 
Navy in 1960. Two years after his initial enlistment, Mr. Balmaceda appealed to the 
Bureau of Naval Personnel for a rating change to navy recruiting counselor. Afterwards, 
the Bureau of Naval Personnel accepted his request and his rating and position shifted 
from steward to recruiting counselor in 1962.
296
 
Several institutional factors also played into the unlikely and gradual enlistment 
of Filipinos into other positions in the U.S. Navy since the 1950s. In 1948, U.S. President 
Truman implemented Executive Order 9981 for the racial desegregation of the U.S. 
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military, which ―‗hereby declared to be the policy of the President that there shall be 
equality of treatment and opportunity for persons in the armed services without regard to 
race, color, religion, or national origin.‘‖
297
 Executive Order 9981 exerted more 
presidential pressure to promote well-qualified, hardworking, and strongly competitive 
African Americans and other nonwhite minorities into different and higher positions of 
rank and file in the United States military. Officially, U.S. commanding officers were no 
longer able to categorize and subjugate minorities as stewards, especially if the expertise 
of certain enlisted minorities evidenced qualifications well beyond manual duties. 
Truman‘s 1948 executive order was also quite timely, especially considering that the 
implementation of the United Nation‘s Declaration of Human Rights, in that same year, 
increased the degree of global political and media attention to the U.S. nation-state‘s 
treatment of racial minorities, particularly African Americans. For the Harry Truman 
presidency and the U.S. nation-state, the official public declaration of Executive Order 
9981 in 1948 was instrumental in enforcing, if not re-establishing, the image of the U.S. 
as a leading global model of democracy and human rights. As Mary Dudziak and others 
have argued, this image and hopeful practice of U.S. political ideology was especially 
important in positioning the U.S., militarily and strategically, as a direct and dominant 
ideological force against communism during the pre-McCarthy era of the Cold War.
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The ideological and strategic timing of Truman‘s executive order proved no exception to 
the U.S. nation-state‘s diligent efforts in promoting itself internationally as a global 
leader of freedom, liberty, and democracy. 
Following Truman‘s executive order of racial integration in the U.S. military, 
more and more African Americans requested and were granted positions different from 
and higher than stewardships, especially from the 1950s onward. This relative trend of 
upward mobility among African Americans within the U.S. military also applied, in some 
ways, to Filipinos. As evidenced in the numerous testimonies conducted by previous 
scholars (and further assessed in this chapter), many Filipinos were positioned within and 
beyond the ranks of stewardship in the U.S. Navy after Truman‘s executive order in 
1948. Some, like Nestor Enriquez, adopted and adapted to such different positions as that 
of naval storekeepers, corpsmen, enginemen, and gunners, while some became enlisted in 
similar and higher ranks in the U.S. Coast Guard, as in the case of Ray Burdeos and 
others. The relative enlistment of these Filipinos within and beyond the ranks of naval 
stewardship during this period also reflected and furthered their inclusion and presence in 
the Cold War U.S. nation-state. Executive Order 9981, therefore, allowed racialized 
minority enlistment in different horizontal and vertical positions in the U.S. Navy. In 
addition, the U.S. government revised the 1947 Military Bases Agreement in 1952 to 
allow up to 1,000 Filipinos into the U.S. Navy on a yearly basis, specifically to aid the 
U.S. in its war against Korea. In 1953, just one year later, the U.S. government increased 
the quantity of Navy Filipino enlistment to 2,000 yearly. Massive enlistment of Filipinos 




These Filipinos‘ decisions to enlist and participate in the U.S. imperial project 
were guided by the need to advance the socioeconomic status of themselves and their 
respective families. Many of these Filipinos became well-educated during their 
childhood, adolescence, and formative years in the Philippines. Nonetheless, their 
increasing knowledge and skills, attained through much of their secondary higher 
education, arguably lessened their tolerance in experiencing a particular daily 
contradiction. This contradiction was defined by the daily reality of living through and 
witnessing the socioeconomic local poverties shaping their daily lives since World War 
II, coupled with the idealities/fantasies of socioeconomic mobility, American middle 
class values, and imperialist masculinities witnessed often (if not daily) in printed and 
visual outlets of American militarism and popular culture. 
Examples of discourse that expressed and popularized these idealities/fantasies 
can be found in films, literary works, and other publications popularized during the late 
1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s. According to cultural studies historian Christina Klein, 
these knowledge productions were especially prevalent within middlebrow public 
discourse and were part and parcel of U.S. America‘s imperialist ―fascination‖ and 
sentiments with Asia and the Pacific in order to promote ideologies of ―U.S. civil rights‖ 
and ―democracy‖ abroad, particularly in regular publications like Reader‟s Digest and the 
Saturday Review magazines, numerous novels, travel essays, and American musicals 
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American films circulated and propagated conceptions of imperial masculinity, 
particularly in the form of global exploration and heteronormative romantic love—
whether intra-racially between a white male and a white woman, or interracially between 
a white male and an Asian woman (but never an Asian male or other male of color with a 
white woman). Such films, as studied by film scholars within the framework of race, 
gender, and sexuality, included China Gate (1955), Love is a Splendored Thing (1955) 
and The World of Suzie Wong (1960).
300
 On one hand, these popular films, largely 
produced in the 1950s and 1960s, represented redemptive narratives of victory for the 
American empire in the post-Korean War period—narratives that were later reconfigured 
to some degree in the post-Vietnam War period during the 1980s (particularly through 
the Rambo series, which I discuss a bit further in the dissertation epilogue). On the other 
hand, these American romance war films of the 1950s and 1960s also inspired many 
Filipino males in particular to live out the imperial fantasies of the white male 
protagonists in these films through the U.S. Navy. 
One of these U.S. Navy Filipino enlistees who were significantly influenced by 
the visually powerful displays of white imperialist American culture, particularly in the 
decision to apply for U.S. Navy enlistment, was Aladino Alfaro Simbulan. In his 
interview with the Hampton Roads contingency of the Filipino American National 
Historical Society (FANHS), Mr. Simbulan recalled the scene(s) in the 1960 film Where 
the Boys Are where the navy sailors, wearing white uniforms, were chased by white 
women within and across different countries. After watching this movie and recalling this 
scene to his interviewer, Simbulan proclaimed, ―That‘s the life I want. So I said, ‗Oh, 
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 By joining the U.S. Navy, many of these Filipinos thought they would be 
upwardly mobile enough to gain access to the material benefits of American consumer 
culture. That way, they would be able to provide monetarily for their families in the 
Philippines. To echo the words of enlistee Mr. Simbulan, ―‗I also want to be able to 
provide for my parents. That‘s the main thing… To provide for my parents really ‗cause 




Media technology, in the form of advertisements and popular film, also played a 
persuasive role in engaging Filipinos to apply for the U.S. Navy to become enlistees in 
the early postwar period. Advertisements for navy enlistment circulated vis-à-vis 
American-sponsored newspapers in the Philippines—not just in the early postwar period, 
but throughout the twentieth century. One of these American-sponsored newspapers was 
the Manila Chronicle. According to retired navy enlistee Roberto Gatdula Facun, the 
advertisements were often seen in small print in the back pages of the newspaper. 
Nevertheless, while the advertisement was too small to notice ―unless you take a closer 
look‖, its size was visible enough to inform local Filipinos of the ongoing availability of 
naval enlistment, and to motivate such local Filipinos as Mr. Facun to apply for and join 
the U.S. Navy in order to provide socioeconomic support for themselves and for their 
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 In addition, these advertisements in national and local Philippine newspapers 
announced the U.S. Navy‘s desire for enlistment of Filipinos. Such advertisements also 
prompted local Filipino Ramon Burdeos to apply for and join the Navy from Sangley 
Point after encountering the announcement in the local newspaper in Cavite City.
304
  
Hence, the ―little‖ ads in American-sponsored newspapers were instrumental in 
facilitating Filipino interest to apply for enlistment in the U.S. Navy and relative 
inclusion in the U.S. nation-state
305
 because they gave local readers hope that joining the 
navy was possible, if not more tangible. And by joining the navy, they would be able to 
live the ―fantasy life‖ of citizens in the imperial metropole, thus becoming more 
geographically and upwardly mobile. These local ads have been cited by numerous Navy 
Filipinos who have generously provided testimonials of their experience leading up to 
and within the U.S. Navy. While these local ads were often featured in small print and 
often in the back pages of these local Philippine newspapers, it was the mere visibility of 
these advertisements that caught the colonized eye of these Filipinos, and hence 
presented the rare chance for these Filipinos to join the U.S. Navy, especially amidst the 




                                                 
303
 Ibid., 47. 
 
304
 Oades, 51. 
 
305
 In Our Uncles‟ Words, 45. 
 
306
 These local ads still have not been uncovered by previous and present scholars specializing on this topic 
(myself included). To do so would require revisiting the Manila Chronicle archives—both in the Philippine 
National Library in Manila on the one hand, and in the Smithsonian Archives in Washington, DC on the 
other—and would entail an additional research project on the impact of Philippine local newspapers on the 
engagement and recruitment of Filipinos in the U.S. Navy. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this particular 
project, it is important to note that evidence of the mere presence of these ads in these local newspapers, as 
testified by these Filipino veterans, was just enough to excite the minds and hearts of these locals Filipinos 




 Commercially successful American films that were widely distributed in the 
Philippines further propelled Filipinos to apply for U.S. Navy enlistment. From Anchors 
Aweigh in 1945 to Where the Boys Are in 1960, these American movies spurred local 
Filipinos‘ embrace of the U.S. Navy and the U.S. nation-state as places of work and 
residence. Anchor‟s Aweigh provided a coming-of-age narrative of a white young male 
protagonist in Los Angeles who encountered two U.S. navy sailors on liberty. Aspiring to 
join the U.S. Navy when he was old enough to do so, the protagonist saw the two Navy 
sailors (one of them Frank Sinatra) as living ideals of heteronormative masculinity. On 
one hand, the plot of the latter film (Where the Boys Are) was not as directly related to 
the U.S. Navy as implied in Mr. Simbulan‘s testimony. On the other hand, the film‘s 
engaging portrayal of four white college women becoming romantically linked with 
white civilian males—while on spring vacation—glorified unconventional yet still 
heteronormative ideals of white masculinity during the 1960s. While such films played 
contingent roles in increasing U.S. national support for its imperial endeavors in the Asia-
Pacific during the early Cold War, they also played a key role in influencing locals in 
such areas of the Asia-Pacific (in this case, the Philippines) to enlist and join in such 
globalist endeavors.  
The prevailing influence of American movies in U.S.N. Filipino enlistment 
illustrated the confluence of U.S. popular culture and American military hegemony 
during that period. Veteran Ramon Burdeos, whom I mentioned earlier, decided to join 
the U.S. Navy after seeing the white heteronormative male bravado and popularity of an 
                                                                                                                                                 
local families. Hence, for these local Filipinos, these ―little‖ ads had a significant impact on their decision 
to actually apply and enlist in the U.S. Navy. Without these ―little‖ ads, these Filipinos would not have 





onscreen Frank Sinatra portraying a navy man in Anchors Aweigh. Produced and globally 
distributed in 1945, the film still weighed heavily in the hearts and minds of such local 
Filipinos as Mr. Burdeos ten years after its initial production, prompting him to apply and 
join the U.S. Navy by October 1955.
307
 
Many of these cases are evidenced in the oral histories of Navy Filipinos 
documented by scholars Yen Le Espiritu, Riz Oades, and Ray Burdeos, along with other 
community-based scholars and students from the Filipino American National Historical 
Society (FANHS) in Hampton Roads. These community scholars and students conducted 
interviews of Navy Filipinos within major Filipino communities in San Diego County 
and Hampton Roads respectively. Many of these enlistees had already spent a 
considerable amount of years in college in the Philippines to pursue careers in various 
established local professions before cementing their fates by joining U.S. Navy instead. 
One of these Navy Filipinos, Mr. Sicat, was college-educated and trained as a chemical 
engineer before joining the U.S. Navy in order to provide more material sustenance for 
his family.
308
 Moreover, many of them came from well-educated backgrounds. One of 
their subjects and interviewees, Rufino ―Pie‖ Roque from Guaga Pampanga, attained a 
Bachelor of Science degree in agricultural engineering from the University of the 
Philippines before enlisting in the U.S. Navy instead in 1959.
309
 Gene V. Medina, 
interviewed by Riz Oades, enrolled in the University of the Far East in Manila for five 
years, where he majored in Business Administration. After this five-year period of 
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training to become a business professional, Mr. Medina opted instead to enlist in the U.S. 
Navy from Sangley Point on February 26, 1965.
310
 
Subsequently, the tens of thousands of working-class and well-educated Filipinos 
who migrated to the U.S. through naval enlistment since 1944 already marked the early 
stages of the ―brain drain‖—well before the congressional passage of the 1965 
Immigration Act. This added politics of enlistment signified another point of distinction 
between the history of Filipino immigration to the U.S. and that of other racialized and 
ethnic groups falling under the sociopolitical label ―Asian American.‖ This massive 
influx of late war and postwar Filipino migration was what Filipino American historian 
Fred Cordova called the ―Third Wave‖ of Filipino migration. For example, most—if not 
all—of the dozens of Filipino enlistees interviewed by former enlistee Ramon Burdeos 
were trained to become educated professionals before joining the U.S. Navy between 
1945 and 1965. One of Mr. Burdeos‘s interviewees, Gregory P. Alabado, attended the 
University of the Philippines as an electrical engineering major. During his senior year, 
Mr. Alabado joined the U.S. Navy from Sangley Point, Philippines, and sworn in on 
December 14, 1954.
311
 Moreover, retired Navy enlistee Mario G. Gamboa was in his 
third year in law school to become a lawyer when he succumbed to the enlistment 
temptation and joined the Navy vis-à-vis Sangley Point in late 1959.
312
 Additionally, 
Mariano Montilla, another enlistee, spent at least two years at the University of the East 
in the Philippines before joining the U.S. Navy on October 8, 1964.
313
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Another one of Burdeos‘s interviewees, Corpsman Jeff Colet, also attended the 
colonial-rooted University of the East in Manila—in 1953. There, he took liberal arts 
classes in general, and primarily European and U.S. history courses in particular. While it 
appeared that he was desiring and training to become a historian, the exotic visual 
landscapes that these courses emphasized, such as the Leaning Tower of Pisa juxtaposed 
with the knowledge of his grandfather‘s tenure in the U.S. Navy, prompted his desire to 
visit such touristy places in Europe and the U.S. through the navy instead. Subsequently, 




Degrees of Upward Mobility 
 
In addition, the increasing inclusion and presence of Filipinos in the U.S. nation-state was 
evident in their global geographic mobility throughout their tenures of enlistment, 
especially in contrast to the limited physical movement of their civilian counterparts in 
the Asia-Pacific (as evidenced in chapter four). Starting from their initial enlistment, 
whether in Sangley Point, Subic Bay, Clark Air Force Base, Baguio, Samar Province, or 
in any of the other U.S. military bases in the Philippine archipelago, an overwhelming 
number of Filipino enlistees fulfilled their learned dreams of ―seeing the world‖ by 
applying to and enlisting in the U.S. Navy. In turn, their physical ability to ―see the 
world‖ further evidenced their visibility and inclusion as nonwhite minorities in the U.S. 
military and the nation-state. 
Similar and dominant trends of geographic mobility were prevalent in most if not 
all of the published oral history accounts of Filipino enlistees. After their initial 
enlistment in the U.S. Navy, these Filipinos underwent extremely intensive and often 
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degrading experiences of boot camp in one of the U.S. military bases in the Philippine 
archipelago or elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific (Hawai‘i and San Diego included). While 
these enlistees had the chance to see these particular parts of the world, the range of their 
actual daily activities were severely limited, especially during boot camp. Francisco 
Cariaga Gonzalez, for instance, provided the following testimony of his boot camp 
experience while stationed in 1953 in San Diego: ―During the twelve weeks of boot camp 
at the Naval Training Center in San Diego, one of my duties was to wash uniforms by 
hand.‖
315
 Their menial duties were also complemented by their intensive studies of 
―stewardship‖, as well as their restricted physical mobility during this introductory stage 
of their navy tenures. In Our Uncles‟ Words, Conrado Organo Calpito provides the 
following testimony: ―… the first four week[s] you are not allowed to go out [on liberty]. 
All you do is study seamanship, the structure of the ship, all the surface craft like the 
destroyer and all the seaman terminology. Tying knots, square knots, all these knots, 
granny knots—that was a shock to me because I didn‘t even know what a granny knot or 
square knot was. But because of my interest, I learned fast.‖
316
 And lastly, extensive 
physical training was demanded of these newly enlisted Filipinos. According to enlistee 
Gregorio Bergado Ellazar: ―Boot camp was… hard for other people, but me, I‘m used to 
work[ing] hard. I don‘t mind hard work. We wake up 5 o‘clock in the morning everyday, 
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After boot camp, U.S. naval ships transported them to the Naval Training Center 
in San Diego, California; Bainbridge, Maryland; or, Great Lakes, Illinois for steward 
training. After about three weeks of training, naval personnel transferred ―their‖ Filipino 
enlistees to U.S. military installations at wherever commanding officers requested them 
to perform as stewards or within other lines of duty. Some of the most common stations 
of Filipino enlistment within the domestic U.S. nation-state included places that best 
prepared these enlistees for their assigned work positions. These places included 
Brooklyn and New York City, NY; Providence and Newport, Rhode Island; Camp May, 
NJ; Groton and New London, CT; Philadelphia, PA; Saint Mary‘s County and Annapolis, 
Maryland; Norfolk, Little Creek, and Newport News, VA; Charleston, SC; Jacksonville, 
Mayport, Key West, and Pensacola, FL; New Orleans, LA; Mobile, AL; Corpus Christi, 
Galveston, and Freeport, TX; San Diego, San Francisco, Long Beach, and Kings County, 
CA; Honolulu, HI; Seattle, WA; and many other bases within the U.S. nation-state.
318
 
Besides menial labor, stewardship training, and physical training, these enlistees‘ 
encounters with the racialized civilian world shifted their scope of what it meant to ―see 
the world‖—particularly in some of these aforementioned places of enlistment. Jovencio 
Meru Sison, for example, provided the following testimony of his experience arriving to 
his first duty station in Mayport, Florida: 
Riding the bus we see the sign up front as soon as you board the bus, ‗Colored 
people start from the rear white people start from the front.‘ So what does the 
Filipino do? He‘s not black. But he‘s colored and it‘s questionable. So what we 
Filipinos did was start from the middle. We start from the middle that way there 
will be no police coming in and or no commotion on the bus and the driver is not 
gonna say anything. Then when there were more Filipinos in the area, we were 
welcomed and could sit anywhere. We could sit in the front, nobody would 
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question you or sit in the back. Sometimes we would scatter intentionally, some 
would sit in the front, some would sit in [the] middle, and some would sit in the 





J. Sison‘s account illustrated the fact that these enlisted Filipinos got a chance to ―see the 
world‖ in a way that they likely did not expect upon arriving in the U.S., particularly in 
terms of race. Filipinos, like other Asians, blurred the black-white race dichotomy in 
American society, especially within the militarized space of the U.S. Navy. Alas, 
Filipinos often responded to and negotiated being ―in the middle‖ of the race question in 
the U.S. nation-state by ―sticking together‖ or disbursing in groups, especially when 
realizing their relative strength in numbers. 
Nevertheless, despite the structural limitations in military and civilian society that 
may have inhibited their ability to ―see the world‖ as they previously envisioned it, they 
were able to fulfill some of the dreams that they had prior to joining the navy by 
achieving them through the navy. Whether exploring foreign imperial sights during their 
travels, courting women (or even men) in civilian society, and/or fulfilling their filial 
obligations as sons, fathers, and brothers through remittances, these enlistees were able to 
fulfill their sense of male responsibility through the Navy. Ray L. Burdeos‘s testimony 
arguably provides valid historical evidence of his fulfillment of such responsibilities as a 
Filipino male. Take, for instance, his account of being stationed in Gloucester, NJ, near 
Philadelphia, during the early 1960s. According to Burdeos, his experience being near 
Philadelphia was reminiscent of his high school colonial education in the Philippines 
where he learned about the landmark constitutional achievements of the U.S. American 
city:  
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To be stationed near Philadelphia was a blessing for me. In my high school 
history class, I had been fascinated by tales of that city. I could still remember 
many things about Philadelphia, the city of brotherly love and the capital of 
Pennsylvania, which William Penn settled. It was the birthplace of America, 
where the U.S. Constitution was drafted and signed during a federal convention 




According to Burdeos, his visits to Philadelphia were a chance for him to openly 
participate in mainstream American popular culture and simultaneously fulfill his sense 
of heternormative manhood. This sort of fulfillment was illustrated in his interactions 
with one of the Filipina American dancer(s) in American bandstand: 
In those years, Philadelphia was home to a very popular daytime TV show, 
American Bandstand, with Dick Clark as the host. I happened to meet a beautiful 
Filipino-American girl named Barbara Magallanes, who attended the dance 
sessions quite frequently. She was the only ethnic Filipino who regularly attended 
the dance. I heard that she became a good friend of the attractive aspiring singer 




Additionally, Burdeos recounted being ―fairly successful in dating white girls‖ during his 
tenure in Gloucester, as well as in New York City—the place where he was stationed at 
after Gloucester in 1964.
322
 There, he had a brief romantic affair with the white Captain‘s 
daughter, Kimberly Bullard. While the outcome of that romance severely limited his stay 
at this military base (I will explain this in greater detail and analysis in the next chapter), 
this narrative of ―seeing the world‖ was intricately connected with his intra- and inter- 
racial heteronormative relationships while stationed in these places of ―the world.‖ 
Burdeos‘s heteronormative dreams of ―seeing the world‖ were finally 
consummated through his experience of meeting another woman while stationed in New 
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York City (this woman being of Philippine descent). What transpired from this courtship 
was their matrimony on April 4, 1964 in Toronto, Canada. After later being stationed in 
Great Lakes Naval Training Center in Great Lakes, Illinois, Honolulu, Hawaii, San 
Diego, California, New London, Connecticut, and Base Ketchikan, Alaska, Burdeos 
retired in Galveston, Texas in 1979—still married with children to this day.
323
 In his 
memoir Burdeos testified—through this courtship and eventual marriage, starting and 
raising an upwardly mobile family, and further participating in the U.S. nation-state 
through his contemporary contributions to American civil society—his immense 
gratitude for the support of the U.S. military during and beyond his Navy and Coast 
Guard tenure. 
Further historical evidence of the U.S. nation-state‘s inclusion of these Navy 
Filipino enlistees—along with their families—meant access to U.S. naturalization, 
citizenship, and veterans‘ benefits under the G.I. Bill for these enlistees. Ever since the 
congressional passage of the 1940 and 1942 Nationality Acts, the U.S. nation-state 
included enlisted Filipino veterans who served at least three years for the U.S. during its 
imperial wars abroad: World War II, Korean War, and or the Vietnam War. Their 
naturalization, citizenship, and access to the G.I. Bill enabled these Filipino enlistees‘ 
inclusion in the U.S. national body politic—especially after their retirement if they 
decided to settle more permanently in the United States.
324
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After undergoing intensive and extensive boot camp and steward training, 
Filipino enlistees‘ stations of enlistment often not only included the domestic U.S., but 
also other U.S. militarized installations across the globe, particularly those in the Trans-
Atlantic, Mediterranean, and the Asia-Pacific. Overwhelming evidence in the oral 
historical record pointed to the enlistment of Filipinos in such areas where global wars 
were most eminent, particularly in Japan in the aftermaths of World War II, in Korea 
during the early 1950s, and in Europe and Vietnam during the 1960s. While most U.S. 
troops, in general, were stationed in these areas around the globe, Filipino enlistees in 
particular celebrated their geographic mobility while on liberty from their duties on-base 
or on-ship. During their time on liberty, Filipino enlistees happily socialized with the 
locals. Nestor Enriquez was one enlistee who celebrated his geographic mobility and 
relative inclusion in imperial civility while on liberty. For instance, while stationed in 
Spain after his promotion to submarine patrolman, Enriquez recalled his delight from 
interacting with the local Spaniards, as well as from his observations of his fellow 
enlistees‘ interactions with the locals. According to Enriquez, the local Spaniards treated 
him and other Filipinos like ‗brothers and sisters‘, allowing him to reconcile—to a 
degree—Spanish cruelties and punishments towards Filipinos during Spain‘s 300-year 
colonial history in the Philippines.
325
 Enriquez‘s testimony, therefore, illustrated multiple 
layers of his appreciation for geographical and upward social mobility through his open 
interactions with local Spaniards during his time on liberty. On one level, these social 
interactions with the locals provided a sense of delight for him and likely for the other 
Filipino enlistees stationed in Spain during that time. Also, on a deeper level, such 
moments gave Enriquez a profound sense of reconciliation, in the historical sense, of his 
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previous conceptions towards Spanish citizens of the former colonial power in the 
Philippines. 
 
Citizenship in the U.S. Nation-State 
For Navy Filipinos, the nuances in obtaining U.S. citizenship were evidenced 
institutionally by the 1940 Nationality Act, the 1947 Military Brides Act, and the 1952 
Immigration Act, coupled with the everyday experiences of the Filipino Navy enlistees 
themselves. Their ability to gain citizenship was contingent upon several factors. First, if 
the Filipino enlistee served in a U.S. war for more than three years, then citizenship was 
more immediately attainable from the U.S. government. However, if the enlistee served 
in a U.S. war for less than three years over the course of their enlistment, then the process 
of obtaining citizenship was considerably longer, if not more tedious. The candidacy for 
citizenship among enlistees who served less than three years in war depended rather on 
the extremely limited U.S. national naturalization and citizenship quota. This was 
enforced institutionally by the 1940 Race and Nationality Acts.
326
 
One enlistee who fell under this latter ambiguous category was David C. Orolfo 
of the U.S. Coast Guard. During the Kennedy presidency, the INS denied Mr. Orolfo of 
U.S. citizenship because he fell slightly below the citizenship requirements for foreign 
national U.S. wartime veterans. According to the oral historical record, Mr. Orolfo, a 
veteran in the Korean War, missed the cut off date for citizenship by just three months. In 
order to appeal for U.S. citizenship, Mr. Orolfo wrote a letter to President Kennedy 
shortly after he and his Coast Guard unit welcomed the president‘s visit in New 
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 In this letter, Mr. Orolfo confirmed his status as a wartime veteran and 
requested the U.S. president‘s ―assistance to legal status.‖ Mr. Orolfo‘s persuasive case 
sparked a response from the Attorney General himself, Robert F. Kennedy. In his 
response, Robert Kennedy affirmed Mr. Orolfo‘s request by commanding Mr. Orolfo to 
go to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico, where he would complete his legal paperwork and 
hence his legal status in the U.S. After obtaining a passport from the New Orleans 
consulate (by showing his birth certificate to the embassy) and filling out the necessary 
paperwork, Mr. Orolfo‘s U.S. legal status was confirmed. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Orolfo 
successfully applied for and obtained U.S. citizenship based from his revised veteran 
status—as granted by Robert F. Kennedy‘s initiative.
328
 
In one sense, for Filipino enlistees, gaining citizenship meant further horizontal 
and vertical mobility within the ranks of the U.S. military, including the Merchant 
Marines. After the Second World War, opportunities for Filipinos in Seattle to enlist in 
the Merchant Marines were available as long as they were U.S. citizens.
329
 In addition, 
for others, obtaining citizenship meant opportunities for upward mobility to officer ranks. 
For example, in 1965, U.S. commanding officers offered Filipino enlistee Mr. Finones 
Manglicmot enrollment in Officer Candidate School after obtaining U.S. citizenship. 
After applying for citizenship during that year, the INS officially approved Mr. 
Manglicmot for citizenship, and swore him in as a U.S. citizen.
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With access to naturalization, citizenship, and the G.I. Bill, the U.S. government 
allowed enlisted Navy Filipinos further possible access to the white middle-class 
American Dream socially, and the U.S. nation-state politically. Since the initial 
congressional implementation of the G.I. Bill in 1944, like many marginalized U.S. 
military veterans of Asian, African, Pacific, and (at times) American Indian descent, 
Filipinos who served at least three years under the U.S. military were also allowed the 
following G.I. Bill of Rights: one, access to housing loans and homeownership; two, free 
or paid college education; and three, free guidance toward employment in civilian life 
following (conditional) honorable discharge.
331
 
Moreover, the privilege of living in subsidized navy housings further facilitated 
the model minority politics of enlistment for Filipinos in the U.S. Navy since (at least) 
1944. One example of Navy Filipino housing residence, privilege, and community 
building was in the navy housing communities in Hampton Roads, Virginia. Located two 
miles from the Virginia Beach Oceanfront, this Navy housing complex (otherwise known 
as Wadsworth Homes) resembled a relatively upscale condominium neighborhood in 
Norfolk, a suburban area of the Virginian state.
332
 It was in such subsidized 
neighborhoods as these where postwar Navy Filipino enlistees and their families often 
resided, settled, built, and enforced their own respective communities, fiestas, and other 
social and family gatherings.
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Access to citizenship, G.I. benefits, and U.S. nation-state settlement brought more 
and more opportunities for heteronormative family building among U.S. Filipino 
enlistees, particularly after the congressional passage of the 1947 Military Brides Act. 
The first two waves of Filipino migration consisted primarily of single, civilian, working 
class, and professional Filipino males during the first half of the twentieth century. 
However, the third wave (1945-1965) consisted not only of enlisted Navy Filipinos, but 
eventually their families since the passage of the 1947 Military Brides Act.
334
 Thus, for 
Navy Filipino enlistees, the politics of their enlistment meant being able to bring over 
their respective families in civic and political participation within the U.S. nation-state—
often from working-class, well-educated, and professional backgrounds. Increasing 
opportunities for such family building and settlement in the U.S. became available not 
just to these Filipino enlistees, but for their partners and descendents as well. One of 
these enlistees taking full advantage of these opportunities was Pedro Antolin. Mr. 
Antolin, a veteran steward during World War II and the Korean War, met his wife in July 
1950 while stationed overseas in Pusan, Korea. After completing his enlistment in Korea, 
he and his wife returned to the United States, eventually settling in Tacoma, WA.
335
 
Mr. Antolin was one of a wide plethora of Filipino male enlistees who were able 
to build and sustain families thanks to the Military Brides Act. On one hand, such 
previous scholars as Ji-Yeon Yuh and others have astutely pointed out the extent to which 
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white and nonwhite U.S. Americans benefited from this act while serving in the Korean 
War and other imperial wars abroad. On the other hand, it is also important, within the 
scope and framework of this chapter, to emphasize Filipino enlistees such as Mr. Antolin 
and many, many others who were able to marry overseas locals, bring them to the U.S., 
and create sustaining and upwardly mobile navy families and communities within the 
U.S. nation-state.  
Marrying overseas was not the only way that Filipino enlistees created upwardly 
mobile families in the U.S. nation-state, especially during the Third Wave of Filipino 
migration from 1945 to 1965. In the latter half of this period, particularly in the early 
1960s, more and more Filipino women, whom interested Filipino male enlistees 
considered a ―good catch‖
336
, migrated to the U.S. as nurses under the Exchange Visitor 
Program. While their settlement in the U.S. was intended to be temporary, many cases of 
them dating and marrying Filipino enlistees proved otherwise. Under such circumstances, 
their residence became permanent, and their veteran male counterparts hence were able to 
build, sustain, and expand their military families within the U.S. nation-state. 
 
Conclusion 
As evidenced throughout this chapter, there is a large kernel of truth to the conceptual 
and actual emergence of these ―model minority‖ politics of enlistment following the 
Second World War. To a large degree, access to naturalization, citizenship, and G.I. 
benefits shaped the politics of enlistment for Filipinos within the U.S. Navy. Greater 
access to such privileges and benefits not only differentiated them from their civilian 
counterparts, but also gave them the material tools to fulfill their male responsibilities of 
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providing for their families in the Philippines, the U.S. and possibly elsewhere around the 
globe. Their ability to travel all over the world during the course of their enlistments not 
only further distinguished them from their civilian counterparts. This additional privilege 
enabled them to fulfill their heternormative sense of masculinity while abroad and at 
home.  
Simultaneously, for U.S. military officials, enlisting Filipinos enabled them to 
fulfill increasing demands for stewards, especially within branches that were becoming 
more vacant following racial integration in the U.S. military during the late 1940s. With 
racial integration allowing more upward mobility for African Americans within and 
beyond the steward branch, there was increasing demand for Filipino enlistees to fill 
these vacant spots. Supplied with preconceptions of Filipinos as ―hardworking,‖ ―loyal,‖ 
and ―submissive,‖ U.S. military officials—in many cases—viewed them largely as a 
―model minority‖ within the U.S. Navy, particularly in the steward branch. Further 
knowledge of the educational experience and skills among many of these enlistees 
informed officers to promote them within different branches, positions, and higher ranks 
in the U.S. Navy. Nevertheless, for the military officials, there was a strong and common 
sense of neo-colonial sentiment that spurred their decision to enlist Filipinos primarily as 
stewards—from the U.S. bases in the Philippines to the White House metropole in 
Washington, DC. The official declaration of ethnic inclusion into different branches, 
positions, and ranks within and beyond the U.S. Navy did not occur for Filipinos until 
1973, when Admiral Zumwalt formally changed the terms of their enlistment from 
―stewards‖ to ―seamen.‖ As seamen, Filipinos were allowed access to more skilled lines 




change allowed more official and immediate integration of Filipinos into higher ranks 
and positions in and beyond the U.S. Navy. 
Nevertheless, while many of these Filipinos enjoyed much of the privileges, 
benefits, and upward mobility that were eminent from the politics of their enlistment, 
their relative success stories do not necessarily represent the deeper and broader 
meanings of what these politics of enlistment entailed for them during the course of their 
naval tenure—and beyond. In addition, these relative success stories of minority 
enlistment and experience do not yet represent the larger majority of the 22,000-plus 
Filipino enlistees who have served between 1944 and 1973. The oral and written records 
of this ―silent majority‖ of Navy Filipino enlistees have yet to be documented and 
historically assessed. As the next and final chapter more closely illustrates, significant 
and structural dualities inherently shaping the politics of Filipino enlistment persisted 
during the third wave of Filipino migration between 1945 and 1965. These dualities were 
especially evident in the institutional restrictions and discriminations shaping the 
conditions of Filipino steward enlistment. These particular dualities both highlighted and 
concealed the degrees of Filipino marginalization from political, military, and social 
spaces of the U.S. nation-state, and the degrees of discrimination and patronization 
against Filipinos within these exact same spaces. These dualities shaping Filipino 
enlistment provided more grounds of commonality with their civilian counterparts than 









The Restrictive Politics of Filipino Enlistment in the U.S. Navy (USN): Degrees of 
Marginalization in the U.S. Nation-State, 1946-1976  
 
 
Continual and increasing Filipino recruitment during the postwar period did not exist 
without U.S. officials‘ precautions and prejudices towards Filipinos and their enlistments 
in the U.S. Navy. Such prejudices predicated upon historical and social conceptions of 
race, gender, class and sexuality regarding ―native‖ Filipinos ever since the U.S. 
entangled itself as a nation in ―troublesome matters‖ in the Asia-Pacific during the late 
nineteenth century. Preconceptions of Filipinos as too ―childlike‖ to self-govern or too 
―savage‖ to participate in U.S. imperial projects of modernity justified and facilitated 




Nevertheless, from 1945 onwards, with the bi-national anticipation and 
acceptance of Philippine independence in 1946 and the powerful impacts of the World 
War II era-Double-Victory Movement in the U.S. civilian and military spheres, white 
U.S. political and military officials found it more and more difficult to justify, facilitate, 
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and regulate the politics of recognition and exclusion based explicitly on racial 
misconceptions of minorities that were more commonly accepted before World War II. 
That is not to say, of course, that race- and class-based ceilings no longer existed 
in the US. Far from it.  On the one hand, there were considerable and groundbreaking 
strides in the overall working and living postwar conditions of veterans from different 
racial and ethnic backgrounds. On the other hand, U.S. officials and officers still enlisted 
these veterans largely in the mess-steward positions in the U.S. Navy—particularly 
Filipinos. Scholars of various interdisciplinary formations have illustrated the restriction 
of enlisted Filipinos primarily as stewards in the U.S. Navy—even in the postwar era. 
Regardless of the depth and breadth of knowledge, skills, and expertise among newly 
enlisted Filipinos, U.S. officials recruited locals from the Philippine archipelago strictly 
as stewards upon initial enlistment. Even the ones who were able to transfer to different 
and higher positions in the branches of the U.S. military started initially as stewards. As 
stewards, these Filipinos worked solely and subserviently in the mess hall, cooking for 
and attending to navy personnel.
338
 
In this chapter, I examine the continual and varying degrees of discrimination 
against Filipinos in the navy and other branches of the U.S. military. Although these 
enlisted stewards had more opportunities for upward mobility within and across the ranks 
of the U.S. military, U.S. officials could at any time terminate their enlistment in 
preference for individuals they considered more ―American‖ in the domestic sense. These 
cases more likely occurred in the years directly following the Philippine Independence 
Act, as passed by Congress in 1946. With the Philippines officially declared as a 
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sovereign nation-state, U.S. officials again considered Filipinos as ―aliens‖, rather than 
foreign nationals. As foreign nationals during the U.S. colonial period, Filipinos were 
allowed entrance into the U.S., whether as civilians or enlistees. However, as ―aliens‖, 
U.S. officials no longer were able to legally enlist Filipinos into its military during this 
period. In addition, U.S. Congress passed a 1947 law requiring ninety percent of all ship 
crews aboard U.S. commercial ships to be U.S. American citizens, thus further limiting 
Filipinos from access to citizenship in the early postwar period. 
This chapter is divided into three parts. First, it briefly overviews the immediate 
aftermaths of the five-year period of Filipino exclusion from the U.S. Navy from 1947 to 
1952, as enforced in the 1947 Military Bases Agreement (MBA). Second, this chapter 
explores the continuing conditions of institutional, spatial, and everyday forms of 
marginalization that shaped the inclusion of Filipino enlistees in the U.S. Navy and other 
branches of the military during this period, as well as after the 1952 MBA revisions 
which allowed between 1,000 and 2,000 Filipinos per year in the U.S. Navy. And three, 
this chapter briefly assesses the politics of Filipino enlistment during the 1970s when 
civilian journalists and scholars started to expose and critique the continuing enlistment 
and discrimination of Filipino stewards, particularly those in the U.S. Navy and Coast 
Guard. 
By looking at these postwar patterns of and responses to Filipino enlistment, I 
provide the following arguments. First, though racial integration in the U.S. military was 
officially enforced in 1948, discrimination was still part and parcel of how enlistment 
policies were implemented in the U.S. military, particularly in the navy and the coast 




particularly Filipinos, in the steward branch during the postwar period. Second, despite 
some evidence of upward mobility within the militarized space among Filipino stewards, 
racial paternalism shaped the overarching politics of Filipino steward enlistment. Racial 
paternalism—whether in the White House, or other militarized spaces in general—shaped 
the relationship between the stewards and their superiors on the one hand, and the overall 
conditions of inclusion facilitating Filipino enlistment on the other. Hence, racial 
paternalism was an act of inclusion, just as it was an act of exclusion. This means of 
exclusion was happening not just through the practice of exclusion itself, but through the 
conditions in which Filipinos were included in the militarized space. This was evidenced 
with Filipinos being enlisted primarily—if not only—within the steward branch through 
their placement as stewards, and in their restrictions from speaking Filipino within these 
designated working spaces as well. Additionally, these terms of inclusion and exclusion 
were evident in interracial romance in this postwar period. In this respect, I look 
specifically at the experience of Filipino enlistee Ray L. Burdeos, and how the cautions 
and outcomes of interracial romance formed the conditions of power and subordination 
within the U.S. militarized space. And thirdly, I argue that by the mid 1970s, public 
discourse had much more of an impact on the shaping of USN enlistment policy toward 
Filipinos than in the pre-1965 period. I demonstrate this case through a close textual and 
historical reading of Timothy Ingram‘s widely referenced journalistic article called ―The 
Floating Plantation‖ and Jesse Quinsaat‘s influential essay ―An Exercise on How to Join 
the Navy… and Still Not See the World.‖  
 
Filipino Exclusion in the Aftermath of the 1947 MBA and 1948 Racial Integration in 





The conditional reconfigurations of Filipino exclusion lasted from 1947 and 
continued throughout the 1950s, despite individual cases of upward mobility. These 
sweeping conditions of exclusion most immediately impacted 4,000 Filipinos who 
initially were enlisted in 1947 by U.S. officials to serve as stewards in the Merchant 
Marines. However, soon after congressional passage of the 1947 federal law mandating 




These revised conditions also greatly affected the working livelihoods of Filipino 
enlistees in the U.S. Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS). Previously known as 
the Second World War Army Transportation Service, the Seattle-based MSTS 
transported troops to and from Korea during the Korean War. After the war, the MSTS 
suffered from severe economic setbacks transpired in the midst of a national recession. 
To resolve this matter, the MSTS laid off all of its Filipino stewards in 1956. Soon 
afterwards, nonetheless, the MSTS replaced these Filipinos in preference for American 
national citizens, specifically veterans who returned from the Korean War and were 
apparently not Filipino.
340
 In addition, these postwar reconfigurations of Filipino national 
exclusion directly impacted U.S. officials‘ policies of Filipino recruitment and enlistment 
in the U.S. Navy. Between 1947 and 1952, the Bureau of Naval Personnel stopped 
recruitment and enlistment of Filipinos altogether, as stated earlier.  
Also, post-1948 upward mobility among African Americans within the naval 
ranks, coupled with the subsequent increase in demand for stewardships further 
facilitated and restricted the enlistment of Filipinos as stewards by the 1950s onward. 
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President Truman‘s declaration and implementation of racial integration in the U.S. 
military propelled the enlistment and promotion of many African Americans in different 
and higher ranks than the stewardships to which they were previously appointed by U.S. 
military officials. Subsequently, African American vacancies and officers‘ demands for 
Filipino stewards converged as U.S. officers facilitated the ―migration‖ and promotion of 
African Americans to different and higher positions in the U.S. Navy in particular, and 
the U.S. military in general.
341
 Meanwhile, the re-emergence of Filipino steward 
enlistment in the 1950s also facilitated the continual restriction of Filipinos to the ranks 
of stewards, especially considering the relative lack of collective political and civil 
activism among Filipino enlistees during this period. This was especially true in 
comparison to African Americans, whose activist leaders and massive protests pressured 
and prompted further political and social change for racial minorities in both the civil and 
military spheres of the U.S. body politic. For the third wave of Filipino immigrants, their 
commonsensical naval status, in the eyes of (still mostly white) U.S. officials and 
officers, continued to be that of stewards servicing their official U.S. ―superiors.‖ 
These continual restrictions remained prevalent not just in their placement of 
enlistment, but also in the working and living space in which they worked. As stewards, 
their work and presence were largely restricted to the racialized space of the mess room. 
The mess room was an enclosed space, often located in the basement of the ship or in 
other marginalized spaces on-base, where the stewards, previously known as ―mess 
attendants‖, cooked meals for their ―superior‖ officers. It was also a designated space 
where they cooked and ate their own provisions. One of the most evident examples of 
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this racialized spacing was detailed in my archival findings of the mess hall in the White 
House during and beyond the Truman presidency.
342
 
During the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies, White House officials hired as 
many as twenty-five to thirty Navy Filipino stewards to assist these respective 
presidential administrations. Officials directly hired them into the White House because 
of the high demand for stewards of Philippine descent. There is not enough evidence in 
the written historical record to assert why the White House was employing navy stewards 
directly. What was more evident, from my findings, was that the presidential preference 
for Navy Filipino stewards, whether they were classified as active, on fleet reserve, or 
even retired in some cases, was consistently high during these U.S. presidential periods 
and beyond as well. As stated in the correspondences assessed in chapter two, during the 
early-mid 1940s, many U.S. Navy officials preferred Filipino enlistees because they were 
perceived to be hard working and more subservient to the authority of the officials. Such 
perceptions likely transcended to U.S. White House officials as well. Although the U.S. 
Navy banned further enlistment of Filipinos between 1947 and 1952, White House 
officials continued to send requests to the U.S. Navy to transfer enlisted USN Filipino 
stewards directly to the White House to assist the U.S. president. On one hand, more 
historical research needs to be done on the specific logics and reasons for the hiring of 
Filipino stewards in the White House. On the other hand, what is necessary to clarify is 
that White House Filipino stewards were primarily hired by direct transfer from the U.S. 
Navy. 
Nevertheless, these stewards‘ spatial movements and place of work were largely 
restricted to designated and enclosed areas. Spatial boundaries were demarcated between 
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the stewards and other White House personnel, particularly in terms of where their meals 
would be eaten. In a June 13, 1951 memorandum, White House Aide Robert Dennison 
confirmed that ―no one other than regularly assigned stewards will be permitted to eat in 
the kitchen.‖
343
 In the same memo, even budget nationalism, as I explained briefly in 
chapter five, was being potentially exercised in determining the working and living space 
of Filipino stewards in the White House. For instance, Dennison hinted at the potential 
reduction of stewards if ―the facilities of the mess become overtaxed.‖
344
 
In 1951, then-U.S. President Harry Truman was making major renovations in the 
White House, despite the fact that the U.S. was going through a national recession. While 
logics of budgetary nationalism shaped the rhetorical contours of downsizing 
employment of stewards, these logics remained largely absent in funding projects as 
extravagant and immensely expensive as rebuilding the White House during that year. 
Included in this project was the stewards‘ mess hall, which was scheduled for renovation 
between May 29 and June 11, 1951. More specifically, it was contemplated that such 
renovations would involve the direct downsizing of the mess hall in order to ―provide 
adequate service with the facilities available.‖
345
 
The White House mess hall was located underground in the basement of the West 
Wing. Before 1951, the mess hall was severely cramped and undersupplied for the 
marginalized stewards working within the mess hall, despite the fact that it was located in 
one of the most extravagant housing stations in the world. For instance, there was only 
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one table that was twelve feet in width and twenty-four feet in length. According to the 
mess officer during that time, Leo Roberts, because of the immense length and width of 
the only table in the mess hall, ―one could readily understand the difficulty in conducting 
a conversation over lunch.‖
346
 This prompted the stewards to eat their meals elsewhere 
besides the mess hall, while still being mandated to pay a monthly mess bill for using the 
mess hall facilities. The taxing monthly bill, coupled with the cramped space of the mess 
hall informed the mess officers‘ assessment of the mess kitchen as ―a most unsatisfactory 
operation in every aspect.‖ Before Mess Officer Roberts‘ tenure, the White House mess 
hall was operated by Army General Harry Vaughn who, before Robert Dennison, was the 
military aide to presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman. By 1950, Rear Naval 
Admiral Robert Dennison replaced Army General Harry Vaughn as military aide to the 
U.S. president.
347
 Therefore, the transition of White House mess hall operations reflected 
a shift from an army- to navy -led entity. (The navy has had a much longer and sustained 
history of managing the mess hall and its attendants than the army or any other branch of 
the U.S. military.) In one sense, this formal naval occupation of the White House mess 
hall, from 1950 onwards, enhanced the efficiency and eminent domain of the mess hall‘s 
existence and function for the U.S. president, his staff, and the White House as a whole. 
In another sense, the formal shift of mess hall operations in the White House enforced the 
continual spatial, racial, and class based restrictions of (Filipino) stewards within the 
White House. 
After replacing Harry Vaughn as Military Aide to the President, Rear Admiral 
Dennison asked Leo Roberts to assist in the renovation of the White House Mess, in 
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accordance with navy standards. This led Roberts to replace the existent mess hall with a 
renovated one. Subsequently, the three-week renovation of the mess hall began and was 
completed by June 1951. General items of its renovation included the replacement of the 
immensely long table in the kitchen room (which was used by President Roosevelt‘s 
administration to read maps) with six smaller tables, each one fitting between four and 
six mess attendants; the addition of at least twenty-eight chairs to accompany the new 
tables; the replacement of its map-reading lamps with ―soft ceiling lights‖; the white and 
blue navy colors painted on the ceiling; the displays of poster-size visuals of the 
presidential yacht (USS Williamsburg), e.g., the ―Little White House,‖ the President‘s 
vacation home (Camp ―Shangri-La‖/Camp David), and the presidential plane (then 
known as ―Independent One‖); the exchange of existing kitchen equipment for new ones 
made of stainless steel; and the imports of ―Navy-approved‖ utensils, linen, and menus in 
the mess hall as well.
348
 
While some of these mess hall revisions may have appeared beneficial for the 
global image of the White House presidential staff and U.S. national public, the revisions 
also revealed interesting implications for more efficient and eminent utility that came at 
the cost of further enabling and enforcing spatial restrictions for the stewards. For 
instance, the visual installations of the stewards‘ other working spaces, e.g., the 
President‘s yacht, vacation spot, and airplane, only further confirmed and enforced where 
they were permitted to be physically present as enlisted stewards in the White House, 
regardless of how ‗eminent‘ these working spaces may have been. Moreover, while the 
installation of smaller tables and dimmed lights enhanced the function of the mess hall as 
a designated space for these stewards to eat and gather for breakfast, lunch, and dinner, 






these particular renovations also further limited chances for central organizing or 
mobilization among the stewards if they chose to intellectualize and act upon such 
possible grievances as their mandated monthly mess bills, and the existence and 
enforcement of their spatial restrictions as stewards in the wardroom messes within these 
eminent domains of the U.S. commander-in-chief. 
Like the White House military officials who served before him, Mess Officer and 
Captain Leo Roberts had a preference for Filipinos as ―his‖ stewards. His preference was 
likely informed and shaped by the fact that he received a Philippine Liberation Ribbon 
for his commendable services as a naval officer in the Philippines during the Second 
World War. The paternalistic and fraternal bonds that he forged with local officials and 
personnel in the Philippines perhaps informed his preference for as many as thirty-four 
Filipino enlistees to work under his assistance for the U.S. president during his brief 
tenure as the White House officer from 1950 to 1952. 
Limited spaces of physical and social mobility illustrated instances of racial 
marginalization within the presidential White House, as well as in local U.S. militarized 
spaces and the U.S. nation-state in general. While Filipinos were being included in the 
White House as stewards, they were still conceptualized as inferior or marginal within 
these spaces. Between 1945 and 1965, San Diego remained as such a domain where 
spatial restrictions of Filipino enlistees remained eminent. For Filipino recruits nineteen 
years or younger, their scarce physical presence in dances held by the YMCA, for 
example, was enforced by design. According to Gregory P. Alabado, a newly enlisted 
navy recruit in San Diego by 1954, he was one of only a few Filipinos, and Asians in 




Alabado, in his oral historical record, acknowledged how Filipinos were most exclusively 
well- and widely- received in the ―skid row‖ enclaves of San Diego. With a plethoric 
presence of Filipino restaurants, the ―skid row‖ enclaves were the only spaces, he noted, 
where they could socially and culturally unite without being intrudingly surveillanced or 
reprimanded for speaking Filipino, or even eating Filipino food in the steward branch.
349
 
These continual restrictions, based largely on legacies of race, ethnic, and national 
relations, also facilitated and enforced individual and patterned relationships between 
Filipino stewards and their (mostly white) officers based on racial paternalism. By racial 
paternalism in this context, I mean specifically the unequal relationship between the 
white ―superior‖ officer and the Filipino ―subordinate‖ serving that officer. This concept 
shaped and guided previous scholars‘ works on U.S. militarism in different historical 
contexts, specifically Mary Renda‘s study on the relationship between U.S. military 
personnel and the Haitians whose land they occupied between 1915 and 1940.
350
 
Nevertheless, in my own historical study, I have extended and reconfigured this concept 
in the historically contextual relationship between U.S. white officers and Filipino 
stewards. Just as racial paternalism justified and enforced U.S. occupation in the 
Philippines during the first half of the twentieth century, by the bi-national manifestations 
of U.S.-Philippine relations during the second half of that century, explicit and subtle 
forms of racial paternalism continued to exist in the structural relationship between 
Filipino stewards and white U.S. military officers. 
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For example, in another Navy town, Groton, Connecticut, taxi cabs were known 
to send enlisted Filipinos to the backdoor of the Chief Petty Officers‘ Club where the 
kitchen was located, rather than to the front main entrance. During this period, even 
civilian taxi cab drivers outside the navy base presumed Filipinos as merely ―mess boys‖ 
who went to the officers club for kitchen employment rather than social enjoyment. This 
was the case for Nestor P. Enriquez, who was stationed in Groton by the mid-1960s. Mr. 
Enriquez was one of the very few Filipino enlistees who became ranked as a chief petty 
officer during this period, rather than as a mess boy during his early years of enlistment 
in the late 1950s. Nevertheless, one day when he received a taxi cab ride to the Chief 
Petty Officers‘ Club, the driver sent him to the backdoor of the vicinity, again presuming 
that he was a mess boy and not one of the invited chief petty officers to the club.
351
 
Strict—and scrutinized—spatial restrictions especially applied to newly enlisted 
Filipinos, as illustrated in Mr. Alabado‘s and others‘ oral historical records. The limited 
agency in spatial mobility, during the first few years of their enlistment, were further 
evidenced and enforced by their ambiguous legal status in the United States. Despite 
legal entry into the U.S. through military enlistment, the INS did not consider them to be 
legal residents, or as naturalized citizens yet. Thus, as ―aliens‖ within the U.S. military, 
their initial entry into the U.S. was widely welcomed, yet with extreme exception to their 
physical movement within U.S. military and civilian society. Although their veteran 
status, over time, allowed them further inclusion into these spaces of the U.S. nation-
state, the politics of their enlistment lay in the fact that their subsequent social and 
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upward mobility never reached what Teresa Suarez astutely coined as ―white male 
privileges in all areas of life and property despite liberal claims and inclusion for all.‖
352
 
Therefore, the general restrictions of Filipino enlistment were also evident in the 
spatial sense within the U.S. militarized space. Their work was largely restricted within 
the mess hall, or the steward branch. These employment restrictions, coupled with the 
continual hiring of almost exclusively nonwhites as stewards, were evident in the words 
of a commanding officer in a 1947 memo addressed to a navy journalist: ―‗there are no 
white personnel in the Steward Branch.‘‖
353
 While navy officials denied such details to 
civilians during the Second World War (as evidenced in chapter two), by the early 
postwar period, the naturalized segregation of the steward branch was one restriction that 
officers were not as hesitant to admit, especially to this ―insider‖ navy press journalist 
who did not record or write on this issue in navy press publication for probable reason of 




In 1952, U.S. officials lifted its ban on Filipino enlistment. With the Korean War 
in peak escalation, and the increasing mobility of African Americans to different and 
higher positions of enlistment, U.S. commanding officers again became co-dependent on 
one of its staunchest allies to fill escalating gaps within the steward ranks: Filipinos. In 
the 1952 revision, the Bureau of Naval Personnel permitted the enlistment of 1,000 
Filipinos on a yearly basis. Although Filipino enlistment in the U.S. Navy was banned 
again in (and since) 1992, it was between 1947 and 1952 that one can gain a better 
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historical sense of the exclusive politics of Filipino enlistment, especially as they 
pertained to the terms and conditions of bi-national U.S. Philippine relations, Cold War 
politics, immigration restriction, and national economic restoration. In addition, 
previously interviewed Navy Filipino enlistees acknowledged their relative lack of 
upward mobility within the ranks and files of the U.S. Navy. 
Moreover, despite the changes and uneven continuities of Filipino exclusion in 
the U.S. military, there were particular conditions of exclusion that remained constant 
throughout this period between 1945 and 1965. Besides the initial and restrictive 
enlistment of Filipinos as stewards, U.S. officials barred everyday practices of Filipino 
culture—especially in terms of language. While U.S. and Philippine colonial teachers 
enforced English as the primary language spoken in Philippine schools, the prohibition of 
Filipino language dialects in formally militarized spaces of the U.S. was an extension of 
that exclusion in the postcolonial period. Even from the moment of possible—not 
actual—recruitment from the Philippines, U.S. officials strictly enforced communication 
in the English language for further consideration of enlistment candidacy. According to 
navy steward Jay Ruiz all the recruit exam rooms displayed the following sign: ―ONLY 
ENGLISH IS SPOKEN HERE.‖
354
 If one of the U.S. officials noticed a possible enlistee 
speaking his own or another person‘s local dialect, then that enlistment candidate would 
immediately be sent back to his home province or barrio.
355
 Despite the fact that U.S. 
officials, in a few cases, permitted the cooking and serving of Filipino food
356
, their strict 
prohibition of Filipino language dialects within U.S. militarized spaces remained 
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dominant throughout and beyond this period (until 1973)—even from the moment of 
possible enlistment in the U.S. Navy. 
The limited upward mobility among Filipino enlistees not only existed within 
their steward positions in the U.S. Navy and other branches in the U.S. military, but they 
even extended beyond the duration of their military service into civilian life. In her brief 
study on honorably discharged and Los Angeles-based Filipino enlistees in the federal 
government civil service sector after 1946, Linda España-Maram calculated that out of 
513 discharged Filipino veterans eighty percent landed in federal government civil 
service jobs directly related to their steward work in the U.S. military. These jobs 
included those of busboys, domestic servants, and janitors. While only 7.4% of these 
wartime veterans obtained skilled positions of welders and mechanics, only 3.7% of these 
513 veterans were able to transfer to a professional or managerial position in the civil 
sector.
357
 While their line of work within the service sector was quite distinct from that of 
their civilian counterparts in the cannery industry, the levels of marginalization by their 
employers were likely similar in both the service and industry sectors within the civilian 
sphere of the U.S. nation-state.
358
 
Lengthy and bureaucratic obstacles toward citizenship provided additional limits 
of inclusion for enlisted Filipinos in the U.S. nation-state. For Filipinos who did not enlist 
at all during wartime, their chances for attaining citizenship were even lower. Rufino 
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―Pie‖ Roque, for example, enlisted in the U.S. Navy in 1959, well after the end of the 
Korean War. Over the duration of his naval service, Mr. Roque applied for U.S. 
citizenship twice to no avail. There were two reasons for this. First of all, he, like all 
newly recruited Filipino enlistees, was not considered as a legal immigrant by the INS. 
And second, according to Mr. Roque, ―it took a special act of Congress to make all 
Filipinos become U.S. citizen[s].‖
359
 While it was definitely true that newly recruited 
Filipinos were not all considered U.S. citizens or even legal, Mr. Roque, for some reason 
or another, chose not to specify the ―special act‖ that permitted Filipinos U.S. citizenship. 
This ―special act,‖ when aligning the contents of Mr. Roque‘s testimony with the 
historically prevailing developments during that time, was most likely the Nationality Act 
of 1952. This act extended immediate U.S. citizenship to foreigners who served for the 
U.S. armed forces during the Korean War. Likely because of the timing of his enlistment 
as apart from wartime service, Mr. Roque was denied U.S. citizenship twice during his 
naval career. Hence, his path toward citizenship was much longer and tedious than those 
who enlisted during wartime. Subsequently, Mr. Roque‘s path toward U.S. citizenship 
illustrated another point of nuance and restriction for enlisted Filipinos within the U.S. 
nation-state. Additionally, upon initial enlistment, Filipinos were considered neither legal 
nor illegal residents of the United States. As enlistees in the U.S. military, the INS 
insured their overall legal status in the U.S. as informally legal aliens, despite the fact that 
they were not yet classified as legal residents.
360
 
Another point of restriction shaping the politics of Filipino enlistment was 
interracial romance. However well-documented this topic of interracial romance has been 
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in the works of previous scholars, none have discussed the restrictions, evidences, or 
ramifications of interracial relationships between Filipino enlistees and the relatives of 
their commanding officers. Generally speaking, interracial relationships during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have been and continue to be researched by 
Filipino, Asian American and U.S. studies historians—specifically, within the following 
contexts: U.S. white male enlistees and local women of occupied territories in the Asia-
Pacific; single Filipino males and white females in the U.S. civilian sphere; and even 
Navy Filipinos and (non)white civilians within U.S. militarized spaces.
361
 Meanwhile, 
there has only been one recorded case of ―forbidden‖ racial miscegenation between a 
Filipino male enlistee and the white relative of his commanding officer. This one 
particular case has come to be relatively well known within navy communities of Filipino 
America. This case has been briefly documented in 2004 by Riz Oades in his study of 
Navy Filipinos, and by the Filipino male enlistee himself who underwent this highly 
unique and telling life story of racial miscegenation and restriction in the U.S. military. 
The name of this Filipino enlistee was Ray Burdeos, and his particular story related to 
him and ―the Captain‘s Daughter.‖ Regardless of the level of entertainment and gossip 
that this story might bring as it did when it first happened, it does give us a better 
understanding of the institutional and everyday restrictions and discriminations against 
Filipinos enlisted between 1945 and 1965 within the U.S. militarized space—especially 
in terms of race. 
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This brief interracial affair happened within the Coast Guard Base in New York 
City in 1963, while Mr. Burdeos was working for a U.S. captain as a steward. One day, 
while serving dinner for the white captain and his family, he met the captain‘s daughter 
for the first time, and was ―mesmerized by her.‖
362
 Despite direct and persistent warnings 
by his fellow Filipino colleagues and African American mess officer, Mr. Burdeos 
remained just as persistently defiant to their commands and continued to pursue the 
daughter of his white commanding officer. His feelings for the captain‘s daughter turned 




While the date went pleasantly well for both of them, Mr. Burdeos (the captain‘s 
steward) and Ms. Bullard (the captain‘s daughter) felt just as cautious as Mr. Burdeos‘s 
shipmates were about them as an interracial couple, especially during a time when 
advancements in U.S. race relations were emerging but not yet nearly fulfilled. During 
the early 1960s, interracial romance was, in some ways, just as forbidden in many public 
spaces as in the 1930s. Even in the early 1960s, U.S. public officials and military officers 
found interracial romance as a ―transgression of the social order,‖
364
 and therefore 
forbidden. While interracial romance could have been grounds for deportation for 
Filipino civilian males in the 1930s, by the 1960s repatriation to the Philippines was also 
a possible repercussion for such Filipino enlistees as Mr. Burdeos. 
As Michel Foucault, Ann Laura Stoler, and other scholars have argued, state and 
society‘s regulations on sexuality have historically been utilized as disciplinary and 
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coercive means of domestic and colonial governance. During the intensely brief affair 
between Mr. Burdeos and the captain‘s daughter, no one knew the potential social and 
cultural consequences of this interracial romance more than Mr. Burdeos and the 
captain‘s daughter themselves. Throughout the course of their date, their mutual sense of 
delight for each other‘s company was constantly met with an uncanny fear that any one 
of Mr. Burdeos‘ colleagues, or even the captain himself, would spot them together.
365
 
And if anyone of the U.S. military spotted them together in this romantic sense, then 
disciplinary measures were likely to follow swiftly and harshly. Possible manifestations 
from such disciplinary measures would not only jeopardize the future of their 
relationship, but even the social, cultural, and professional aspects of their future 
livelihoods within a U.S. nation-state still largely defined and demarked by race. 
By the end of their night out, one of their worst fears came true. As Burdeos 
escorted Bullard (the captain‘s daughter) back to her house and kissed her good night, he 
saw the captain himself waiting for his daughter to come to the house safe and sound. 
The captain, meanwhile, chose to save his pronounced measures of discipline and 
punishment towards Mr. Burdeos for the following morning.
366
 
During that morning, the captain ordered Mr. Burdeos into his office. There, 
within the space of the captain‘s military authority, the captain himself was not as 
hesitant as the night before to express his personal and professional distaste for Mr. 
Burdeos‘ romantic pursuit of his daughter. The captain also conveyed his wife‘s intense 
feelings of ―hate‖ toward Mr. Burdeos for even harboring the thought of pursuing their 
only daughter, let alone having an actual romantic relationship with her. Despite 
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Burdeos‘ response of regretful yet respectful persistence for the captain‘s blessing, from 
that moment on, the captain expressively perceived Mr. Burdeos as ―sexually deviant‖ 
and a threat to the social order of the military base in New York City.
367
 
Surprisingly, however, the captain did not view Mr. Burdeos as a possible threat 
to the sweeping social order of the entire U.S. military. Rather, the captain ended their 
brief and intense meeting by announcing Mr. Burdeos‘ immediate transfer to a base that 
the captain considered distant enough to secure not just the social stability of the NYC 
base, but especially his own privileged upward mobility as a white captain soon to be 
evaluated for admiral. The captain‘s choice for Burdeos‘ transfer was a place more than 
1,300 miles south of New York City: New Orleans.
368
 
After multiple transfers to other bases within the Trans-Atlantic, Mr. Burdeos 
settled in Galveston, Texas in 1964. It was during this time that Mr. Burdeos spotted his 
former captain Bullard, who was now an admiral, during an officers‘ party at the 
Bachelor Officers‘ Quarters (BOQ). Despite Mr. Burdeos‘ anticipated misgivings about 
reuniting with Admiral Bullard, the admiral himself took the initiative to meet and briefly 
socialize with Mr. Burdeos. In this brief and relatively less intense encounter, Admiral 
Bullard sincerely asked Mr. Burdeos about his current state of professional affairs and 
endeavors during that time. In turn, Mr. Burdeos respectfully responded by 
acknowledging his full-time work status at the base in Galveston and his part-time 
coursework at the local community college.
369
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After hearing Mr. Burdeos‘ update, Admiral Bullard congratulated Mr. Burdeos 
on his continuing hard work and dedications, and wished him good luck in the future. 
Over the course of their conversation, both of them dared not mention the brief and 
―forbidden‖ interracial romance between Mr. Burdeos and the admiral‘s daughter, which 
likely would have caused serious repercussions and transgressions of the social order 
during and after the officers‘ party.
370
 
It was within that moment in 1964, far away from the New York City Coast 
Guard Base, that the Admiral felt socially comfortable enough with Mr. Burdeos to 
briefly chat with him again, and to congratulate him for all his service and hard work 
during his enlistment. Though a certain amount of tension still existed between them in 
this particular encounter, it was during that moment that the admiral‘s conception of Mr. 
Burdeos as a loyal and committed worker overshadowed his preconception of Mr. 
Burdeos as a possible ―sexual deviant‖ one year earlier. This prevailing piece of 
knowledge about Mr. Burdeos, in the American eyes of Admiral Bullard, lay parallel to 
this admiral‘s conceptions of Filipino stewards who serviced him in the years before Mr. 
Burdeos in 1963. 
In this brief series of encounters between Mr. Burdeos and Mr. Bullard, we can 
see how race and sexuality shaped the grounds of restriction and marginalization for 
Filipino enlistees within the U.S. militarized space. During the early 1960s, enlisted 
Filipino stewards like Mr. Burdeos were strictly prohibited from having interracial 
romantic relationships with anyone related to their commanding officers. Such race-based 
social and sexual prohibitions were enforced and naturalized by the authority of white 
commanding officers, personnel, and their willing subordinates—including and 
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especially Mr. Burdeos‘ colleagues.
371
 This mode and site of what Susan Koshy would 
coin as ―sexual naturalization‖ not only facilitated the social and sexual parameters of 
white supremacy within the U.S. militarized space, but also informed and shaped the 
inclusive spaces of racial paternalism that structured the relationships between white 
commanding officers and nonwhite Filipinos, as evidenced in such encounters as that 
between Mr. Bullard and Mr. Burdeos. These spatial parameters in the U.S. militarized 
space facilitated, regulated, and limited the social and spatial mobility of Filipino 
enlistees—both within military and civil society. 
 
Post-1965 Politics of Filipino Enlistment 
 
To a significant degree, the policies and politics of Filipino enlistment helped shape the 
historical conditions for the 1965 Immigration Act and post-1965 Asian immigration to 
the United States. The Double Victory Movement‘s influence on minority enlistment and 
upward mobility were evidenced institutionally by Truman‘s Executive Order No. 9981 
in 1948. This order racially desegregated the U.S. military and allowed nonwhites, 
especially African Americans, further upward mobility within its ranks and files. 
Although racial segregations and restrictions still remained prevalent in many ways, for 
Filipino stewards the formal implementation of the 1948 executive order permitted 
upward mobility on some levels as well. Such cases were evident—and celebrated—in 
the oral historical records cited in the fifth chapter, and commemorated in previous works 
by community scholars and historians over the past thirty years. 
However, public critique and revision of the continuing enlistments and 
restrictions of Filipino stewards became as imminent as ever during the 1970s. Arguably, 
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the most important public critique emerging in this period came from author and PBS 
television journalist Timothy H. Ingram.
372
 In October 1970, Ingram contributed an 
article to Washington Monthly, a bi-partisan journal that covered national politics from 
the U.S. metropole in Washington, DC. This article, titled ―The Floating Plantation‖, was 
an exposé on the hiring and discriminatory practices of Filipinos as stewards in the U.S. 
military, particularly those in the Navy and the Coast Guard. 
Ingram‘s four-page article revealed findings and insights from his interviews with 
U.S. naval officials and Filipino stewards stationed in three institutional spaces within the 
metropole: the Department of Transportation, the White House, and the Naval Academy 
in DC and Maryland. Officials of the Department of Transportation and the Naval 
Academy, in particular, were relatively cooperative and willing to be interviewed by 
Ingram. Subsequently, these officials presented Ingram with convincing quantitative 
figures that illustrated how many Filipinos in the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard were 
enlisted as stewards during that time (13,884 out of 16,669 and 800 out of 900, 
respectively). Also, within the Naval Academy, 258 of the 365 enlisted stewards were 
Filipino.
373
 However, White House officials were not nearly as cooperative in sharing 
details of the hiring practices of Filipinos during that time. Despite the unmistakable 
presence of Filipino stewards serving the U.S. president and his staff, White House 
officials were ―reluctant to talk about this.‖
374
 Additionally, Ingram compiled empirical 
evidence of how this continuing hiring practice served to enhance and enforce white male 
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class privilege amongst existing U.S. officers aboard naval ships and stations. According 
to Ingram, the rank of the U.S. officer could be detected by the number of stewards that 
he had at his disposal. For an admiral, it was three; and for a captain, one.
375
  
Moreover, Ingram exposed the problem of communication between Filipino 
stewards and their ensigned officers, based on language. According to one rear admiral 
interviewed by Ingram, ―their‖ stewards spoke English in a way that was relatively 
limiting and difficult for the officials and other native English speakers to understand. In 
addition, the tendency of the Filipino stewards to ―stick together‖ and socialize 
collectively, in Filipino, enhanced these officials‘ difficulty and likely anxiety in 
communicating with Filipino stewards.
376
 
From his interviews and observations, Ingram coined the policies and politics of 
U.S. naval Filipino enlistment as a ―colonial arrangement‖
377
, and the navy itself (along 
with the Coast Guard) as a ―floating plantation‖ for continuing to enforce its 
discriminatory hiring and enlistment practices of Filipinos as stewards. This American 
journalist paralleled the enlistment of Filipino stewards to the hiring of Mexicans vis-à-
vis the Bracero Program, along with the history of slavery of African Americans. Ingram 
emphasized running parallels in U.S. official justifications for these comparative 
racialized practices. In all three cases, U.S. officials claimed that they were helping these 
recruits of color ―escape from poverty.‖ Also, officials have argued that these recruits of 
color were thankful for supporting themselves through the work that they were doing, and 
hence ―liked‖ their assigned labor—regardless of how menial their labor may have been. 
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Such logics and justifications, Ingram emphasized, were especially unacceptable during a 
time of major progress in terms of civil rights, equality, and ―liberation‖ up to that point 
in U.S. history. Ingram even noted relative progressions within other branches in the 
military sphere in this regard, as evidenced in the hiring of civilians, not enlistees, in the 
Army, Air Force, and Marines. In ―contrast‖, the Navy and Coast Guard were the 
―floating‖ branches of the military that continued to enlist and restrict Filipinos in the 
steward branch. Because of their continuing hiring practices, coupled with the perceived 
parallels of their practices with those running slave plantations, Ingram coined the U.S. 
Navy—along with the Coast Guard—as the ―floating plantation.‖
378
 
The article likely raised the anxieties that officials already had in enlisting 
Filipinos as naval stewards, particularly in regards to anticipated reactions by these 
stewards and civilians if such information was known to the national public. Given that 
such information was therefore accessible to the U.S. national public through Ingram‘s 
article, U.S. military officials were suddenly held more accountable for following through 
with implementing fundamental changes toward social justice that aligned more with 
relative changes made in the civilian sphere. In 1968, the U.S. Army, Air Force, and 
Marines apparently changed its steward enlistment policy from hiring enlisted Filipinos, 
and other enlistees of color, to hiring civilians in general—regardless of race. 
Nonetheless, up to the date of the article‘s publication (1970), this change did not apply 
to the U.S. Navy. 
Hence, the national publication and distribution of Ingram‘s article likely 
caused—if not reignited—more public concerns about this continuing enlistment 
practice, perhaps exerting more pressure on U.S. Navy officials to implement similar 
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changes that other military branches had made up to that point in time. About three years 
later, in 1973, Admiral Zumwalt officially changed the name of the steward rank to one 
more racially inclusive and dignified in theory and working practice: seamanship. In 
addition, Admiral Zumwalt‘s Z-gram policy, implemented in 1974 and 1975, set the 
stage for English-language courses for foreign nationals to improve their communication 
and accommodation skills with their fellow enlistees and superiors, and to lessen their 
likelihood of being recipients/victims of ethnic intimidation or harassment by military 
personnel and officers.  
Moreover, the national publication and circulation of Ingram‘s influential article 
reached working-class and activist agents of the Asian American Movement by the mid-
1970s. One of these activists, in particular, was a Filipino American named Jesse 
Quinsaat. In his 1976 article ―…How to Join the Navy… and Still Not See the World‖, 
Quinsaat acknowledged Ingram‘s historical references to the continual policies of 
Filipino steward enlistment, along with the bases that enforced colonial policies of 
racialized servitude and white male privilege in the U.S. military. Subsequently, Quinsaat 
complemented such secondary evidence with interviews of fifteen Navy Filipinos, as 
conducted by him and eight other students identifying themselves—in the anti-colonial 
sense—as Pilipino (walá ng Spanish letter ―F‖).
379
 
While the content and form of these interviews illustrated the continuing 
obstacles, limitations, and restrictions that these enlistees faced in the U.S. Navy and 
other branches of the military, these interviews also presented a diverse plethora of 
perspectives that Ingram did not uncover in his respective article: the perspectives of the 
                                                 
379
 Jesse Quinsaat, ―An Exercise on How to Join the Navy… and Still Not See the World,‖ in Emma Gee et 





Navy Filipinos themselves. In addition, while Ingram gestured toward the legacy of 
colonialism (generally) in shaping the continuing enlistment policies of servitude within 
the U.S. Navy, Quinsaat astutely historicized and specified this practice—as they 
pertained to Filipinos—to the beginnings of the Philippine-American War in 1899, and 
the emergences (and legacies) of American militarism and colonialism that followed after 
that war was declared in the Philippines.
380
 
Published in the 1976 anthology Counterpoint: Perspectives on Asian America, 
Quinsaat‘s article—along with a plethora of other essays in that anthology—has spoken 
directly to a strong contingency of Filipino, Asian American, and other minority scholars 
and activists since the time of its publication. Such scholars and activists included those 
in the post-Vietnam War era who catalyzed the veterans‘ movement, particularly in 
behalf of Vietnam War veterans who returned to the U.S. and were mistreated by the 
same exact citizens for whom they fought while stationed in Vietnam. In addition, these 
activists, while aiming to recover the histories of these veterans, also sought to critique—
if not erase—the very conditions and legacies shaping veteran enlistment: militarism, 
colonialism, and genocide. I engage the politics and contributions of these future 
generations shaping the post-Vietnam War era—among them veterans, scholars, and 
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“Is it the end of enlistment as we know it?” The Uneven Politics of the “U.S.-
Philippine Nation” and Demilitarization in the Post-Vietnam War Era, Late 
Twentieth to Early Twenty-First Century 
 
 
Throughout the course of the twentieth century, the U.S. nation-state‘s politics of Filipino 
enlistment served to expand the U.S. as an empire in the general sense, and to reconfigure 
its hegemony in the Philippines in the particular. From its colonial implementation in the 
early half of that century to the emergence of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ imaginary 
since World War II, the U.S. nation-state continually considered the Philippines as a 
strategic military site for expanding and policing its socioeconomic interests overseas, 
especially in Asia and the Pacific. Additionally, various branches of the U.S. military, 
specifically the navy, consistently saw the recruitment of Filipino civilians and enlistees 
as integral to the U.S. imperial project, despite their evident anxieties of Filipinos shifting 
political alliances with U.S. interests. On the one hand, their policies of inclusion shaped 
the enlistment of Filipinos within and beyond the naval branch of the U.S. military. On 
the other hand, their politics of enlistment facilitated the marginalization of Filipinos 
primarily within the steward branch to work as cooks and messmen, as well as the 
periodic exclusion of Filipino enlistment altogether when U.S. officials considered 
Philippine sovereign interests as opposite with theirs. While these policies of inclusion, 
marginalization, and exclusion shaped the limited upward mobility of these Filipino 




national relationship between the U.S. and the Philippines: specifically since World War 
II. 
Nevertheless, between 1990 and 1992, three momentous events occurred that 
marked key breakthroughs and ruptures within U.S.-Philippine relations. Firstly, in 1990, 
the U.S. granted national citizenship to Filipino veterans who fought in behalf of the 
Philippines and U.S. during World War II.
381
 Secondly, in 1991, the Philippines suffered 
one of the worst disasters the world has ever seen: the volcano eruption in Mt. Pinatubo, 
which severely damaged Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Base. And thirdly, in 
1992, the U.S.—with elite cooperation by the Philippine Congress—formally ended its 
lease on the military bases in the Philippines. 
On the one hand, the naturalization of World War II Filipino soldiers—in the 
Philippine armed forces—as U.S. citizens signified a victory for the ―U.S.-Philippine 
nation‖ on three counts. First, it represented a victory for these veterans and their allies 
who sought forms of compensation that were equitable to those received by their Filipino 
steward counterparts, along with the Filipino soldiers from the First and Second Infantry 
Regiments in the U.S. Armed Forces. Secondly, this victory marked one step toward the 
redemptive recovery of these veterans‘ untold histories of sacrifice, valor, and pain 
previously lost since the 1946 Rescission Act barred World War II Filipino veterans from 
receiving benefits for their allied services with the United States. And thirdly, in the 
general sense, this congressional act was part and parcel of the U.S. national public‘s 
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redemptive recognition of their veterans—recognition which was lost since the 1970s 
following the Vietnam War. Political restoration of veteran recognition was especially 
important for U.S. officials seeking national public approval for militarist escalations in 




On the other hand, if the congressional passage of the 1990 Naturalization Act 
marked victory for the Filipino veteran movement in particular—and the U.S. veteran 
movement in general—the events that followed also reinforced, in varying degrees, the 
fragility and uneven status of Philippine-U.S. relations that has been evident through the 
case studies of Jesus Bautista, Leonicio Arceo, Bartolome Roldan, and many others 
presented in this dissertation. The immediate and mass devastations of Mt. Pinatubo led 
to the forced evacuations of hundreds of thousands of Filipinos from their homes, 
especially for those who lived closest to the fatal volcanic site. Meanwhile, many elite 
Philippine officials
383
, seeking immediate assistance to this national disaster, urged 
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 Some Philippine officials strongly advocated for the retention—if not return—of U.S. bases in the 
Philippines, especially in light of the Mt. Pinatubo disaster. To some of these officials, U.S. base retention 
and military assistance was needed in order to rehabilitate specific sites and resources that were seriously 
damaged from the volcanic explosion. One of these pro-base advocates was Richard ―Dick‖ Gordon. 
During the early 1990s, Gordon was mayor of one of the cities that had been most historically dependent on 
the U.S. military for economic sustenance, and had been within closest physical proximity to the Subic Bay 
U.S. naval base: Olongapo City. According to policy analyst Roland G. Simbulan, Mayor Gordon ―used to 
be one of the fiercest pro-bases advocates in the country, mobilizing the city‘s base-dependent communities 
in Manila to rally for the retention of the bases‖ (Simbulan 2009, 2).  
In the meantime, other officials, particularly Philippine national labor and political leaders, 




international support—particularly from the U.S.—as they did during and following 
World War II. However, for U.S. officials, the event sparked intense debate: should they 
provide much needed emergency and military assistance to their staunchest ally?  Or 
should they finally cut their lease on the military bases in the Philippines without long-
term budgetary commitments and personnel assistance, especially in behalf of 
rehabilitating the Philippine archipelago from this monumental volcanic disaster? 
U.S. officials decided on the latter, with formal approval by the Philippine 
Congress. In 1992, the U.S. military evacuated all of its personnel, officers, and material 
property from the bases in the Philippines, which left Olongapo City, Subic Bay, and 
other areas near Mt. Pinatubo in environmental and infrastructural disarray. With the 
formal end of the U.S. military‘s lease intact, so was the official policy regarding Filipino 
enlistment in the U.S. military. In that same year, U.S. military officials banned 
enlistment of Filipinos in all branches of the U.S. military, including the 
stewardship/seaman branch of the U.S. Navy. Therefore, for Filipinos hoping to join the 
U.S. Navy as a means to provide material support for their families—especially in the 
aftermaths of the Mt. Pinatubo disaster—the bi-national decision for U.S. base evacuation 
marked the end of enlistment as they knew it. 
                                                                                                                                                 
agreement and would hence facilitate U.S. base evacuation from the Philippines for good (Simbulan 2009, 
1). These competing perspectives on U.S. base retention vs. evacuation sparked debates within the 
Philippine Senate in 1991, and especially following the Mt. Pinatubo disaster during that same year. What 
transpired from these two key events were the following. First, on September 16, 1991, the majority of the 
Philippine Senate voted in favor of rejecting a new base treaty that would permit U.S. base retention for 
another ten years. Second, in 1992, Philippine Congress passed the Base Conversion Development Act 
(BCDA), which provided assistance for converting the former U.S. bases to commercially driven areas 
within infrastructural frameworks provided by the Philippine national government and its corresponding 
local governments that were closest to these former bases. And third, once the BCDA was formally 
established and successfully approved by U.S. standards, U.S. military forces completed their formal 
evacuation from the Philippines on November 24, 1992. (Simbulan 2009, 9) Therefore, from these debates 
and congressional implementations, the successful conversion of these bases, from U.S. military to 
Philippine controlled entities, become prioritized over retaining U.S. bases in the Philippines for an allotted 





Nevertheless, the formal ends of this enlistment policy—as we, the readers know 
it—have also meant the informal bi-national continuities of alliance between U.S. and 
Philippine officials, most often in behalf of the U.S. nation-state interests as a global 
empire in today‘s post-9/11 era. As long as the U.S. continues to impose and enforce its 
imperial/ambitious interests as an empire, the most powerful agents of the Philippine 
nation-state will likely continue—as ―Asia‘s staunchest ally‖—to supply the U.S. with 
civilian labor and even military enforcement. This has already been evident with the 
continuing implementation of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
384
, Philippine 
President Arroyo‘s enlistment of Filipino soldiers in post-9/11 U.S. wars, the contract 
employment of Filipino civilian workers in the militarized Middle East, and the U.S. 
military‘s ―training exercises‖ in Mindanao and other regions of the Trans-Pacific. 
The current state of U.S.-Philippine relations, like previous events and cases 
uncovered and assessed in this dissertation, attests to the continuing and departing 
formations of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖—hopefully for the betterment of the peoples 
of diverse races, ethnicities, classes, genders, and sexualities shaping this bi-national 
formality. The current presidents of both nations, Barack Obama and Benigno ―Nonoy‖ 
Aquino III respectively, arguably exemplify the most promising bi-national presidential 
partnership in the history of U.S.-Philippine relations. One is a former law professor, 
community organizer, and the first black president in U.S. history; and the other is the 
heir of perhaps the most prominent human rights activist and martyr in twentieth-century 
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Philippine history. Both are arguably the most intellectually and socially educated 
presidents ever to take executive lead in the national politics of their respective 
countries—particularly in issues and ideologies of social justice.  
While the highest achievements within this bi-national partnership have yet to be 
seen, a series of questions remains as poignant as ever within the currents of this trans-
pacific bi-national formation. To what extent will their respective histories of civil rights, 
community building, and socially diligent epistemologies shape their concerns, actions, 
and politics on matters pertinent to U.S. and Philippine relations? Will the structural 
legacies of militarism, colonialism, and imperialism that have shaped U.S.-Philippine 
relations since 1899 become minimal—if not obsolete? Or will these presidents‘ past 
politics and epistemologies of social justice shift (if not already) toward a more 
pragmatic, electoral, and ―real‖ bi-national politik that will not only entail the continual 
enforcement of the neo-colonial U.S.-Philippine relationship, but the continuing 
enlistment of Filipinos and other people of color (still) marginalized by ethnicity, race, 
gender, sexuality, class, disability, geography—at minimum—to enforce the continuums 
shaping globalization and the most privileged global nations within it today? Or, will in 
fact their respective genealogies and backgrounds in social justice and human rights 
translate in promoting harmony, diplomacy, and mutual cooperation—rather than war 
and militarism—on a bi-national, global, and multilayered scale that has never been seen 
before in the history of U.S.-Philippine relations?  
Nonoy Aquino and Barack Obama have officially met at least one time over the 




2010 during Aquino‘s brief U.S. tour.
385
 During this seven-minute meeting, two matters 
were discussed: first, cleaning up ammunition remains in Corregidor; and second, 
―competing territorial claims‖ for islands in the South China Sea, otherwise known as the 
Spratlys controversy. But how much actual follow-up was there from this meeting, 
regarding these and related matters? This remains to be seen in the contemporary record. 
There was intended to be a follow-up meeting between Aquino and Obama on September 
20, 2011 during Aquino‘s subsequent visit to the U.S. for the launching of the Open 
Governance Partnership (OGP).
386
 While no meeting actually transpired between the two, 
this visit only assured the continual bi-national partnership/friendship between these two 
presidents and nations, as it was Obama who invited Aquino to this ―new multilateral 
initiative to promote transparency, empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness new 
technologies to strengthen governance.‖
387
 According to the November 16, 2011 issue of 
Sun Star, a Philippine online news publication, the next official meeting between 
President Obama and President Aquino is scheduled to be ―early next year‖ which, as of 
the time of this dissertation completion, would be at anytime—if not already. The 
primary goal of this meeting is twofold: one, to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of 
the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty (implemented in 1951); and two, to update 
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Because of the immensely hectic schedules of both presidents—to put it most 
mildly—this second meeting has yet to happen and perhaps is unlikely to occur this year. 
Nevertheless, a floodgate of possible topics and events might be discussed during and 
after this future meeting: to what extent might leftist scholars and activists see this 
meeting as an opportunity to highlight their discontents with the ongoing role of 
militarism in shaping U.S. and Philippine relations? How might this resilient contingency 
articulate the promising—and contradictory—imaginaries that continue to facilitate this 
bi-national formation? To what degree might this politically diverse contingency bring 
back to light historical truths, realities, and legacies of the Philippine-American War that 
remain just as prevalent in many hearts and minds of this contingency as they did during 
the war‘s peak from 1899 to 1902? 
In this day and age, it might be as (relatively) safe as ever to discuss the 
Philippine-American War within public and academic discourse, likely because it is seen 
as most distant in the bi-national and global memory—temporally and politically.
389
 But 
perhaps in the realm of popular discourse, an event as seemingly fictitious as the 
Philippine-American War still needs to be seen just as that: a fictitious, rather than actual, 
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ruptured site of U.S. empire and foreign policy. The Philippine-American War has played 
as much of a role in establishing the bi-national U.S.-Philippine relationship—through 
militarism, mass coercion, and major enlistment—as has the global public in forgetting 
this war throughout the twentieth century and early twenty-first, and most recently, in 
current recollections of this war as a ―distant past‖
390
 or ―story of fiction.‖
391
 Returning to 
the history of Filipino enlistment in the U.S. military, I recognize the need to recover the 
stories of these Filipino veterans, just as I see the urgency to critique—if not obliterate—
the conditions of war, militarism, and orientalism that facilitated their enlistments, 
subjugations, and other related aftermaths of such historical and contemporary 
facilitations (including the wars in the Middle East since the 1990s). As stated in my 
introduction, my simultaneous recovery of Filipino civilian and enlisted labor history, 
folded with my continuing critique of colonial militarisms, is what differentiates this 
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dissertation from groundbreaking works in migration studies, military studies, and 
diplomatic history since the 1990s. 
 Understandably, military families of different political backgrounds have 
embraced their soldier-citizen relatives or descendants who have joined the U.S. military 
in behalf of the nation-state, particularly military families from racially and ethnically 
minoritized backgrounds. Even within Filipino American communities, this conception 
of the soldier-citizen has been just as—if not more so—embraced as well. On the one 
hand, many of these enlisted Filipino veterans in the U.S. military served within the 
steward branch of floating and stationary bases, including Sotero Abiva, Mariano 
Floresca, Jeff Colet, and many others acknowledged in this dissertation. Over time, by 
the 1990s, Filipino stewards in the White House started to receive more public notoriety 
within and beyond Filipino America for their services to the U.S. president at the time 
(Bill Clinton), as well as for reporting what they might have known surrounding the 
Lewinsky case. Additionally, since the 1990s, a considerable plethora of works have been 
published regarding Filipino stewards in the U.S. military, specifically within intersecting 
realms of community and academic scholarships. These works have emphasized the 
recovery of these veterans‘ oral histories and testimonials. As acknowledged earlier in 
this dissertation, such works include Yen Le Espiritu‘s Filipino American Lives (1995) 
and Homebound (2003), Riz Oades‘s Beyond the Mask (2004), and the Filipino American 
National Historical Society‘s In Our Uncles‟ Words (2006). Subsequently, a number of 
Filipino veterans have taken it upon themselves to write their own memoirs of U.S. 
military enlistment and comparative upward mobility in the U.S. nation-state. Armed 




retired veterans, Ray L. Burdeos, researched the history of his own service in the Navy 
and Coast Guard, along with the histories of about a dozen of his fellow shipmates who 
served with him at various stages in his enlistment. What transpired from his seven-year 
self-reflection and extensive research was his book Filipinos in the U.S. Navy and Coast 
Guard during the Vietnam War (2008), which has been one of the many primary sources 
shaping the research in this dissertation. 
Besides the general recovery and celebration of retired Filipino veterans, a large 
segment of the Filipino American community has highlighted and honored active Filipino 
veterans since the end of the Cold War. These particular veterans have elevated beyond 
politics of enlistment which have restricted their respective elders to the steward branch. 
One of these well-known veterans is a Filipina American woman: Dr. Connie Mariano. 
Like some of her male steward counterparts (including her own father), Mariano was 
enlisted in the U.S. Navy. However, unlike many of these first generation Filipino 
stewards, Mariano was raised primarily in the U.S., received a college degree, and 
graduated from medical school at U.C. San Diego. Shortly after graduating from medical 
school, Connie Mariano enlisted in the U.S. Navy as an officer before being transferred 
to the White House. There, Dr. Mariano served as primary practitioner of President 
George H.W. Bush by the early 1990s. Following Bush‘s presidency, Mariano stayed 
onboard as the ―White House Doctor‖ throughout Clinton‘s two-term presidency from 
1993 to 2001. Following the Clinton presidency, Mariano started her own practice in 
Scottsdale, Arizona and openly shared her story about being the ―president‘s doctor‖ to 
folks within and beyond the Filipino American national community. By 2010, like Ray 




story to the U.S. and global public. What transpired from her own recollections was a 
book titled The President‟s Doctor, which gained notoriety not just within Filipino 
American communities, but in U.S. national discourse—as evidenced by her appearance 
in Jon Stewart‘s The Daily Show during 2010, along with the national circulation and 
sales of her memoir.
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While the careers and relative upward mobility of these Filipino veterans continue 
to be recovered and celebrated within and beyond Filipino America, the current presence 
of Filipino stewards in the U.S. military—particularly those in the White House—
illustrates the continuing sentiment that U.S. military officials have for hiring Filipinos as 
stewards. This ongoing sentiment, as illustrated throughout this dissertation, can be traced 
within and beyond the scope of U.S. colonialism in the Philippines. Up to this day, U.S. 
military officials continue to enlist retired or active Filipino Americans as stewards in the 
White House, as there are several who remain there during the current presidency. On the 
one hand, the ongoing prevalence of Filipino steward enlistment in the U.S. military 
reminds us of the historical legacies of war, militarism and colonialism shaping U.S.-
Philippine relations. On the other hand, the historical and current presence of these 
stewards provide concrete points of departure to assess how much sacrifice, commitment 
and honor these veterans put forth in their works, settlements, and mobility—within, 
beyond, and perhaps despite the hierarchical structures of the U.S. military. As what is 
commonly stated, and can perhaps be applied to this ongoing history between Filipino 
enlistees and their U.S. officers: ―one hand cannot exist without the other.‖ To put it more 
broadly: the historical implementations and continual legacies of slavery, war, militarism, 
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and colonialism in facilitating the U.S. as empire cannot be more likely—if not 
possible—without the military enlistment and political marginalization of its racial and 
ethnic minorities, including Filipinos. 
Subsequently, to the tens of thousands of Filipino veterans who have enlisted in 
the U.S. Navy since 1944, their relative successes, settlements, and global mobility could 
not have been fulfilled without the U.S. Navy—and for that, many forever exemplify 
their gratitude to the military for granting those opportunities to them. To the U.S. 
officials who hired these Filipinos, they are formally thankful for the hard labor and 
unwavering loyalty that these veterans provided for the U.S. military. And lastly, to the 
descendants of these veterans—like myself—seeking to recover their respective histories 
while simultaneously critiquing and transforming the structural conditions shaping their 
enlistments, the phrase ―one hand cannot exist without the other‖ takes on a notably 
different meaning. This mutual recognition and militarized condition of co-dependency, 
indebtedness, and gratitude deserves further research and investigation, especially in light 
of the politics of enlistment that reinforce this unequal but co-dependent relationship. 
While I may have conducted such research and investigations within this dissertation 
project, it is through this project that I hope to take more active steps in order to erase the 
historical silences that have reinforced these militarized relationships on one hand, and 
the global presence of the U.S. as an empire on the other. This engagement with erasing 
these silences involves historical transformations from master-slave hierarchies to 
proactive forms of indebtedness—if not gratitude—towards decolonizing and anti-
colonial projects within particular ―native‖ and global contexts:  
 




ng mga kalayaan. 
 
 
To ancestral and living practitioners of Filipino culture, in addition to historical 
scholars of Filipino cultural studies, utang na loob literally means a sense of inner debt. 
As stated in the third chapter of this dissertation, loob means ―inner,‖ utang means 
―debt,‖ and na is the linker that apparently makes this sense of indebtedness ingrained 
within the heart and psyche of the Filipino in a way that establishes co-dependency 
between the Filipino subject on the one hand, and the (often) privileged recipient of that 
indebtedness on the other. While Vicente Rafael and others
393
 have widely contextualized 
this cultural practice within the Filipino local and Spanish friar relationship, other cultural 
critics have studied the ways in which Filipino mass movements have rearticulated this 
cultural practice within varying degrees of decolonization and anti-coloniality. Take 
Reynaldo Ileto, for instance. In his historically groundbreaking text Pasyon and 
Revolution (1979), Ileto delineates Philippine nationalism among religious-based 
independence movements that interpreted utang na loob in the horizontal and collective 
sense among the Filipino masses.  
This horizontal based interpretation of utang na loob, to Ileto, fostered intense 
bonds of collectivity stemmed from a common sense of freedom that stood apart from the 
Spanish colonial state in the latter 1800s, later against the U.S. occupation during the 
Philippine-American War of the early 1900s, and even during the Sakdalista movement 
during the 1930s. These anti-colonial articulations of freedom were otherwise known as 
kalayaan, which literally means freedom in the largely Tagalog-based Filipino language. 
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While different contingencies of Philippine nationalists had divergent definitions and 
understandings of this term throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries (e.g. 
class-based vs. classlessness, reformist vs. radical independence, local vs. internationalist, 
among other criteria), what these different contingencies and movements had in common 
was that they imagined this sense and practice of the word as steadfastly in opposition to 
the U.S. colonial state and its later variations of imperial hegemony in the Philippines. 
This was arguably—if not especially—true for the Hukbalahaps, whose wartime bi-
nationalist political allegiances to the U.S. nation-state shifted towards an oppositional 
sense of kalayaan and utang toward a classless Philippine national society during the late 
1940s and early 1950s. Similar sentiments existed within more explicitly communist 
national movements in the Philippines since the mid-1950s, including Partido ng 
Komunista (PKP) and the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), along with the 
CPP‘s military enforcements through the National People‘s Army (NPA). Meanwhile, in 
post-1980 United States history, contingencies of artists and scholars within Filipino 
America have insisted on transforming what core Filipino values of utang na loob and 
kalayaan might mean in the decolonial sense, especially as these artistic statements stand 
in scholarly alliance with critical ethnic studies, queer studies, and other interrelated 
scholarships of historical undisciplinarity.
394
 
Because of the privileged and competing politics of the ―U.S.-Philippine nation‖ 
that remain to this day, I still do not know how the contents of this dissertation project 
will be received—especially in events as public as conferences and gatherings, or in 
moments as private as dinners and phone calls with navy parents and relatives. To me, 
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nonetheless, one thing might remain as clear and present as ever: such necessary—if not 
inevitable— spaces of interaction will certainly manifest ―learning moments‖, as one of 
my colleagues relayed, in ―wiping away the billion layers of coconut husks,‖ as martyred 
poet Emmanuel Lacaba would note.
395
 As someone closely related to the global 
landscape of Filipino America, I notice that an overwhelming majority of scholars, 
artists, and community advocates within this bi-national entity have traced their personal 
and intellectual genealogies to Filipino relatives in the U.S. Navy and the comparative 
history of U.S. militarism—along with its associated components of hegemony—in the 
Philippines. How can we further decipher these infinite connections between enlistment 
in and beyond the U.S. Navy on the one hand, and the enforcement and ruptures of U.S. 
militarisms on the other, especially in relation to the Philippines, other places in Asia and 
the Pacific, and elsewhere around the globe? Perhaps more specifically, how can I—
personally, intellectually, poetically—offer my gratitude to the U.S. military and its 
veterans (including my tatay, nanay, tiyo, and lolo)
396
 for monetary support and practical 
guidance to such ―navy brats‖ as myself who achieved degrees of higher education vis-à-
vis the G.I. Bill? At the same time, how can I deliver critiques and transformative points 
that are historically comprehensive and engaging enough to further erase conditions, 
silences, and class privileges that stem from the history of militarism itself—along with 
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Appendix A: Mess Leo Roberts and Filipino Stewards during Truman Presidency 











































Appendix B: Mess Leo Roberts with Chief Rangasa and Chief Pascual at Camp David—
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